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ABSTRACT

Intended for teachers in training and inservice courses, the seven chapters of this book focus on children and schooling, on some of the ways child development and learning have been perceived, and on how such perceptions appear to have affected or informed the process of formal education. Fundamental to the organization of the book is the attempt to reflect a gradual development of some of the major issues in the socialization of children as seen from a social psychologist's perspective. Specifically, the seven chapters are: (1) Perspectives of Childhood: Historial Overview; (2) Schooling; (3) Psychology and Education; (4) Language, Communication, and the Curriculum; (5) Socialisation and Achievement; (6) Constraints on the Curriculum; Social-Psychological Issues; and (7) Self-Esteem and Social Learning. Three problems are focused on throughout the book: the disjuncture between theory and practice; the mismatch between the curriculum and the child; and the relevance of social learning and attribution theories, which, though important to social psychologists, seem neglected by educationists. A "rough, linguistic/cognitive socialisation chart" showing changes in conceptual growth and development, the CARALOC (Children's Attribution of Responsibility and Locus of Control) pupil questionnaire, and a copy of "Twenty Official Rules of the Schools in the USSR" are appended. (RH)

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Children and Schooling

Issues in Childhood Socialisation

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For my father, O.T.G.

Introduction

This book is about children and schooling, about some of the ways in which child development and learning have been perceived and how such perceptions appear to have affected or informed the process of formal education. Schooling is seen as part of socialisation, itself a process of social learning which centres upon the gradual internalisation of values, norms and culture. While socialisation in its entirety can be thought of as a cumulative-cum-interactive affair bearing upon our human development and decline throughout the life-cycle, schooling cannot. True, schooling is now long, rather than short, an experience often endured rather than enjoyed, but in most modern societies it stops for the vast majority of adolescents at the age of 16 years or so, and that majority then escapes with relief into the adult world.

What follows are seven moderately lengthy chapters each of which is, in effect, self-contained and can be read on its own. These essays are intended to provide basic commentary, some synthesis or overview and, one hopes, stimulation for discussion and further study. Notes and suggestions for further reading are provided at the end of each chapter. Fundamental to the organisation of the book is an attempt to provide a gradual development of some of the major issues in the socialisation of children as seen from a social-psychologist's perspective. Children are viewed very much as *social products;* and the interrelatedness of theories of child-rearing with those of the growth of cognition and an increasing awareness of self are important themes which are gradually extended throughout the book. Additionally, the complexity of the issues increases as the book develops.

Some may be surprised to note that classroom interaction and studies of teaching styles have (for the most part) been omitted. It was felt that these have been dealt with at length elsewhere and that constant exposure and the political capital made have created as much heat as light, coupled with a tendency for educationists to perceive classroom interaction itself as the social psychology of education. Moreover, such topics are essentially based upon empirical investigation of person–situation interactions and the appropriateness of their methodologies is still hotly disputed. Consequently, much of the recent debate on classroom interaction is couched in terms which have little real meaning for class teachers and which seem to have surprisingly little purchase on the methodology of organisation and teaching. The perspectives of these chapters are broader, more discursive and, in part, concerned with aspects of education which do not appear to have been adequately synthesised in terms relevant to teachers.

The lives of children are shaped by interaction with their caretakers, their friends, their teachers and within the institutions provided by adult

society. In this book the reader will find five broadly discursive summary chapters dealing with changing beliefs about child-rearing; with the roles of schools and teachers in the culture; with the twisting strands of psychology and their relative impact on schools; with perspectives of achievement; and with self-esteem and locus of control. Additionally, two more polemical chapters are included on the interplay of some of these issues in respect of formal education and the curriculum.

Certain problems in particular have preoccupied me in the shaping of this book. One is the age-old problem of a disjuncture between theory and practice; another is that of the frequent mismatch between the curriculum and the child; the third concerns social learning and attribution theories, which, though an important part of social psychology, seem yet so neglected by educationists. In particular there has been relatively little written in the UK on perceived personal control and academic achievement, despite much on the more obvious *social* correlates of school success. The final chapter tries to redress this imbalance by reminding one how fruitful might be the work stemming from Julian Rotter's social learning theory, how critical some of it may still be for a finer understanding of the processes of socialisation (and education) and how clearly much of it relates to the motivation of the child and his beliefs in himself.

The essence of social psychology is *social influence*, how the real, imagined, expected and implied behaviour and attitudes of others affect our behaviour. Definitions of childhood and education have such cultural salience that teachers and children bring a cargo of cultural *bric-à-brac* to the schoolroom; a cargo which sensitises, alters, inhibits and modifies the interaction taking place. Furthermore, many categories employed in education are notoriously vague and seem more intended as rallying cries for the faithful, than as accurate descriptions of what does or does not go on.

Discussions of education herein are predicated on the following beliefs:

(1) The school is a social and cultural institution which serves primarily as an environment in which to 'exchange ideas, resources and people through a network of communications systems. The curriculum as taught is an example of such a communication system.'*

(2) Education is primarily concerned with human development; and schooling is a vehicle for mobilising and directing that development at the behest of adults.

*Skilbeck, M., appendix A, in Walton, J. and Welton, J. (eds), *Rational Curriculum Planning* (London: Ward Lock, 1976), p. 154.

(3) Curriculum theory (of which there is certainly no dearth) is bound up with theories of learning, with perceptions of the validity of knowledge and with views of culture.
(4) In the classroom *transaction* frequently overrides *content* and personal perception of the 'messages' transmitted is a crucial feature of all learning.
(5) Physical, economic and external social constraints inevitably impose pragmatic shape upon educationalists' intentions.

Lastly, it should be pointed out that this book is not written with the sole intention of informing educational theorists, but rather that it should serve the purpose of placing some of the main issues, as I see them, before teachers in training and on in-service courses. It is presented as an attempt to put some of the problems which teachers have frequently discussed with me into a context recognisable by teachers and relating to theory and to their concerns. Inevitably the arena is larger than schooling itself. Schooling is embedded in the formal organisation of a society's attempts to perpetuate itself and to direct its regeneration. But, as is well known, socialisation processes have a tendency to 'solidify'; and despite the uniqueness of individual schools, teachers and pupils, one cannot but be aware that schools, as a vital part of that socialisation, move easily towards conservation and confirmation of existing social roles, norms and values, as well as towards a perhaps unwilling or even unwitting preservation of existing social-class structures.

NOTES, REFERENCES AND RECOMMENDED READINGS

At the end of each chapter are notes and references which provide additional information to the chapter content preceding. There then follow short lists of recommended reading, designed to expand particular topics or to act as catalysts for further reading and research. For the serious student, it is usually both helpful and advisable to keep one's own references to additional reading in some systematic and consistent manner.

THREE THINGS TO REMEMBER

It seems to me likely that humanistic education will continue to provide the educators' ideology, but that managerial education will continue to represent the reality. That is to say, the most likely development may be that educators will continue to place primary importance on distribution values in explaining their efforts to themselves. But when important issues are raised influencing the structural relations between schools and communities, the aggregate values of managerial education are likely to prevail in their actions. So the professional ideology is likely to be humanistic, but the operational ideology is likely to be one of social utility.

(T. F. Green, 'Schools and communities: a look forward', *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 39, no. 2, 1969, pp. 236–7)

There is no more dangerous man than the expert with one, or perhaps two, years of schoolteaching experience – except the legion who have none.

(F. Musgrove, *School and the Social Order*, New York, Wiley, 1979, pp. 1–2)

Most children accept school as a necessary evil, as do most teachers. The two minorities, those who value its experiences too highly (as I do) or hate it obsessively, are relatively small.

(A. R. Barton, *School for Love*, London, Hutchinson, 1976, p. 153)

Chapter 1

Perspectives of Childhood: Historical Overview

RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND ROMANTIC IDEOLOGY

Presumably, any recognition that education is an institutionalised form of socialisation, and one specifically designed by the state, must itself take cognisance of the 'state of childhood' and of the states towards which those children must be directed. Thus, when a society decides, presumably collectively, or through the medium of some government decision, that the time is ripe for a national system of education, its first thoughts are usually to distil some overall purpose and to set this out in the form of specified aims and objectives for the total system. What is thought most desirable for children is, however, rarely the sole factor guiding such a declaration. Expediency in terms of market forces, in terms of feasibility, in terms of political stability may also be a crucial factor for consideration. In particular it is usual for such a distillation to take very clear soundings not merely of the dominant values, but of the political and financial conditions current in that society.

The state's aims and objectives are made public and are then reified to some degree, becoming the principles of action. In England the Education Act 1944 is concerned with the education of all citizens 'to the full extent of their interests and capacities, from cradle to grave, to participate in a democratic and technological society and to serve their country loyally'[1]; and many English people, even today, see such a statement as epitomising the major objective of schooling. As well as ensuring that these principles are fulfilled in respect of subsequent national and local organisation of state schooling, they are usually implicit in the selection of knowledge regarded as important for presentation at different ages of schooling. Bernstein has referred to this – the curriculum – as 'what counts as valid knowledge'.[2] Clearly, the nature of that curriculum will itself be affected both by ideologies current in the culture, and by the persons responsible for their presentation and selection. Likewise, the ideologies are not only in part reflected in the organisation and content of teacher education and training, but will also affect the selection of personnel considered suitable for teaching and overall viewpoints about the teacher's role. What is often forgotten is that the learners themselves will have a critical effect upon the nature of the information presented within that curriculum and that, moreover, different ideologies will often lead to

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very different views concerning what is appropriate for children of different ages and levels of ability. In short, what the culture deems to be the characteristics of children will often critically affect the content and nature of the transactions made between one generation and another. Curricular transactions within the school are no exception to this rule, except in so far as one must take account of the processes of institutionalisation and, consequently, of a sometimes slower rate of change in the nature of the transactions than may be exhibited in society generally. Different perspectives of children, different assumptions about their 'character', lead to different views of knowledge and different views concerning appropriate modes of presentation.

There is no current dearth of written advice upon the upbringing and education of young children, nor was there in the past. During the seventeenth, eighteenth and possibly the first half of the nineteenth centuries, however, perspectives on child-rearing were clearly linked with what the Newsons call, 'expectation of death, rather than with the hope of a balanced and integrated life'.[3] Such perspectives were for the most part related to two main features of life; the one consisting of the reality of high infant mortality, the demographic actualities of an age which (almost of necessity) followed practices of 'hardening' the child; the other concerning a viewpoint of ultimate salvation which has some of its origins in Calvinism, Pietism and Methodism, and which are often loosely categorised as Protestant or Puritan belief. Certainly, children were often treated with what we would nowadays regard as unwarrantable harshness: 'Severity was doubtless hallowed by puritan and stoic traditions; but the quasi-medical practice of hardening had been advocated by the physician, John Locke, and found ready acceptance in an age which discovered the principle of innoculation.'[4] Clearly, where education and child-rearing are inseparably linked, as indeed they were prior to the mid-nineteenth century, one must take account of pronouncement and tract, religious letter and medical advice, since such statements formed the background to family opinion and to the socialisation of the child in Europe and North America.

As Sunley remarks, it followed from such advice as that of the Protestants that many parents tended to regard all children as inherently sinful, to believe that play might well be the device of the devil and that strict discipline resulting in perfect obedience and seriousness was the only possible route to salvation.[5] Such views clearly sprang from what might be regarded as an earlier generic protestantism, and while it would be simplistic in the extreme to regard them as representing the *only* coherent view of children during the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they were certainly extremely pervasive in Europe and America and, moreover, were common well into the nineteenth century. One should, of course, bear in mind the fact that most education prior to the nineteenth century was informal rather than

institutionalised, and that the comments of Crispus (see below) and others were often couched in the form of advice to mothers or to parents on the upbringing of their children generally. But formal education and its curriculum were certainly thought of in like vein, in terms of religious and moral training. Lesson content and transactions were imbued with the Protestant Ethic. The dominant cultural ideology largely dictated the reactions of the older generation to the younger. Child characteristics were thought to be those of sinfulness, with ever-watchful death looking for a chance to clutch the pranksome idler to his bosom before salvation had been assured. As has been said earlier, such a view was at any rate highly realistic as regards infant mortality. Many a 'pretty bud' *was* doomed to an early grave. Thus considerations of material suitable for learning, whether at home, at Sunday school, or school proper, were based upon adults' beliefs that the child should rapidly acquire a desired moral state, rather than upon any real understanding of the immediate needs of children.

The essential distillation from a Calvinist view of child-rearing is well illustrated in Crispus's (pseud.) *On the Education of Children*, written in 1814:

> The root and foundation of misconduct in children is human depravity; depravity in the parent and depravity in the child. This ought never to be overlooked, nor forgotten in any of our systems of education, but should be perpetually kept in view. Corrupt ourselves, we look with a more favorable eye upon the faults of our children, and feel a reluctance in conveying a censure to them which will recoil upon ourselves.[6]

There is much to suggest, therefore, that the Protestant Ethic, as it is often loosely termed, had a profound effect upon seventeenth-, eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century views of children. But to pretend that the Protestant Ethic can be seen as some unified whole and a cohesive force would be to flout the historical evidence. Undoubtedly, the combination of high infant mortality, the emphasis upon salvation and notions of predeterminism (springing from Calvinism), and what Weber referred to as the subtle combination of the 'four principal forms of ascetic Protestantism', namely, Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism and the Baptist movement,[7] all produced views of childhood which were remarkably consistent in Europe and North America for well over two centuries. The represented nature of childhood was one of wilfulness and idleness, one which was inherently sinful; thus education was usually heavily weighted in favour of the inculcation of humility, industry and obedience. The nineteenth-century Protestants were, however, much more open than many to the impact of Darwinism during the latter half of the century and also to pressures from emerging

intellectuals and scientists. This later led to different positions within protestantism, from which in part emerged such totally polarised viewpoints as fundamentalism and positivism.

The admittance of differing and evolving 'creeds' within protestantism was possibly one of the vital aspects which later distinguished some of the mainstream evolutionary modernists from their forebears and may have been gradually responsible for the shift in emphasis from faith to good works. In part, of course, this shift from faith to the striving, competing ambience of the nineteenth century, is one of the central issues discussed in Weber's famous essays of 1904–5. Very approximately the effect upon views of childhood (especially during the latter half of that century) was to increase the emphasis upon industriousness as a desirable learning experience during childhood, a change of emphasis from mere *passive obedience* to that of *effective outcome*, or as Little remarks of puritanism: when it appears, 'the moral pressure will be on for the voluntary, self-initiated economic behaviour'.[8] (This theme is discussed again in the context of socialisation and achievement in Chapter 5).

One must reiterate, however, that much of this ethos is more concerned with the socialisation and upbringing of children in the home than in formal educational institutions. For in England at least, schemes of national education were relatively late on the scene and even the Forster Act of 1870 was not fully implemented until the local government acts of 1880–6. Consequently, much of nineteenth-century English education was dependent upon religious foundation and philanthropy. (Up to 1833 there was no grant by Parliament for education and schools were financed by religious foundations and by charity support.) Such religious foundations, while often motivated by the highest ideals, were not necessarily capable of viewing childhood with any sort of objectivity. Moreover, many such foundations had their roots in the Calvinism of the past and still regarded children and childhood as the battlefield between the forces of good and evil.

Thus it can be said that, however described, the Protestant-cum-Puritan traditions of Christian nurture held considerable sway over the ideas of many concerned with the upbringing of children between the mid-seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries in England, North America and non-Catholic Europe. Such traditions, though, were not the only ones, and, while by the 1850s a transformation was slowly coming about in the writings of the Christian advisers in part hastened by the impact of Darwin, a transformation epitomised by the term 'romantic' was also slowly gaining ground. Many might argue that Rousseau, writing in the second half of the eighteenth century, was the father of such an ideology, but in part its origins lie back in such diverse roots as Aristotle's 'learning by doing' and in the deist theories of natural goodness. Rousseau, however, gave it life and immediacy. He

was an impassioned and articulate critic of his society and in his writing on education saw possibilities for reform through the education of children. In *Emile* he proposed that the child should be nurtured 'naturally', growing up as Nature intended, free from the corrupting influence of urban France and residing in a southern French village where his learning, under the watchful eye of a tutor, would be true learning unadulterated by the sophistications of society. The tutor's task was not so much to teach as to enable Nature to work her miracle for him. Society, full of unnatural and harmful influences, must be kept from the child. It is heady stuff, powerful and persuasive. Moreover, it has had a continuing influence – in part good, in part bad – upon perceptions of child-rearing and the relationship between the development of the child and the cultural context. It contributed to the closer observation and understanding of children and to a greater recognition of their real state and development. It laid useful emphasis upon the corrupting evils of a society moving towards increasing urbanisation and industrialisation. But it was dangerous in so far as it led to an oversimplification of the relationship between child development and culture. It was good in that it helped lay the foundation for the great interest in childhood shown later by such people as Darwin, Preyer, Froebel, Watson, Hall, Thorndike and Freud; an interest which can be thought of as being centrally concerned with the 'original' nature of man through observation and understanding of the child. It gave strength and purpose to the eloquence of some of the romantic poets (notably Wordsworth), as well as heart to those impoverished Chartists who saw education as part of the way to establish greater dignity for all men and women.[9] But like the so-called Protestant Ethic, it should not be represented as some single, consistent and dominant ideology; it, too, is a ragged and fractionated conglomerate of ideas from a variety of sources, which happened to push very roughly in the same direction. And, for much of the first half of the nineteenth century, the two dominant ideologies of child-rearing – those of the 'free and the un-free child' – ran side by side.[10] The Protestant/Puritan model, while usually in the ascendant, was the one concerned with restraint, discipline and salvation; the Rousseau/Romantic model was one concentrating upon the essential innocence of children. Needless to say 'Rousseauphiles' were disapproved of and actively discouraged by the writings of the evangelical reformists, such as Hannah More or Wesley.[11] English reformers of the 1800s took up the ideas of Rousseau, modified, developed, or adapted them. From then on the dissolution of the essentially Calvinist ideology quickened, and though that ideology continued as a powerful force, a force to be reckoned with, throughout almost the entire nineteenth century, its overthrow can be considered assured by 1900 (assured but not absolute).[12]

Boas once referred to the flowering of views of childhood innocence

as 'the cult of childhood'.[13] This 'cult' had origins stretching at least as far back as those of Calvinism. For instance, Earle (1628) wrote that 'A childe . . . knowes no evil, nor hath made means by sin to be acquainted with misery'.[14] But the innocence of childhood is a view particularly associated with the writing of Wordsworth and Blake. Wordsworth's famous line

> The Child is father of the Man

is often quoted without the two subsequent ones:

> And I could wish my days to be
> Bound each to each by natural piety.[15]

It is quoted as exemplifying a view, held in part by Rousseau and the Romantics, finding fruition perhaps in Freud (and perspectives of a subsequent loss of innocence?) and continued right through to the optimistic, though culture-bound, perspectives of modern humanistic psychology. There is little doubt that in *The Prelude* or 'Ode, Intimations of Immortality' Wordsworth does display a conviction that the child is born in 'Freedom and innocence', that 'Nature' is, if not the most secure, perhaps the best tutor, and that

> Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
> Shades of the prison-house begin to close
> Upon the growing Boy.[16]

As such his influence has been well documented; as indeed has Blake's.[17] Blake's Angel no doubt incurred much Calvinist criticism in saying 'Little creature, formed of Joy and Mirth,/Go love without the help of anything on earth',[18] lest such an exhortation be taken as advice to children, too. But Blake's views of childhood had the advantage of being both securely and obviously related to Christianity, at the same time as representing to his readers the non-corrupt nature of the child wholesomely and attractively.

Other poets and essayists such as Lamb and Hazlitt may be clearly associated with views of childhood running directly counter to those of Calvinist doctrines. Lamb in particular[19] lets his warmth and concern for children show in such items as 'Dream Children' *(Essays of Elia)* as well as in his contributions to Coleridge's *Poems on Various Subjects.* In the same year that Lamb published his *Tales from Shakespeare* (1807) John Harris published his *The Butterfly's Ball.* It was an unusual poem in that it was clearly written with children in mind, yet, as Darton points out, describes revels which 'had not a trace of moral value, nor the least touch of archness, patronage, grown-up-ness, be-goodness' in them.[20] It

was as a breath of fresh air in children's writing – and beneath it lay the changing perspectives of that century. Moreover, in some respects, and taken in conjunction with the gathering strength of the 'cult of childhood', it heralded those perspectives of childhood which still are partly with us today.

Among the architects of 'childhood' as we know it, or describe it today, must surely be accounted one, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827). Not that his ideas are easily represented as a unified whole:

> If one struggles to sort out the various strands that comprised Pestalozzianism, there appears a bewildering tangle of diverse philosophical threads, such as enlightened rationalism, naturalistic romanticism, German idealism, pietistical Christianity, social philanthropism, political reformism and industrial liberalism. It was a mixture rather than a blending.[1]

But what is clear is that Pestalozzi cared for all humanity, and especially for children. He was a legend in his own lifetime. He negotiated with Napoleon, was the friend and adviser of kings. He opposed education based on force, submission and rote, but he believed in firm discipline, set tasks and no distractions. He opposed corporal punishment in schools, but saw it as a reasonable part of child-rearing at home. Above all he emphasised the *humanity* of the child. He believed that the child lived in his own world and that it repaid adults to study and understand that world, if they were to become effective teachers. He stressed the importance of the neo-natal environment. He admits his debt to Rousseau, yet was concerned with detail and structure in learning. For Pestalozzi, language development was the key to learning and he developed exercises and games with phoneme and morpheme stems, so that the child could, by learning at his mother's knee, be capable of distinguishing various sounds so as to help the teaching of later reading and writing. At the Yverdon Institute in Switzerland Pestalozzi developed and encouraged early exploration in mathematics and geometrical relationships such that it formed a central core to the curriculum even for 5-year-olds.

Alas, in this day much of Pestalozzi's influence, his sound plans for lessons, his central concern with the child's view of himself, is forgotten. In part this was because his English disciples, notably Charles and Elizabeth Mayo, seem to have been pedants as well as pedagogues. Though they founded the Home and Colonial School Society in 1836 to establish and perpetuate their version of Pestalozzianism, it is clear that only aspects of structure and lesson planning (particularly that of the object-lesson) were really adhered to. The liberalising, humanising concerns of Pestalozzi were not well understood, nor much followed in England. In the USA, the story is rather different. Though Pestalozzi

would, in all conscience, have had great difficulty in recognising some of his heirs, his ideas helped to provide that rich seedbed for later nineteenth- and early twentieth-century activity-oriented and 'child-centred' educationists.

All this is both to compress and underscore that, as Aries reminds us,[22] children as we know them today are no more than the cultural and historical yield of the previous centuries. The child is the monument to his culture, as well as its product. Literature likewise reflects and parallels this in itself. Sully summed up the position quite clearly eighty years ago, when he wrote that the 'grace of childhood' owed much to the discoveries of the poets:

> Wordsworth has stopped over his cradle intent on catching, ere they passed, the 'visionary gleams' of 'the glories he hath known'. Blake, R. L. Stevenson and others have tried to put into language his day-dreamings, his quaint fancyings. Dickens and Victor Hugo have shown us something of his delicate quivering heart strings. Swinburne has summed up the divine charm of 'children's ways and wiles'. The page of modern literature is, indeed, a monument of our child-love and our child-admiration.[23]

Thus, the Rousseau-cum-Romantic view developed during the nineteenth century, and if flowered not only in Europe, but in England and North America equally. The natural development of the child would, if unsullied, it was thought, be tending towards the good and the beautiful. The child, now innocent and to be protected from the ugly and perverse, would, if nurtured openly and 'naturally', achieve perfection. With him, would come a changing society and increasing social worthwhileness.

It was not only poets and essayists who were captivated by such views, but educationists, too: in particular, Friedrich Froebel (1782–1852).[24] Froebel was a philosopher and one who gave the name 'kindergarten' to the world. In 1826 he wrote:

> Therefore the child should, from the very time of his birth, be viewed in accordance with his nature, treated correctly, and given the free, all-sided use of his powers. By no means should the use of certain powers and members be enhanced at the expense of others, and these hindered in their development; the child should neither be partly chained, fettered, nor swathed; nor, later on, spoiled by too much assistance[25]

and

> Thus, we find the human being even at the earlier stages of boyhood fitted for the highest and most important concern of mankind, for the

> fulfilment of his destiny and mission, which is the representation of the divine nature within him.[26]

Friedrich Froebel's early educational ideas were worked out during the period he spent at his Educational Institute at Keilhau. This institute was established in the small village partly at the behest of his widowed sister-in-law, who had three boys. To these three boys were added three more – and, with this little band of six, and two other adults (Middendorf and Langethal), the institute quickly grew to some sixty pupils. It was hard pressed and later persecuted by the Prussian government on both political and religious grounds. But despite Froebel's leaving the institute in 1831, he continued to write and point the direction towards an education curiously blending optimism in man with a regard for Christianity, an education truly 'process'- rather than 'content'-oriented. One hundred and fifty years later Froebel's principles have a familiar and very modern sound to them, and one imagines that Froebel and Piaget would have had much to say to one another:

> Self-activity of the mind is the first law of instruction; . . . slowly, continuously, and in logical succession it proceeds . . . from the simple to the complex, from the concrete to the abstract, so well adapted to the child and his needs that he learns as eagerly as he plays.[27]

Fletcher and Welton say Froebel clearly came under the influence of the romantic school of thought. 'Nature was almost deified . . .[and] the glamour of the conception, so readily warmed by poetic emotion, spread rapidly throughout Europe. It marked another side of the rebellion of the human spirit . . . [and] may be traced in the romantic literature of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.' [28] Froebel wrote of education taking account of the view that man, being a divine being, was in unity with all things of nature, that instruction was not to be directive and interfering, but passive, nurturant and protective, that discipline must direct instinct and channel it rather than merely oppose it. But (unlike Rousseau) he believed that there were, however, the unbridled impulses which the child must learn to check and utilise, that play should be 'naturally progressive' and that his 'gifts' and 'occupations' were an integral aid to the education he envisaged.[29]

Froebel, then, in his launching of the kindergarten movement, created perspectives and theories of early childhood education which were at once practical and mystical. Such views quickly spread, despite the initial persecution, throughout Europe, North America, England and New Zealand. Froebel clearly believed that the seeds of perfection which lay in each child could be drawn forth and nurtured through the effective use of symbols and gifts. Much of his analogy and metaphor was drawn

from the language of gardening. The educator, like the expert gardener, was to provide the appropriate soil and climate to enable the seed to unfold and grow towards the light of perfection and unity with God and Nature. In actual fact, the mystical overtones were soon forgotten – but the practices, hallowed by time and shown to be effective, are still in part adhered to and followed today.

SCIENTIFIC CHILD STUDY AND EDUCATION

While Froebel may be seen as a clear and legitimate heir to the European 'romantic' tradition, he also represents an important link in the nineteenth-century 'chain' which leads to Spencer, Freud and Thorndike. Not that Froebel can be represented as unsystematic. There is much in his observations which is clearly derived from empiricism and detailed minutiae of working with and watching children. But for the most part it is a 'creed', rather than a descriptive analysis; it implies 'ought' rather than 'does'. Cleverley and Phillips put this point quite clearly when, in referring to Spencer, they say:

> What *is* the case is an empirical matter, but what *ought* to be the case is an ethical question. The point that Spencer missed was made in an interesting way by one of the founders of modern educational psychology, E. L. Thorndike, around the time of Spencer's death (1902): 'The need of education arises from the fact that *what is* is not what *ought to be*. Because we wish ourselves and others to become different from what we and they now are, we try to educate ourselves and them.'[30]

Froebel was well aware of this, but for the most part addressed himself to the *ought* of education. Later writers began to move back a stage and to consider what the child actually *is*. In some respects this helps redress one of the imbalances in Froebelian theory. For, like many before him, Froebel is so attentive to what the child will become, that one can, at times, forget what the child is. There is, too, an emphasis which still (and in the time-honoured tradition of previous centuries) sees the child as yet 'without', that is, as an incomplete adult.

Of quite different character and somehow not fitting easily into the mainstream of child study is J. F. Herbart, the earnest, hard-working, early nineteenth-century German philosopher. Dunkel says that oblivion engulfed Herbart with unusual speed.[31] Certainly, while my teachers probably knew something of him and his methods, current teachers and students in training know nothing. Yet Johann Herbart would not have been surprised. His fame both came and went after his death. Born in 1776, he studied philosophy at Jena, then taught at the universities of Göttingen and Königsberg. Apparently a good,

methodical and conscientious lecturer, he wrote several major works on philosophy and pedagogy. He died, aged 65, in 1841, a not terribly well-liked local figure and professor. It was not until some twenty years later, in 1865, that a certain professor Tuiskon Ziller of Leipzig published a book called *Foundation of the Doctrine of Educative Instruction* which purported to put forward some of Herbart's main ideas. Dunkel suggests that much of Herbart was omitted and replaced by Ziller's ideas. Be that as it may, the flowering of 'Herbartianism' had begun. Societies for the study of Herbartian pedagogy were founded both in Europe and the USA. Indeed, American Herbartianism 'took off' with characteristic American verve and gusto, and John Dewey was one of the original council members of the expanded and refounded National Herbart Society in 1895. Yet Herbart's theories were only popular for about forty years, then once more faded into obscurity. His name remains in the history of education, rather than the mainstream of German philosophy, where he sought to 'put psychology and pedagogy on adequate bases'.[32] His ideas were used and reassembled, altered, modified and abstracted, but apparently little studied in their entirety. Educational historians and elderly teachers remember only his 'four steps', a relatively minor if important element in his work. (These were expanded into five by Herbart's 'followers' a quarter of a century or more after his death.) His four steps were *clarity, association, system* and *method,* and Ziller altered both Herbart's emphasis and meaning slightly by changing the first step into two (analysis and synthesis), in order to lay greater stress on the different phases of instruction. As Dunkel points out, the four steps are in any case subject to considerable change of name and emphasis even in Herbart's own writing.[33] But the desirable emphasis to be achieved is clear, both in the pedagogical and psychological writings. Sequence and taxonomic analyses of topic are both essential. It would not be too extreme to say that Herbart was groping towards an understanding of the psychology of learning, as well as trying to formulate ideas concerning the desirability and logic of task analyses, knowledge hierarchies and what we might now call 'vertical transfer'.

But whatever else Herbart did not do, he did advance the science of psychology and the considerable interest in pedagogy shown in the second half of the nineteenth century. The scientific study of children and of childhood likewise seems to have gained considerable impetus, if not actual entry into the world, during the second half of that century. Undoubtedly, it was Charles Darwin (1809–82) who did much to stimulate the study of childhood. Though his own study of his infant son was not published until near the time of his own death, he had used evidence derived from the systematic observation of children in several of his scientific explanations and certainly employed it in his reflections on man's origins and on man's links with other members of the animal kingdom.

Many writers have suggested that the publication of that *Biographical Sketch of an Infant* in 1877 (begun in 1840) also marked the beginnings of child psychology as we know it today:

> Like a true naturalist, Darwin's records were 'atheoretical' in nature; they simply described the developmental phases his child passed through. Chronologically ordered, the observations dated each developmental change by year, month and day. Darwin's method set the stage for subsequent research and theory in the field, which also stressed the relationship between developmental changes and chronological age (for instance Piaget). It remained for future theorists, most notably Freud and his students, to overlap the 'atheoretical' naturalism of Darwin with a substantive theory of personality growth and development.[34]

For Darwin, the baby could be regarded as the link between animal and man. In particular, the theory was expounded that *in utero* the embryo and foetus passed through a successive series of stages exemplifying the different stages of development of animal life. The development of the individual, that process termed ontogenesis, was thought to be a recapitulation of the origin and evolution of the species (phylogenesis). Thus, a theory of recapitulation grew up in which the early swimming and crawling movements of the child were equated with the swimming movements of fish. The Moro or 'grasp' reflex (sometimes termed the Darwinian reflex) was seen as a survival from the days when the primate infant clung to its mother's hair as she moved about among the trees. Like Darwin, and during the late 1870s near the end of Darwin's life, Wilhelm Thierry Preyer was using the so-called baby-biography as an attempt at a detailed and careful documentation of his son's mental development and apparent associated processes during the first four years of life. Preyer's book, *The Mind of the Child* (1882), aroused considerable interest in Europe in the new scientific study of children. Preyer's work is often coupled with that of G. Stanley Hall (1846–1924), partly because Hall first introduced Preyer's study to the east coast of the USA, partly because both Preyer's biographical study and Hall's early questionnaires are thought of as the essential 'scientific' or systematic ingredients usually employed in child study from then on. In both the early biographies, and the early questionnaires, too, there are obvious and serious weaknesses: biased sampling – generalisations from atypical samples, subjective and loaded methods of recording. Nevertheless, they clearly helped lay the foundations for child psychology as we know it today.

Hall appeared to have been much influenced by Darwin's views concerning the origin of species and he believed that the growth of the mind also could be seen as a series of definite stages. The stages were said

to correspond with the evolutionary stages of mankind. Hall's ideas received an enthusiastic reception in the USA, where they were published first in Massachusetts, and many societies were formed in the Boston area dedicated to the observation and documentation of child behaviour. By means of questionnaires, schedules and observer diaries, Hall was able to gather together a vast amount of empirical work. From this, he was able to make analyses of typical behaviour patterns, problems, and so on. Information concerning appetites, fears, dreams, punishment, memory and on the development of normative physical and cognitive abilities was discussed in a relatively sophisticated way. Many people regard the questionnaires used as forerunners of modern personality inventories, despite the problems of response bias, loading and naïvety in the questions asked. Without doubt, Hall's work, more than that of any other psychologist except perhaps Freud, reached the ears of a large number of ordinary American and English citizens and heralded much of the changing attitude of the early twentieth-century educationist.

SUMMARY

From this short basic overview, it can be seen that not one but many conceptual frameworks have been used for the study of children or for statements about how they might (more usually 'should') be reared. Empirical observation of children came into ever more frequent use during the second half of the nineteenth century. It was not new then, but it clearly gained particular impetus from the work of Darwin, and the biological and evolutionary basis to child-development studies is a secure and fundamental one. During the latter part of the previous century Rousseau had discussed the *natural* development of the child and had regarded the influence of society as very often corrupting and unnatural. As I have tried to show briefly, this strand or seam has been an important one in perspectives of child development and education. Its 'romantic' overtones have allied with or become wedded to similar ones which have been responsible for very important ideological stances in child-centred education; it has in some manner both aided and checked those social determinists who perhaps paid too much attention to socioeconomic changes and pressures. Denzin reminds us that there can be

> no coherent sociological theory of self, society, social relationships and social structure until the sociologist has adequately grasped and understood the symbolic, interactional, and linguistic foundations of the socialisation process. The worlds of the child, whether hidden or private, public or open, serious or playful, constitute a set of obdurate realities to which all sociological theories must eventually return.[35]

From the biological 'seam' has been worked much that is relevant to behaviourist approaches to child study. Cognitive theorists, too, such as Piaget, have clearly depended upon ideas stemming from evolutionary and biological approaches. But the picture is confused. One should note that an offshoot of Darwinism became a form of social determinism, and recall that Karl Marx dedicated his premier work to the memory of Darwin. All in all the different ideas tend to be frequently cross-related. But surprisingly, however, this does not lead to a uniformity of basic beliefs, nor to a readily recognisable single conceptual framework. Perhaps, as Carl Rogers suggests, each strand has taken its implicit philosophy along with it; and such philosophies still exert suprisingly strong and pervasive pressures upon research related to child studies.

Following the inspiration of Darwin and the pioneer work of Hall and Preyer came a host of writers all weaving different aspects of child study and behaviour into their writings. Freud, Thorndike, and Kohler spring instantly to mind as having particular and far-reaching effects upon the study of children. Chief among these is certainly Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), whose influence on education we consider in greater detail in Chapter 3. It is clear that many of the writers concerned with the freedom of the child have been critically influenced by the Freudian conception of a relationship between repression in childhood and subsequent neuroses. A. S. Neill, and to some extent Homer Lane, extended this idea to the conception of education as therapy. Such concepts have formed a long and important tradition since then. One might well see the writing of Morris, in England, and Holt, in the USA, fitting clearly into this tradition.[36] However, it should again be emphasised in such a brief summary as this that there is not one tradition but many which have cross-fertilised in the gradually changing perspective of childhood as they have grown and flowered, and altered, during the present century. As we have seen, the growing enthusiasm for ideas about the liberation of the child, especially of the younger child, do in Europe owe a great deal to the influence of Froebel and later (possibly) to the ideas of Montessori.[37] During the first twenty years of this century such ideas began to supplement the mainstream psychological contributions of Binet, McDougall[38] and Susan Isaacs. The latter figure, as most college-trained primary teachers will remember, was particularly influential in the education of young children in England. Her effect upon the Froebelian movement has extended to this day, and her principal works on the intellectual and social development of young children are still likely to be consulted some forty years after their writing. In fact, Susan Isaacs spent her lifetime interpreting psychodynamic theory to parents and teachers and writing of her school and clinical experiences. But Susan Isaacs was, among other things, interpreting Freudian theory, and it is Freudian theory, even a half-understood misconception (at times), which can be

seen as the leit-motif of educational change during the first half of the twentieth century. Selleck,[39] writing of the advances in educational ideas in England, maintains that the English progressives (Isaacs was certainly such a one – and one, moreover, much revered by college principals) stood on the shoulders of Freud to achieve the advances in the education of young children and to shout their message to the world.

During this century the study of children has become not merely respectable, but very fashionable. Slowly the child psychology of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has allied itself with other subject areas, with psychoanalysis, child guidance, paediatrics and psychometrics. Social psychologists, ethologists and anthropologists have all added their contributions to those of the growing band of educational psychologists. Fashion and conjecture have played their part, as no doubt in any other subject; but to this has been added the problems which are unique to much of the human or behavioural sciences, namely, the difficulty and danger of generalising those elements of human behaviour which are not amenable to generalisation. For every 'empirical' finding, there have been found opposing ones. Whether it be maternal deprivation[40] or (more recently) paternal deprivation seems so often a matter of fashion rather than of finding. Many of the arguments have been subsidiary to a potent element in the discussions of human behaviour, that of the relative importance assigned to nature or to nurture; and arguments about their importance have appeared in a variety of guises throughout the last 100 years, certainly since the work of Francis Galton, that eminent nineteenth-century scientist. The central controversy concerning the impact of heredity on the environment, though now relatively sterile, still rumbles on, sustained at times by a shot from one side or another. Despite such 'hardy perennials', however, the general stream of ideas has been towards accumulating knowledge from the different supportive disciplines in order to enhance and improve the diagnosis of educationists concerning the presumed entering characteristics of their learners at whatever age. Possibly no one has done more in that process than Jean Piaget with his steady erosion of problems in epistemology and child development through a process of systematic observation, documentation and analysis of children's thinking. Serious questions are often raised by his formulations, especially in respect of his utilisation of 'stages' of conceptual development, but hardly a teacher now completes his or her course of training without some reference to Piaget's monumental studies from 1936 to the present day. Equally, few teachers in training can escape without reading something of another major thinker whose work has great implication for them, the writings of Erik Erikson.[41] Erikson's neo-Freudian psychodynamic analyses have taken him far beyond the bounds of child growth and development. Some of his most important work has been in the nature of speculative,

historical and retrospective psychoanalysis. But his work on childhood and adolescence definitely falls into the traditions stated (arguably) by Freud, that of 'being on the child's side', of understanding the tensions caused by the constraints of collective human living in terms of child development. Likewise it would be hard to conceive of a present-day course of teacher education which did not pay at least lip-service to the behaviourist writing of Skinner[42] or, more recently, the broadly cognitive theories of Jerome Bruner. (Such contributions are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.) At very least, the names mentioned are likely to be familiar (if only as names) to educationists who claim to pay attention to the motivation of children and to their apparent individual differences. It would possibly be no overstatement of the case, however, to assert that for many teachers such names, like those of Pestalozzi or Froebel, are no more than a hazy memory; or at best, a series of mnemonics used to recall a hastily assembled body of ideas concerning differing perspectives in psychology, which have, as far as most are concerned, little relationship to what the teacher is thinking of doing with class four that afternoon.

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15 William Wordsworth (1770–1850), 'The Rainbow'.
16 Wordsworth, 'Ode, Intimations of Immortality' (v).
17 See especially Coveney, P., *Poor Monkey* (London: Clay, 1957).
18 William Blake (1757–1827), 'The Lamb' (*Songs of Innocence*).
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20 Darton, H., *Children's Books in England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 205.
21 Gutek, G. L., *Pestalozzi and Education* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 4. Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi was born in Zurich in 1746. A very keen student, he became ill from overwork. He was not popular, but eventually received support to try out some of his plans concerning the education of children. After initial failure and repeated illness, he established his famous school of Yverdon. One of his most famous maxims, and the corner-stone of his educational practice, was 'Real knowledge must take precedence of word-teaching and more talk' (*The Evening Hour of a Hermit*, 1780). He died in 1827.
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24 Froebel had visisted Pestalozzi's institution at Yverdon in 1805 and then taught there during 1808–10.
25 Froebel, F., *The Education of Man* (translated from the German and annotated by W. N. Hailmann) (London: Appleton, 1894), p. 21. Friedrich Froebel was born in Thuringia in 1782, a pastor's son. In 1805 he met a Frankfurt headmaster (and disciple of Pestalozzi), and he taught at Frankfurt for two years. In 1816 he opened his own school, teaching, writing and travelling from then until 1852. His most famous work *The Education of Man* (1826) sets out the importance of education in the home, the importance of play, of carefully graded activities in learning, of how to use his 'gifts' and occupations to extend child learning. In the 1870s two national societies were established in England: the Froebel Society and the National Froebel Union. This latter became the examining body for teachers trained in Froebelian method. Many wealthy Victorians became intensely interested and Froebelian societies were well supported in Europe, the USA, Canada and New Zealand. The Froebelian 'ethic' is all but extinct nowadays in England. See also Fletcher, S. S. F., and Welton, J., *Froebel's Chief Writings on Education* (London: Arnold, 1912).
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27 ibid., p. xv.
28 Fletcher and Welton, op. cit., p. 5.
29 See especially Fletcher and Welton, op. cit., pp. 171–223.
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31 Dunkel, H. B., *Herbart and Herbartianism: An Educational Ghost Story* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 3.
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34 Denzin, N. K., *Childhood Socialization* (London: Jossey-Bass, 1977), p. 7.
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36 See especially Morris, B. S., *Objectives and Perspectives in Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972); and Holt, J., *Freedom and Beyond* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972).
37 Maria Montessori (1870–1952). She began her career (after being the first Italian woman to obtain a degree in medicine) working with retarded children, basing her methods on those devised by the French physician Edouard Seguin. She had considerable success and gradually extended her philosophy and practice to include

other children, opening a number of schools in the Rome slums. Her 'progressive' methods have become popular, stressing as they do the 'natural' development of the child. Montessori schools which follow her methods now exist in Europe and the USA, for the most part as private fee-paying institutions.

38 Alfred Binet (1857–1911); working with Theodore Simon in 1905 they produced a test for mentally retarded Parisian schoolchildren. This thirty-item test is regarded as the forerunner of modern intelligence testing and, when modified in 1908, quickly became the archetype for American and English developments. William McDougall was a pioneer Scottish psychologist whose instinct theory and theories of self-regard (1910–23) were popular in England.

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Chapter 2

Schooling

CULTURE AND LEARNING

> Not as we are but as we must appear,
> Contractual ghosts of pity; not as we
> Desire life but as they would have us live,
> Set apart in timeless colloquy:
> So it is required: so we bear witness,
> Despite ourselves, to what is beyond us,
> Each distant sphere of harmony forever
> Poised, unanswerable . . . (Geoffrey Hill)

If one asks the question, 'What materials, symbols, thoughts are significant for people of different cultures?', a question almost as old as man himself, one recognises how inextricably linked are culture and learning. One must reply that clearly people from different cultures may well focus on different aspects of the same phenomenon, and that it must be remembered that *all* man's conceptual development is context-dependent. All of us see through eyes, hear through ears and employ our senses in ways that have become selective. The child, a biological being, becomes a person through interaction with others, with other thoughts, with explanations, systems of values and different behaviours. The fact that we are both made by and yet make our culture is a feature of constant discussion in all branches of social science and in the humanities as well. 'Even a partially blind person realises sooner or later that the responses of individuals (the traditional dependent variable category of general psychology) are also an ingredient in the cultural environment (or independent variable) that contributes to the determination of those very same responses.'[1]

From the first stirrings in the primeval swamp to the technology of today, adaptation to environment has been of fundamental importance. We can note that anthropologists and psychologists have emphasised that cognition cannot be isolated from habitat or from the cultural context, and that some aspects of cognition are so immediately context-dependent as to be described as 'situationally specific'. We are, through our culture, alerted to some forms of knowledge and ignorant of others. The knowledge which we transmit to our children is shaped and structured according to our social perception. Yet stasis and transformation seem to be twins in the transaction occurring between the generations, and so often schooling can be seen as a process delicately balancing knowledge between those two.

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Some curriculum theorists have talked about this balance in terms of schooling focusing on transmission (viewed in terms of cultural stasis), or on transformation (renewal and change). Too much of the former emphasis in schooling would seem to lead to a relatively static culture, while too much of the latter implies the teacher taking on an active role as agent for change, and possibly, almost continuous revolution resulting from one generation to another. This would be to polarise the viewpoints and overstate the case. There are many checks and balances; not least that schooling itself occurs in a cultural context which shapes its own organisation and content, and that the locus of power lies with the older 'caretaker' generation, rather than the younger.

Many philosophers and sociologists have pointed out that objective knowledge and subjective experience may be seen as interdependent ways of viewing the same phenomenon. The accumulation of consensus perceptions is the necessary condition by which subjective experience becomes objective knowledge. Individuals have to be able to relate their experience through agreed and negotiated symbols that others will understand. Linguists are particularly aware of this, because implicit in the learning of any language are the rules concerning how words and thoughts are put together. Young puts this succinctly when he says:

> the methods of speech and thought that we use are built up only in part logically or systematically. All such methods, from those of the pagan to the physicist, are determined by the customs and the language of the society in which he lives. The child inherits the capacity to learn to utter sounds in sequences that are agreeable to other people. Ultimately he learns to make propositions that are considered true.[2]

For many years social anthropologists have observed various cultures and attempted to give account and explanation of the differences in cognitive development, and have shown how intellectual differences in modes of expression and inquiry may occur.[3] These differences arise principally from the differences in adaptation to differing environments. Distinctions and categories necessary in one language and culture may be unnecessary or of less importance in another. The spread of education, and in particular Western styles of schooling, provided a rich seedbed for further inquiry into the relationship between cognition and culture. Schools developed in one society were sometimes transplanted into another and, together with certain attitudes concerning styles and content, were expected to function in broadly similar ways to the original. This was particularly true in the periods of expanding European colonialism, but is also true of many other forms of socialisation grafted on to the ways of so-called 'primitive' cultures. Many psychologists have been at pains to point out the resultant

differences and disjunctures in learning, notably Bruner, Greenfield and Schmidt.[4]

The topic also has relevance closer to home. Children are not only cultural products of the generic culture and habitat (usually thought of in terms of country of origin and nationality), they are also social and 'subcultural' products; and schooling plays a large part in the production in those societies where the luxury of *states* of childhood and adolescence is a permitted part of that society. This is not to ignore the fact that children have a dynamic relationship with all the forces of socialisation acting upon them, changing them as well as being made by them. But, in general, cultures that lack economic power or which have not espoused formal schooling tend to perceive childhood as short and as an apprenticeship to the business of wresting life and support from the earth. In technological societies children are 'locked up' as the cultural, social, political and scientific investment for the future. Schooling is enforced, is necessary for survival; and schooling focuses the culture upon the children and shapes their cognitive development in many ways, including the confirmation of value systems.

Inevitably, schooling is subject to and part of changes in values, in political ideology (more in some countries than others) and in the disciplines of knowledge. Fashion also plays a part, along with necessity. While most teachers are aware, indeed many teachers are acutely aware, of the fashions which affect pedagogy and transmission of knowledge in schools, few may reflect on the way that tradition and belief shape and institutionalise knowledge in some surprisingly odd ways. Norms, values and social conventions are so much the substance of control in schooling that, after watching a number of primary school assemblies, one could be forgiven for believing, as one headmistress oft repeated to the children, 'We only have nice children here'. As Wilde said in his discussion on art and aesthetics, perhaps form and repetition are the essentials in shaping our understanding. Things may be believed not because they are rational, but because they are constantly repeated.[5] Much of this clinging to form is perfectly reasonable; parents and teachers and peer groups know from experience its salience in the shaping of the mind. And in subtler ways the shapes and forms of our habitat are likewise internalised. Like a hedgehog without fleas, the mountain-dweller feels uneasy in the plains, and the city-dweller, whose perceptual life has been dominated by vertical forms, is possibly unable to appreciate the unerring sense of direction of the desert Arab. The implications of all this can be stated simply, but they are far-reaching. People will perceive the things they see about them in relation to their usefulness, their traditional and ritual meanings. They will be good at things which are important to them or which they do often. The ability to perceive, and to some extent to think and learn, will be correspondingly shaped such that different cultures and even differences

in group experiences will imply different patterns of thinking and learning. Evidence in this respect is quite overwhelming.

Expressed in the extreme form the interdependence of culture and cognition is such that each human's experience can be thought of as unique; as G.H. Mead said, 'No man's me's are another man's me's'. Yet at the individual and institutional level people persist in thinking that the shape of knowledge, its very patterns of distribution, are almost God-given. Nowhere is this more clearly evident than in school. To hear some teachers talk, one might be forgiven for thinking that there had always been ten periods of English per week, ever since creation; or (despite the Ancient Greeks) that maths had more intrinsic value than art. Certainly, my perceptions of knowledge were shaped thus. As a schoolboy, and quite unaware, I was taught to despise woodwork and craft, to regard art as barely a fit occupation for anyone of serious intent, to regard music as a just passable hobby, but to revere competitive games, to see shape and discipline inherent in the classics. When I reflect too on the ethnocentricity of my education, I tremble. In part this latter feature may have been the reflection of the Second World War years, during which I received a portion of my education. In part it reflects the tail-end of jingoism, a sort of frozen insistence, perhaps peculiar to proud places like Oxford, that only the English really knew what civilisation and culture were all about. The rest were merely foreigners who could not begin to comprehend the essentials of life and knowledge. Mercifully, and in later education, I was disabused of such perceptions. But at that time I was unaware of the way in which my perception was closed and altered by the culture of the school and that of the social groups in which my early experiences were formed. Indeed, I must not impute the responsibility as being simply that of my teachers. My cognitive and affective appreciation was being formed by certain patterns of behaviour, certain styles of thinking and certain attitudes which enhanced some viewpoints and precluded others. In particular the Christian ethic shaped our values at school, implemented by those associated with muddy flounders on the rugger field and a weak, vaguely sexist, anti-feminine attitude composed of courtly love traditions and those which viewed womanhood as 'the temple on the sewer'. It is a commonplace that discipline and its ready acceptance were central to English education of thirty or forty years ago. Indeed, there are no doubt schools where this is still so, though one suspects that they would be more often found today in places like Malaysia or the USSR[6] than in England or the USA.

Certainly, it is unlikely that present-day English children would hear sentiments such as these expressed at speech day or parents' evening:

> It is, after all, a painful and difficult thing to make a man fit for the tasks of today and the tasks of the world. And in a school like this I

> think probably discipline and the prospect of penalty is a very important thing indeed. It is no use saying 'I don't like this subject'. The first thing one has to do in a school is to learn how to tackle a subject even if it is uninteresting. You may not love it now but you will love it later on.[7]

Then, the children accepted that view of discipline as readily as they did the view that Latin was the key to learning. Doutless today they would be equally sure that maths or physics are more important than music. If this is not so, why should an adolescent in a state school commonly be expected to devote such disproportionate amounts of time to the respective enterprises?

All this is only to scratch the surface of the relationship between learning and culture. An anthropologist might say, 'change the culture and you change the man'; and to an important extent this is the nub. Every human being is so shaped by his own experience that he has to make great efforts if he is to look through the eyes of another. Now and again a genius such as Newton or Einstein is thrown up by humanity such that perception is created afresh in one area or another, and tardily we take note. Less spectacularly, cultures develop and change, and technical, scientific man requires ways of categorising experience, ways of learning which are different from those of the coracle-weaver or the hunter. But he may pay a price for his changing perception. Adaptation to a technological age is said by some to exact a price not worth paying; not simply because of material hazards such as traffic fumes, nuclear radiation, or over-refined foods, but in terms of changing understanding and tolerance of each other, in terms of changing goals for the 'good life'. A cynical schoolteacher might ask whether the concern with deductive reasoning and systematic conceptual development in the sciences (emphasised in the recent English primary-education report)[8] would have been quite so obvious or immediate had the survey of those 542 English primary schools shown a deficiency in art or music, rather than science. To this one would have to reply that, as in all cultures, the dominant values show in the way we emphasise and reward certain sorts of learning rather than others, and that assuredly (or so we piously hope) our capacities for feeling, attachment, concern, sympathy and aesthetic awareness are still being fostered through different sorts of educative experience. Learning takes many forms and we are supplied with many teachers in a lifetime. The initial internalisation of tasks and roles learned in infancy may be particularly salient, but those learned and performed throughout life will also constantly affect our perception and judgement. For each person there will be advantages and disadvantages; for each culture similarly. The images and shape of knowledge thus obtained will reflect surprising forms of compartmentalisation, gaps in categories and problems in communication between cultures.

Classification, memory, learning and thinking will show differences from culture to culture. But perhaps the important thing to remember is the point made by Cole *et al.* in their concluding review of studies of the cultural context of learning: 'Cultural differences in cognition reside more in the situations to which particular cognitive processes are *applied* [my emphasis] than in the existence of a process in one cultural group and its absence in another.'[9]

THE ROLE OF THE TEACHER

Concepts and Theory

Even a brief discussion of the teacher's role, such as that which follows here, must look at the concepts employed and at the social and social-psychological theory in which descriptions of teaching are usually embedded. The first thing which will strike any newcomer to the area is that the notion of any composite and coherent role 'theory' is probably in error. Certainly, there is a large variety of terms employed by social scientists; but equally certainly, many of them seem unnecessarily complicated, often situationally specific and frequently ambiguous or confusing. Role theory seems to have grown up in association with the term *status*, or position. The term *role* is generally taken to mean 'an ideal pattern of conduct which actual behaviour rarely quite fulfils'.[10] The concept of status as one of placement in a society is likewise a somewhat fluid concept which needs careful redefining or locating at almost every organisational and institutional mediation. In most cases and for all practicable purposes both terms are inseparable and the view usually taken, that role can be best understood as the *dynamic* of status, is an appropriate starting-point.

Role theory is said to deal 'with patterns of behaviour or other characteristics which are common to persons and with a variety of cognitions held about those patterns by social participants'.[11] But although considerable use of such a theory has been made (particularly by social psychologists), there is in fact little agreement over what the theory really constitutes or whether it can be considered a theory at all. Coulson has referred to role as 'a redundant concept in sociology', as one which confuses and obscures rather than illuminates.[12] Biddle in one of the major reviews of the concept and its uses has emphasised the serious drawbacks to role theory and has summarised them thus:

(1) lack of agreement on what is studied;
(2) lack of agreement on what to call it – and widespread use of common terms to mean different things;
(3) lack of any real agreement upon a propositional structure constituting the core of the theory;

(4) lack of organised empirical evidence from studies tied to theoretical propositions.[13]

There is little doubt that Biddle's work still forms the keystone to current thinking on the subject. In addition (and despite the not unfounded criticisms of Coulson), it does attempt an overall theoretical framework and technique for studying the processes of norm formation and role differentiation in a more sophisticated way than the earlier explorations of role analysis by Gross *et al.*[14]

The notion of playing different parts as one progresses through life is not a new one. The idea is certainly a recurrent one in Greek plays and was not unknown to Shakespeare. But it was probably G. H. Mead, one of the founding fathers of social psychology, who first utilised notions of role-playing in theories of human behaviour in a systematic way.[15] Mead's comments on the perceptions of self in relation to others were greatly aided by his use of the term role, but it would be idle to say that it constituted any coherent theory. It would also be futile to pretend that the concept was even particularly central to Mead's philosophy, though it does seem to have enabled Mead to pursue what Strauss refers to as the development of perspectives of 'socialised individualism' and 'an emphasis upon individuality within worlds of common symbolisation'.[16] Since Mead, the terms have been added to and expanded, and role 'theory' has been employed in all avenues of social science.

It was Ralph Linton, the anthropologist, who helped to structure and interrelate some of the original terms. It is Linton who speaks of role as representing the dynamics of status, saying,

> When he [a person] puts the rights and duties which constitute the status into effect he is performing a role. Role and status are quite inseparable and the distinction between them is of only academic interest. There are no roles without statuses or statuses without roles.[17]

Linton is credited with the simple twofold classification of *ascribed* and *achieved* roles. Ascribed roles are those assigned to one by accident of birth and location, such as the roles of male or female, prince or Scotsman. Achieved roles are those which are open to access in some manner, such as those of policeman or lawyer. Such a classification is a useful starting-point, though it offers insufficient subtlety for more than provisional location of the individual in the social system, and it cannot serve in any way as an analytical framework for the study of complex organisations. As Secord and Backman say, two of the really important features to grasp when dealing with analyses of interpersonal behaviour are those of the *anticipatory* nature of role expectations and their

normative quality.[18] By anticipatory the writers mean that anticipation of another's behaviour is based upon a host of attributions made by us on the basis of clues provided from the context. This helps to shape our behaviour and our judgement of what is or is not appropriate. By normative, Secord and Backman mean that a person not only anticipates behaviour in interaction, but often feels obliged to behave in a certain way which is associated with the expectations formed.

Levinson, like Biddle, has maintained that role is a relational term, that it is useful as such, but must be distinguished from social position. He suggests that it may be commonly used in three specific ways:

(1) Structurally given demands (norms, expectations, taboos, responsibilities, and the like) associated with a given social position. Role is in this sense something outside the given individual, a set of pressures and facilitations that channel, guide, impede, support his functioning in the organisation.[19]
(2) The orientation or conception of the part that someone plays.
(3) The actions themselves.

In general, however, the term is clearly used so loosely as to become an accretion of all three of these senses.

In many respects sociologists and social psychologists use the term role in an analytical framework occupying two markedly different positions along the continuum from individual to system. There are those who use it in conjunction with a view of human action based on intricate series of social systems built upon groupings, institutions and organisation; there are those who seem to see life as a succession of roles relating the individual to a variety of social systems. Some social scientists emphasise the importance of role perception as the main determinant of social action (a view which is often particularly appropriate when considering the socialisation of the child, early sex-typing behaviour, motivational patterns and attitude formation). Also, whatever its weaknesses, the bridging nature of the term role is of sufficient import to bring many social scientists of different complexions to some sort of approximate consensus whenever 'fluid' models of social personality are needed. For instance, Allport says that, in the course of their lives, individuals perform many 'different roles successively or simultaneously', and in relation to this comment he suggests four areas worthy of consideration and relevant to the concept of social personality.[20] Later workers, particularly Levinson, Merton[21] and Biddle, could well be said to provide the clear basis for a fifth (in order to do this, one would need to read 'concept' and 'cognition' as being the same). Though the burden of Levinson's and Coulson's points are still pertinent, that the term and concept of 'role' remains one of the most overworked and underdeveloped in social sciences,[22] some general

agreement may be perceived among the plethora of definitions and related concepts. Five useful areas of consensus among writers on the topic appear to be as follows:

(1) *Role expectations* (that is, what the culture or subculture expectations of your role are, the 'rules of the game' for you). A major issue here is from *where* these expectations come, and whether the incumbent of the position is really accurate in his perception of what others expect of him.
(2) *Role concept* (role cognition). This represents an acquaintance with and an awareness and judgement of what it is you believe it to be. The notion of disparity between ideal role and actual role may be pertinent here. However, the concept a person has of a particular role may differ markedly from a series of testable (rather than imagined) expectations of others; and Biddle and Thomas argue that a certain dissonance may even be useful, since it allows room for movement and adjustment.
(3) *Role acceptance.* The degree to which the incumbent accepts or rejects his roles.
(4) *Role performance.* What the individual actually does with his role 'assignment'. Allport maintains that it is in part dependent upon the foregoing points. Whether it is performed wholeheartedly or not would appear to relate to item 3, above.
(5) *Role conflict.* (An addition to Allport's list and in many respects one of the most misused and misunderstood terms employed.) It *may* be experienced on a variety of levels; though it should never be seen as the necessary concomitant of all or any of these conditions, since most humans have a whole variety of techniques at their disposal which alleviate conflict or enable them to hold somewhat conflicting images of the world within their own perceptual framework without any personal disintegration:

    (a) when there is some discrepancy between the individual's perceptions and his actual role behaviour;
    (b) when there is incompatibility between different expectations;
    (c) when there are conflicting expectations or areas of ambiguity which the incumbent is left to clarify for himself;
    (d) when 'external' expectations and own concept differ markedly.

But it should be emphasised that the notion of some core consensus of perceptions is central to the concept of role and to the theory itself. It is certainly difficult to validate empirically such consensus, except at the most basic levels and for very simple roles such that time and again one wonders about the existence of any substantive theory at all.

During 1950–70 several excellent overviews of the nature of role theory, its allied concepts and its weaknesses have been published in the USA and the UK. Biddle in his own comprehensive (though jargon-ridden) review of the early 1960s lists at least ten major attempts at a theory, and emphasises that all of them (like his) pointed to the lack of any real cohesive structure within the field. Not only does Biddle try to show the existence of theory (in his terms) and endeavour to provide a general overview on the particularly vexed problem of role conflict, he also studies the literature pertinent to one selected role – that of the US public schoolteacher.

The Teacher

There have been a substantial number of inquiries into the social characteristics of the teaching profession in Europe and North America during the last forty years or so and it would be fair to say that most of them have been in the nature of excursions into sociohistory, comparative education, the economics of teacher recruitment and supply, professionalisation and the study of the school as a social system. One of the few early general sociological analyses of the teacher's role is that by Waller,[23] who also speaks of sociopsychological issues which have direct relevance to recent and current research on teacher–pupil interaction, classroom language and teaching styles generally. This is not to suggest that Waller's now elderly piece of work is directly transferable from the US school of the 1930s to the English and European schools of today, but rather that no research on the teacher's role would be complete without some consideration of Waller's views of teaching as a special form of uneasily maintained dictatorship. One, too, may see a direct line of approach from Waller through Floud[24] and Wilson[25] to the massive studies of Biddle *et al.* in the early 1960s and then on to the later and somewhat clearer syntheses of English educationists.[26]

All advanced technological societies rely upon institutionalised mass-socialisation of their young, and education is a vital part of this. Schools and their teachers have to impart more than mere book-learning to their pupils: 'They have also to inculcate attitudes, develop habits and skills, strengthen loyalties, promote allegiance and reinforce moral codes.'[27] The disciplinary context, the non-codified ethos of the school, the ambience of transactions, are now more popularly known collectively as the 'hidden curriculum' and in some respects regarded as of greater importance than the manifest curriculum of lessons, books and the formal organisation of knowledge and its access. The hidden curriculum is by no means benign in its modes of transmission, in the values it imparts, nor in its effects, since pupils are immersed 'willy-nilly' in the rules of the school and of the classroom. Children cannot easily ignore

or leave the hidden curriculum. They may have to lie or cheat to support some part of it, even perhaps to turn a blind eye on aspects of behaviour which, while publicly castigated, are privately supported.[28]

The curriculum will be more extended into general socialisation and the teacher's role correspondingly more diffuse in respect of schooling for young children. The primary teacher may also be engaged in acts of supervision, feeding and general nurturance more akin to those of a mother-nurse or welfare agency. But at all levels teachers will need to perform functions that fall into one or more of the following broad categories, all of which are closely interrelated:

(1) 'curricular transactions' (both in terms of planning content, and of furthering related learning);
(2) more general aspects of socialisation often related to values, social control, *mores*, attitudes and etiquette and dependent to some extent both on the community context of the school, and the values and beliefs of the staff;
(3) associated welfare (especially in the early years of schooling).

Each of these categories will, both for teacher and child, cross boundaries of institutional requirement and of personal need (that is, nomothetic and idiographic),[29] and in each of these three, there is likely to be discernible a high personal mode of operation, an idiosyncratic style and technique. This technique becomes most readily observable when employed in the basic function that is expected of all teachers, that of providing intellectual, social and emotional stimulus for the child. In much classroom research the term 'style' is employed in a particular way; that is, in an attempt to categorise some relatively consistent set of teaching tactics relating to a particular strategy, to the organisation of pupils, their curriculum and their behaviour.[30] But it has such obvious and clear links with personality, that the cluster of associated attitudes and behaviours may hinder or facilitate, limit, or extend the operations in categories 2 and 3, above. Ideally, the teacher must have the ability (and the personal charisma – perhaps a less likely concomitant) to present a variety of knowledge, not necessarily explicitly, in an interesting way; knowledge which may extend from the most elementary principles suitable for an infant to complex abstractions appropriate to a young adult whose potential is already seen to exceed that of his teachers. The knowledge itself will often depend upon curricular considerations of what is or is not appropriate to the subject, as well as to the age and stage of the child; and these will to a large part be derived from the culture as a whole (see especially Chapter 6). But whatever that knowledge is and whether it be amenable to didactic exposition or discovery learning, it will mean the adoption by the teacher of methods and techniques which facilitate the ease, accuracy and effectiveness of its

transmission. These techniques may vary considerably, from the skilful exploitation of the teacher's individual traits, 'personality', or charisma, to the use of electronic equipment, special modes of classroom organisation and the employment of particular approaches to learning. Indeed, nowadays teaching techniques must increasingly involve handling audiovisual aids, using programmed texts, teaching machines and calculators (even with young children), using plastics and modern materials in art and writing, being able to collate and cross-reference materials, provide suitable classroom index systems, and so on; all this, as well as working with children who are much more sophisticated than many of their teachers, especially when it comes to an awareness of the silicon chip and transistor 'revolutions'.

It has been said that, 'Education is a crucial investment for the exploitation of modern technology. This fact underlies recent educational development in all the major industrial societies'.[31] But that was written nearly twenty years ago, and while it may remain true in very broad terms, it is also clear that in Western societies in the foreseeable future, education will also need to be critically concerned with leisure, with enforced leisure (the dole queue) and with possibilities for constant retraining:

> If technological innovation puts us on the threshold of a Golden Age of Leisure, this has seemed to offer peculiar opportunities to education. As an instrumental activity, work seems a necessary evil to which education, when properly conceived has nothing to contribute. When orientated towards work, education seems destined to degenerate into mere training. From this standpoint, vocational education is, at best, a device for socialising the young into acceptance of the economic imperatives and disciplines of the world of work. At worst, it sells out education to the values of the affluent society, the rat-race, the military-industrial complex and so on. Hence, when the economic imperative to work is diminished, this seems to point to the importance of that very thing – leisure – to which education seems peculiarly relevant.[32]

Clearly, the curriculum is affected by the society in which the teacher lives, for the demands on the teacher tend to fluctuate according to the current requirements of society. As the bounds of knowledge increase, and alter, so the curriculum must necessarily respond and adapt itself to the new expectations, though the time-lag can be quite considerable. Sooner or later decisions have to be made on what to omit from and what to add to the curriculum, but tradition dies hard and sometimes does not lie down until long after its decease! Constraints on existing curricula are strong (see Chapters 4 and 6), and it is easier to introduce new ideas, though not necessarily easy to *sustain* them, than it is to

remove hardy annuals from a curriculum overgrown and badly in need of pruning. Even at the primary/elementary levels where there is considerable agreement on core curricula, the 'three Rs' are merely the centre of what looks at times like a constantly expanding *stella nova*. Modes of evaluation, too, have a hardening effect upon the curriculum. There is a certain comfort in knowing that what one has taught is always amenable to well-tried, well-known forms of examination. There is also the desirability of maintaining some basic continuity in the flow of socialisation through generation after generation such that it may still be more useful (and definitely more likely to be commended), if one can display an elegant written hand rather than adeptness with a calculator. Clearly, in education, and particularly at the higher levels of secondary education, much knowledge and many techniques are already of little *direct* relevance by the time they have been passed on to the pupils and even relatively 'new' knowledge may have intrinsic value only in that it serves to direct the pupils' thoughts still further (see Chapter 4). Yet we are frequently told that new scientific knowledge needs to be quickly applied, if we are to avoid a relative decline in our living standards as a high technology society, and the most common justification for 'why must we do that, sir?' is that it will get you or society somewhere. (No one has yet decided that long-division can damage your health, but its advantages for *most* of us are distinctly not proven.)

Formal instruction in the classroom is in many respects filtered through a variety of interactions and perceptions. We may think that the prime role of the teacher is that of instruction, yet forget that for many of us the transaction, style, attitude and personality of the teacher so often completely override the content. Teachers differ, and their abilities to organise, discipline and present ideas are in large part a function of their own personalities. In the past many sociologists have focused their attention on the effects of selection (conscious and unconscious) by the teacher. In the days of the county minor and major scholarships in England (and later the 11-plus and the culmination of grammar school work in the School Certificate) teachers may have seen a major part of their role as that of selecting and classifying their charges. The allocation of particular individuals or groups to occupational roles was viewed as fundamental to the educational system. It still is regarded as vital for any complex society. But *how* it is and was done is a matter of serious concern to many. In the 1950s and 1960s sociologists emphasised the ways in which educational opportunities were limited and minimal for groups of manual workers, low-paid or socially disadvantaged in some way. The education system in England was shown to be highly discriminative and, moreover, wasteful of talent. In the 1970s the emphasis shifted and, as comprehensive education and non-selection became a reality (in terms of the abolition of the 11-plus examination), sociolinguistic studies in particular began to clarify ways in which

subtler forms of attitude discrimination could still affect the teacher's prime role. Studies in many parts of the Western world showed that there were certain speech features of lower socioeconomic groups, which appeared to affect teacher expectation and consequent selection. Many studies also showed that people in general (and teachers sometimes) associated different types of personality as well as intellectual abilities with different cultural stereotypes based on speech. This means that while no one denies the importance of primary socialisation within the family and prior to schooling (indeed early language acquisition and type of familial environment are so often the triggers and reinforcers of any later institutionalised selective process such as schooling), it is not easy to separate the prime role of instruction from all the mediating perceptions of the teacher.[33]

Thus, in practice it is difficult to separate curriculum from elements of social control, values and selection; and it is clear that teachers have increasingly taken on a role which includes 'moulding' children or confirming them in socially acceptable patterns. Certainly, as has already been mentioned, teachers of very young children are at times almost solely concerned with those aspects of psychological and social adjusting which will bring the child to terms with himself and his peers, as well as with society at large. Elkin has described the general burden of the teacher's role very clearly, when he says that teachers 'Stand for adult authority and the need for order and discipline . . . for knowledge and achievement . . . [and] such 'middle-class' personality characteristics as correct speech, respect for public property, politeness and neatness'.[34] Wilson referred (1962) to the teacher's role as being that of 'socialiser' and a 'social weaning agent'.[35] Floud preferred to use terms such as 'teacher missionary' and 'teacher social-worker';[36] Westwood, in his seminal review article some ten years ago, described the function of the teacher as being 'the transmission of knowledge and values', and goes on to say,

> [in] this simple duality lies a good deal of the difficulty of the teacher's role; the teacher is not merely an importer of information, of cognitive more or less technical skills and ability; he also passes on to his pupils the values and norms, the beliefs and patterns of behaviour of our society . . . [such] complementary aspects . . . may be termed the 'instrumental' and the 'expressive'.[37]

One of the more obvious functions performed by teachers of young children concerns the welfare of the child. In many countries various combinations of such tasks as supervising school dinners; attention to elementary hygiene; supervision of breaks; arranging medical checks; referring children to the psychologist; treating minor ailments and accidents, form part of the teacher's routine functions. With increasing

concern over road safety, venereal diseases, or drug-taking, more and more authorities look to teachers (especially those in charge of adolescents) to add advice in these spheres to an already diffuse and scattered set of responsibilities. Where home situations or environments do not satisfy or fall short in some way, there may well be additional requests from parents or voluntary associations for the provision of after-school clubs and play-centres. Already, community schools have a long history in England (particularly in Cambridgeshire), and such schools may well insist that extracurricular activities become a serious commitment for their staff such that evening work and supervision commonly extend the teacher's role. Where mothers are out at work all day, the child may need to be occupied and supervised for a period much longer than that of the normal school day. Grants may be available for the provision of school clothes or for the needy to go to school camps and holidays. Teachers act as the agencies controlling the organisation and dispensation of such money. In all, teachers now do much more than merely refer children to social visitors or special schools. They are, in fact, a basic tool of the welfare state. Floud's 'teacher social-worker' already has a long history in England and is a concept fully understood in many countries, from the USSR to the Gambia; and the possibilities of role diffusion for teachers are seen to be virtually limitless.

Clearly, performance of such functions as those I have elaborated depends very much on the age of the pupils and on the type of school and environment. It would be most unwise, for instance, to assume that the teacher's task is identical in all state schools of a given level. Teachers do not so much have one identifiable single role, as a *cluster* of roles in which there are usually clearly identifiable elements common to all. But even within subject specialisms the role changes vastly according to the potentialities and needs of the pupils, as well as the personality of the individual teacher.

No consideration of the teacher's role, however brief, can avoid attention to the teacher's position as controller of the child's fate. The teacher controls this very obviously and immediately in the individual classroom, in that he or she can make life very difficult, not to say downright unpleasant, for a child if such a stance be desired. But this is relatively limited, usually to only a portion of one year's academic life, and *may* not have any long-term effect. It is perhaps more important to note that it is frequently teachers who nowadays control and administer tests and examinations; and that the more that modes of examination and evaluation become flexible and child-oriented, the more central the role played by the individual teacher in assessment. Such flexible forms of examination become ever more costly to administer, a political fact of some importance. Moreover, processes of evaluation in which the individual teacher is so centrally involved (mode 3, CSE, cumulative record cards) tend to expose the teacher more fully to public gaze and,

possibly, public criticism. Profiles, academic records and the use of more flexible diagnostic tools may well be of great benefit to the child and to the direction of really child-matched work, but their use involves recognition of their subjectivity as well as of the benefits they bestow. Perhaps, after all, outside examinations, even the rightly suspect practice of setting 11-plus examinations, had some advantages, in that they were slightly more objective than the profiles so often used for descriptions of junior schoolchildren on record forms of current preoccupation among English LEAs. The assessment of competence in school depends upon so much interpretation of feedback both by the child himself, and by the teacher, that the allocation of life chances, the control of fate, may be at best a somewhat more haphazard and whimsical element in the role than teachers pretend.

Wiseman once made the point that the role of the teacher can be seen from very different perspectives (those within the profession and those outside it), that the educational administrator and the politician probably each have quite different 'brand images' of the teacher and that 'if these differ markedly from those of the teacher himself, the resultant planning, organisation, and legislation are unlikely to receive much professional acclaim'.[38] What is indisputable is that in this era education has become a matter of immediate public concern, and though the social implications of education can sometimes obscure rather than illuminate the public's view of what one might term 'the prime' role of the teacher, there is a continued and lively debate taking place in many countries concerning the relationship of schooling to social, economic and political structures (and hence of the roles of the teachers) in that society. Many such debates relate to the apparently rapid change taking place in teaching methods, but some relate directly to the urgent economic or political concerns of the nation, as well as to the relationship between the teacher's role and the teacher's own political stance. In respect of the latter it has been said,

> social institutions reflect political influences. They may be embedded in the phenomenon of the hidden curriculum, for example. The teacher who thinks that education should be completely insulated from politics is now in a strange position. If he remains obstinately committed to his stand, his own practice may belie his belief since he contributes something to the hidden curriculum in his school. If, without alteration in his belief, he accepts that political influences inescapably affect education systems in various ways, then his declared belief appears to affront reality.[39]

Often, the attitudes that teachers hold (and perhaps display) towards children of different social and class or ethnic groupings are themselves redolent of certain political beliefs.

If one can generalise from research such as that of Brandis and Bernstein,[40] and if teachers do generally view certain sorts of children and their associated reasoning more favourably than others, then class and (by implication) political bias in selection and the offering of opportunity to children seem to be features (albeit 'unconscious' or *not fully understood*) associated with the English educational system. This is not to represent teachers as showing wilful bias in their attitudes towards different groups of children, but simply to underscore one aspect of the problem. It may simply be a form of naïve psychology which more readily responds 'to people like us'! It may be a variant of, or concomitant with, the experience of achievement motivation which forms part of the teacher's own frame of reference, is part of received wisdom in training, yet is itself much less clear than some researchers would have us believe. Here I refer to the notion that differences in child-rearing relate to differences in achievement motivation, that such differences are most easily described in terms of social-class groupings, and that values associated with long- and short-term goals can be meaningfully assigned in terms of socioeconomic status. Certainly, all this is well known to social scientists, since the programmes of research on achievement motivation have poured from the departments of sociology, psychology, industry, comparative social psychology and education. Specific aspects, like the dynamics (and the validity) of the construct *n Ach*, have been debated *ad nauseam* (see Chapter 5). Yet one doubts whether much of these flow into classrooms in other than ill-digested forms. But even half-understood theories of childhood socialisation may leave a long legacy in the mind, may pass into the 'mythologies' still hotly debated in school staffrooms; for instance, the apparent correlation between the child's academic performance and the socioeconomic status of the parents. That there is *some* relationship between child behaviour and parental environment is rarely in dispute. What forms such behaviour may *predictably* take and the salience of certain associated variables, certainly are crucial areas of debate; debates which frequently reflect such different ideological and political stances as to make the conception of the teacher's apolitical role most inadequate. Questions concerning whether teachers should be free to teach what they please; concerning the degrees of participation in school government enjoyed by pupils; concerning pupil assessment of staff, all may quickly expose the degree to which the teacher's role is concerned with the knowledge, skills and *values* deemed of central importance in a society, and hence with ideology and politics. The teacher is one of the 'front-line troops' in society's battle for a recognisable, ongoing cultural identity. The utilisation of cultural heterogeneity is not just a programme for elected politicians concerned with deprivation or immigration, with resources and provision; it concerns the teacher, his job and his beliefs. In a country like England, where it has been

estimated that only about 10 million of the population can be described as truly indigenous, it must be an issue of considerable importance. Teachers convey their messages and beliefs almost inadvertently; they cannot teach without exposure. Transaction and its associated personal ambiences, communicate directly to the child constantly, even when that child may not heed the main burden of the message. Ideology flavours the communication in the classroom, the organisation of learning, the tone of voice, the gesture. Teachers select and control, modify and encourage at every turn. The teacher's role is necessarily political, even if we would wish to aver it otherwise; political in the sense that institutional socialisation is at the behest of the state and (more usually) concerned with some broad attempt at providing for congruence in norms, values and provision of resources; political in that it relates to the administration of government policy; political in that the role is bound up with the means of social control and selection.

THE CHANGING PATTERN

What, then, does all this add up to when a teacher goes to his or her classroom? Certain perspectives culled from psychology and sociology will be currently fashionable (if not currently applicable – the two are not always synonymous) such that teachers may readily display familiarity with, if not understanding of, some of the views of Piaget or Bernstein. On the face of it present-day teachers may be expected to know a good deal more about children, their development and the mechanisms of social selection and control. It is doubtful, however, whether they will know that much about the children's actual learning processes other than the most generalisable features derived from combined reading, intuition and limited diagnostic experience. If schooling is nowadays more process-oriented than product-oriented, it can surely only be considered a relatively minor shift in emphasis, since in reality what is now known about the dynamics of learning is not that easily generalisable to groups of children such that it can be speedily applied in the classroom. Different 'products' are, of course, acceptable in the classroom in a way that they would not have been forty and fifty years ago. There is now recognition that wholesale uniformity of goal or outcome can stultify creativity, as well as insufficiently allow for individual differences in ability and motivation. But the curriculum still relies largely on product, still *infers* process (rather than perceives it or caters for it) in even the most basic of subject areas, even indeed in reading itself.

In 1890 the certificated teacher knew that upon leaving his two-year course at training college,[41] he would have to teach a prescribed syllabus, that there would be set educational standards to apply at the various stages of schooling, that coercion was considered a useful and

highly appropriate mode of transmission. His job, if he were at all unimaginative or insensitive, would be conceived in terms of dinning those standards of attainment into the variety of children he taught, by rote-learning if necessary and aided by suitable incentives, of which fear of the teacher seems to have been quite real if we are to believe much autobiography. That teacher's knowledge of psychology and child development would in all likelihood be minimal, though he might have some idea of lesson plans based upon the so-called Herbartian steps. Indulgence of children would be frowned upon, and undue deviation from the lesson norm would certainly be censured. 'Capes and bays' geography (memorised by heart), the ability to read a passage from *The Times* (as a test for standard 4 in some cases), knowledge of the four rules of number and the ability to copy from perhaps Ruskin's *Sesame and Lilies* in a fair hand would he his yardsticks of excellence. Wherever possible, children would be taught as a class and lessons would in all probability start in the same way, 'Arms unfolded, take up your slates' (or pens, as the case may be). The entering characteristics of children would be thought of very much in negative terms. The children were there to be taught, to be dragooned, disciplined and to commit to memory all those things which adults thought most desirable.

Like their forebears, the late-Victorian teachers for the most part 'knew' with a solid conviction what was suitable for children, what children needed:

> Whatever people didn't know about the children's health or how to teach them, they knew the children's duty. What a tremendous standard was set them! They ought to be silent, they ought to march in and out in orderly fashion, they ought to attend – above all they ought to attend! – to whatever the master or the Vicar or the pupil-teachers or even the monitors might put before them or upon them.[42]

Formal education was conceived of as being concerned with the rudiments of knowledge necessary for the dispatch of the average boy or girl into a sober and industrious life. Many of the teachers would be products of a pupil–teacher system that often resulted in provision of teachers with a limited outlook and little cultural width or tolerance in their understanding of things. Moreover, such teachers were for the most part drawn from one group of society, a group best thought of as the 'genteel poor'. Such a caricature does, of course, do injustice to some of the teachers of the time; and no doubt it would also be possible to find some contemporary teachers who taught more like the caricature of a century ago. But in the main the position has changed considerably.

There are still many assumptions in the transmission of knowledge and content which may not have changed quite as much as educational ideology would appear to suggest. But concomitant with the much-

vaunted but ill-defined shift from product to process-oriented learning, has come a host of different expectations on the part of teachers and certainly a different attitude or set of attitudes on the part of the public. Even twenty years ago Jean Floud was able to describe the teacher's role as affected by some noticeably different expectations; the teacher had become the group leader rather than the dictator, she said. He was the provider of educational opportunities rather than the arbiter of moral authority, the distributor of expertise, and he had become 'the opinion leader under the cloak of which he must manipulate them [the children] to the best of his ability in the light of personal values which are increasingly secular, neutral and imprecisely defined'.[43] Nowadays one may presume that John Smith, B.Ed., in Urban Road Middle School, will know something of the different developmental rates of the children, will know a little of the important (but uncertain and difficult to generalise) features of cognitive style, will be aware that motivational and personality variables are often crucial to learning. It is quite likely that he will be concerned about breadth in his curriculum, and about the problems of coping with interdisciplinary work, while allowing for the beginnings of in-depth specialist knowledge to develop. His class of 11-year-olds will be organised on a group or individual basis. His project work will sometime involve days of one 'subject' at the apparent expense of others. The children's class reading material will, one hopes, be carefully sequenced; actual reading schemes (if still necessary) articulated or programmed to fit carefully with one another. The children may well use self-checking devices for recording progress in much of their basic work, and John Smith will be free to move around his class working with individuals and groups for much of the day.[44] Certainly, whatever else from the nineteenth century remains, it is unlikely that the children will have an unduly fearful attitude towards the teacher. He will be spoken to quite freely by the children; will rarely act as the fountain-head of all wisdom or the 'moral arbiter'; and may well from time to time admit his ignorance and be concerned to learn alongside the child.

It is also safe to say that nowadays the casual visitor to the school, whether a primary or secondary institution, will find much greater variety of organisation between schools than he would have observed 100 years ago. In many English primary schools there will be no syllabus as such, though there may be guidelines written by the head or by a teacher with the responsibility and the enthusiasm for a particular subject area. The curriculum at the primary level, and possibly at middle-school level, too, will be inclusive; the 'seamless coat of knowledge' is a popular term often heard on the lips of modern teacher-trainers! Subject divisions will not intrude and John Smith will make frequent use of community and local resources. The school will be noiser, but it will probably be much more colourful than its counterpart

of three generations ago. Present-day secondary schools, which in some respects have always neglected the entering characteristics of the learners, or at least have never been able to adjust to them and cater for them in the same way as many primary schools, will not be as colourful as their contemporary primary counterparts in the display of individual and group work. But like primary schools, they will be noisier; they, too, will make use of television, tape-recorders, radio and film in order to augment lesson material. In particular, many such schools will have facilities more akin to those commonly found in higher education. There will often be excellent sports halls, workshops and commerce facilities, and sometimes swimming pools and language booths (though these latter seem to have fallen out of favour in the later 1970s). Many secondary schools will have large libraries, comprehensive reference sections and videotape storage systems; some will have microprocessors and mini-computing services. Even so, the pressures of subject boundaries and of examination objectives, as well as those of narrow-minded subject specialists, will preclude much interdisciplinary work and will certainly be unlikely to allow for much of what might be termed 'differential access' to the curriculum. If Jimmy needs three hours a week maths in the second year, while Mary only requires thirty minutes, few secondary timetables (or teachers) will be capable of allowing such differences in contact time or study. But John Smith (secondary or primary) *will* have been taught how to examine his curriculum plans with a view to allowing as many different points of entry as possible for the children. Certainly, he will be expected to continue his own teacher education, to attend courses at the teachers' centre, local college, or university department, and to seek ways of improving his skills. In all schools he will be expected to build upon the enthusiasms and abilities of children as much as possible, to use local idiom and social circumstance wherever it can be used to enrich the school work. Local geography and social actuality will enhance the relevance of his curriculum, even in highly specialist areas of learning. In short, because of the interest in egalitarianism and because of the attempts to meet the demands of 'individualised' yet 'equal' opportunity to learn, the teacher will nowadays be expected to match his curriculum much more closely to the varied abilities and interests of children (see also Chapters 4 and 6). If trained recently, such a teacher will have paid considerable attention to these issues in his college work and, though he may still have a very hazy grasp of much developmental psychology, he will know enough to realise that present-day fashions demand that his relationships with children are founded on understanding rather than fear. Thus, his children (especially in the primary school) are less likely to sit in serried ranks and more usually will be grouped according to interests or current friendship patterns. He will expect to talk to children and with them, but never down to them. He will be aware

that though not easily quantifiable, warmth and teacher involvement/concern seem to be important elements in the learning process. He may well attempt to employ his knowledge of the children's different styles of working, of their particular strengths, of their different levels of motivation and interest, as well as taking account of different levels of ability and any important differences in social background when planning and carrying out his work. Certainly, the children will be much more independent and 'autonomous' than they could have been a century earlier. Their choices, their freedom of action and their concerns, have become principal and uppermost in his mind. Movement about the classroom and children talking and sharing their work have become commonplace and often essential ingredients to the classroom enterprise.

In many parts of the Western world it is nowadays possible to find variations of child-centred and open education which are the result of changing ideologies and expressed and encapsulated in different approaches to school building and architecture. In North American schools such a changed view of the classroom is best described in terms of the 'open school'. In England it is perhaps better described as child-centred education. Both are at times synonymous, but often they are not.

During the late 1950s and early 1960s some English and American school buildings began to change. In 1957 an elementary school in Carson City, Michigan, was built with virtually no interior walls. In some respects it was an echo of the nineteenth-century schoolhouse; in the main it was because the city planners and educationists were convinced that they wanted a school which facilitated team-teaching approaches and mixed-grade situations. In England in the early 1960s Leicestershire pioneered several new school designs which were semi-open or conceived in terms of workshop areas around which the children could move. In both countries the changes were initially (and still are in the main) reflected in primary and elementary school building. Thus, during that period school architects on both sides of the Atlantic could be found drawing up plans for open-area schools, 'workshop' schools and semi-open, combined resource-area schools which were radically different from those which had gone before.[45] However one construes the effects of changing building materials or the varied pressures of economic stringency, the overriding concern seems to have been an attempt to achieve *flexibility* in a world of shifting educational beliefs and assumptions, in a world where 'free activity'[46] and 'learning by discovery' were becoming increasingly the slogans of progressive educationists. To some extent such changed buildings were, in England, no more than an expression of the optimism of the 1960s, part of the drive to replace a large number of the ancient elementary board-school buildings of the past.

In some respects the need for flexibility had been recognised for fifty years or more. Schools built in England just prior to the First World War had heavy glass and wood partitions between some classrooms in order that certain combined drama, craft, or music activities could take place. But such partitions offered little real flexibility. They were cumbersome, their movement entailed considerable advanced planning, and anyway the classes thus partitioned off were usually engaged upon quite different curricula and often differently timetabled. (From my own experience I would certainly assert that these partitions were almost useless and offered little in terms of teaching flexibility.) In the USA it was much the same. Right up to the 1960s schools were being built with removable interior partitions. Again it was assumed that programme changes could be met by rearranging the children and the size of the room. But taking down and re-erecting the partitions proved slow and fairly expensive. New spaces thus created often involved costly alterations to lighting and heating outlets. So, from the movable wall to the school with no interior walls (or very few), seemed to many simply a logical and appropriate progression in building design. Circular and hexagonal buildings became common; star-shaped schools with different resource and practical areas at each point of the star became relatively common (especially in certain parts of England when utilised for infant or first-school building). In the USA the elementary schools often incorporated a central library or 'common' as it is called. The 'open' school or flexible open-plan school had arrived.

Gradually, the increasing interest in semi-specialised approaches to core elements in the curriculum interacted and combined with the need for 'wet areas' and workshop areas where clay, sand and water work, where woodwork and practical maths and science could take place. So small special-purpose rooms or bays tended to be added. Sunken pits or mezzanine floors became popular, especially in the USA and in Canada. In California during the early 1970s a new elementary school was built almost every day and 20 per cent of such schools had totally open interiors and almost 75 per cent contained some form of open and flexible interior. As Boydell points out, it is important to remember that open education can take place in non-flexible buildings and that conversely the open school is not necessarily a guarantee of open education occurring within.[47] But the overall philosophy of the planners concerned with open-area buildings was not that dissimilar from the English ideal, one of ensuring flexibility of pedagogy and interaction between staff and children. In particular, both in the USA and the UK, the desired outcomes were apparently those of individualising instruction wherever feasible. This has sometimes been interpreted as leading to haphazard learning, a by no means necessary concomitant of child-centred approaches, but a serious danger for inexperienced or careless teachers. In most respects concepts of individualisation and open or flexible buildings go together much

more easily than with any reversion to formal pedagogy, though it is still possible to find schools in England and in North America where the approach to teaching has not been fundamentally altered by modern building design. Toews says, 'evaluation of the open plan school is not based merely on physical considerations, but on the impact the space has on the people who use it, and in the freedom it allows for experimenting with new pedagogic theories and methods".[48] In the same paper he says of some Toronto open schools that the staff hoped that the new schools would provide:

(1) a suitable environment for highly motivated pupils to succeed;
(2) provision of such varied opportunities for particular interests that less well-motivated pupils would be inspired;
(3) maximise the use of audiovisual and technical facilities;
(4) allow sufficient flexibility for special and remedial education programmes.

My own research would lead me to feel some unease about the beliefs expressed in item 2, above. Flexibility and increased freedom of choice may be all very well for the child already well-motivated and used to making choices in a world where his own control is relatively predictable. But for children from less fortunate backgrounds, the *relatively* unstructured, choice-laden possibilities of open education can be inimical to his or her acquiring those very skills which will be needed for educational progress (see especially Chapter 5 and also note 38 in Chapter 6). Perhaps, as Margaret Donaldson says in respect of the young child, 'The child needs help to sustain him through the actual process of learning', and later, that teachers 'exercise such control as is needful with a light touch and never to relish the need . . . the ultimate aim of the control is to render itself unnecessary'.[49]

If one accepts that flexibility of organisation and flexibility of building, plant and personnel (openness) are features which mix pedagogical ideologies with theories of organisation, communication and movement, one is clearly aware that the main purpose is to achieve some form of child-centred learning. The possibilities of open spaces, of child choice and of child freedom of movement impose strict discipline upon the teachers. Evaluation of the child becomes of central importance. On the other hand, it is necessary to strike a balance. As one teacher once put it, 'you won't want to spend all your time weighting the pig instead of fattening it'. But fattening on the right diet implies an awareness of relative and appropriate intellectual 'weight'!

One of the problems that many teachers face, especially during their probationary period, is that of coping with the demands of a much freer-flowing organisation, getting to each child on as regular a basis as possible, and keeping track of overall development and progress. Another problem, though of a lesser order, is that of noise. Open

buildings are certainly noisier in my experience; and while one is perfectly aware that the quiet hum of purposive activity is acceptable, buildings with large resource or central work areas can provide a great deal more noise than is conducive to teaching small groups or individuals at the other end of the area. But teachers obviously have different thresholds of noise tolerance, and there is the advantage that there are usually several adults moving through such a teaching area. The children also have more adults to interact with, though are quite often working co-operatively and this, too, is another source of excitement and noise. In all, no prescriptive advice is possible. From the heady pre- and immediately post-Plowden days in England to the somewhat sober days of the late 1970s and early 1980s there has been a definite injection of caution. In particular, systematic development of child learning and the importance of comparative and diagnostic checking have clearly come to the fore. The assumptions underlying child-centred approaches, while not totally submerged by criticism from diverse quarters (which varied from the early stridency of the *Black Papers*[50] to the more cautious tones of the Department of Education and Science (DES) in 1978[51]) have certainly been subjected to careful scrutiny. The results are that there has been a *noticeable pulling back* both in England and North America.[52] The classroom may have changed; certain emphases in learning and styles of organisation are very different from those of 100 years ago, but the burden of current advice runs very much along lines which value a combination of both 'openness' and structure, which emphasise individualism and systematic, logical conceptual development.[53] The big challenge now is to attempt a balance which draws the best from mixed approaches. However, new buildings *do* now exist; the classroom, the ideology and the pupils *have* changed. There is unlikely to be a retreat to coercion and imposition of teacher-chosen material, if only for the reason that our clients, the pupils and the parents, are unlikely to permit it. As Goodlad says, 'Goals for schooling emerge through a socio-political process in which certain sets of interests prevail over others for a period of time' and, though the present 'back to the basics' cries on both sides of the Atlantic may currently be heard loud and clear, there is evidence that this movement has already run its course. Goodlad opines that evidence for this can be seen in the problems which authorities have in defining basic education, and that 'most parents want much more than reading, writing and arithmetic for their children, even though they want these fundamentals assured . . . Parents want all the educational goals to which our society is committed'.[54]

It must also be remembered that the changing classroom now holds vast cohorts of adolescents within its walls, that the elements of education for children up to the age of 12 years or so have given way to much wider concepts of education for all. That 'all' includes

sophisticated, imaginative adolescents, who wish to have a say in their education, who already have a powerful influence in many avenues of modern life and who in many cases are reaching the legal age of majority while still in school or full-time education. Under such circumstances the classroom cannot afford to reflect 'shades of the prison-house'. It must reflect the changing cultural context, respond to changes in technology. Parents, children and teachers are *required* to interact; choices have to be made, curricula justified, explanations offered. Education moves towards 'transformation and participation', as well as mere transmission. The clients have a voice.

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Chapter 3

Psychology and Education

THEORY WITH PRACTICE

Pedagogical theory has been linked with psychology since the days of Herbart (see Chapter 1) and like psychology is, among other things, directly concerned with individual differences. It is a truism to say that no two children are alike, but much that is at the centre of these disciplines nevertheless rests upon the ability to generalise about human behaviour in a sufficiently meaningful way that modest predictions may be made and strategies for teaching adopted. In addition to its concerns with learning *per se*, a great deal of pedagogy is set in environments of busy social interaction. Thus, social psychology, that rag-bag of ideas which falls somewhere in the interstices between sociology and psychology, also contributes to any study of psychology and education.

Within the broad field of psychology contributions to our knowledge of human behaviour are often still classified in terms of certain basic schools of thought or categories. The categories, like most categories employed in the social sciences, overlap and sometimes obscure much more than people think. Very approximately three different broad perspectives may be described. These are normally termed those of the *behaviourist*, the *cognitive* and the *psychodynamic*. Each may still have its adherents and enthusiasts (though they are notably less partisan than in the recent past and the notion of 'Schools' with a capital 's' is no longer appropriate). Each can claim, with some justice, to have contributed not only to our general knowledge of human behaviour, but to our knowledge of learning itself. Each perspective has influenced beliefs about child-rearing, about emotional health and about education such that, for example, non-repressive modes of child nurturance and upbringing are often justified in terms that owe some allegiance to the teachings of Freud and his followers; or, to be openly concerned with a teaching system or a method of character training based upon incentives, rewards and punishments, is to invite being labelled a behaviourist. Much labelling is crudely stereotypic, but some of it has passed as if by osmosis into our everyday language and the way in which we talk about human behaviour. Inevitably, and perhaps fuelled by public usage and the even less discriminating usage by some divisions of the mass-media, certain terms have become emotive, redolent of meaning out of all proportion to what their originators intended or hoped. A 'Freudian' is in this way seen as a person so overpreoccupied with the sexual dynamics of human behaviour that he may be assumed

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to offer a sexual (sexy?) explanation for everything. Likewise a 'Skinnerian', poor man, is condemned as mechanistic and uninterested in the interior workings of the mind or in the feelings of people. As one might expect with even minimal reflection, the truth is very far from such stereotypes. Present-day active inquiry in psychology and education is much more subtle in the background of theory it draws upon, and in many areas of psychology today there is a constant cross-referring and linking of ideas from the different original strands. (Attribution theory, for instance, links behavioural and psychodynamic aspects of psychology, and personality studies commonly associate ideas from social-learning theory, medicine, pharmacology and psychodynamic theory.)

The student teacher, confronted with lectures on psychology during his course may be often bewildered. His main motivation is presumably that of becoming a teacher, rather than becoming a psychologist. Any connection between psychology and education must thus be seen as immediately relevant to the child, the classroom, or the teacher. Such links must also compete in the market-place with commonsense, traditional advice on classroom control and organisation, a host of tips on curriculum planning and many other features concerned with the student-teacher's survival on school practice. But it would be reasonably accurate to say that, for many years, countless student-teachers have sat through equally countless lectures on Freud, Piaget or Skinner without immediately (or even perhaps belatedly) seeing the slightest relevance of the lecture content to school practice. Why, then, is it done? It is because, for the most part, teacher-trainers have long been convinced of the wisdom of gaining insight into both the workings of the self, and those of the developing child. In particular, classroom practice presupposes a particular view of the child and both initial and ongoing attempts to assess his or her stage of development. For half a century and longer, views such as those expressed by Susan Isaacs in 1932 have prevailed in the colleges and departments of education: 'even a first-rate practical teacher can gain something from a study of children's minds for their own sake, and from looking at the facts of children's thinking and feeling and doing, as these have been gathered together by the psychologist.'[1]

Such sentiments as those of Isaacs, coupled with the work of, say, Tibble,[2] or with the later well-known papers by Morris on the contributions of psychology to education,[3] have led teacher-trainers inescapably to the conclusion that psychological studies in education are *a priori* essentials for the would-be and practising teacher. Yet while the case for their inclusion has been made repeatedly and elegantly over many years, and while it is assuredly accepted by most people engaged in the education of teachers, it remains uncertain just how much of those studies may be said to inform the teacher usefully such that his practice is really made more sensible of the psychology of himself or his students.

Of course, one might make the case that even a half-assimilated knowledge of Piaget's findings on concrete operations may usefully guide the practising infant teacher into providing plenty of practical learning experience at the child's level. Yet as we have seen (Chapter 1), 130 years ago, Froebel said something which was clearly intended to lead to a not dissimilar organisation for child learning, and Montessori, like Piaget, certainly emphasised that the child had the potential for self-regulated activity, that is, for using those concrete experiences for the nourishment of intellectual growth. One might also point out that educational testing and particularly the long romance with the means of assessing intelligence have clearly had a considerable impact upon teaching, upon the evaluation of learning and the diagnosis of individual learning difficulties. A good deal of psychological research has clearly influenced educational ideologies and, as has already been emphasised, these affect our assumptions about the child, about the nature of his learning, about the motivation involved, about the personality of the teacher and, ultimately perhaps, about the style of pedagogy involved. But one should bear in mind that education is (like politics) particularly vulnerable to scientific and quasi-scientific findings being used, or worse, misinterpreted in such a way as to further one ideology rather than another. Nowhere is this more obvious, for example, than in discussions concerning the relationships between ability, heredity and environment. As Bodmer says:

> Inheritance and the working of the mind have no doubt fascinated and intrigued mankind since time immemorial. Allegiance to one's own group – be it family, village, country, race or even specie – seems to be almost instinctive and with this instinct comes its complement, racialism. Put these three ingredients – genetics, intelligence and race – together, and you have one of the most emotionally charged topics of the day linking science and social affairs.[4]

Measures of intelligence (or rather their *uses*) have certainly aggravated this controversy, and such measures and their advocates in psychology and education helped to keep alive particular forms of early selection of children, because they were thought to be well-nigh infallible and highly predictive of certain sorts of learning abilities. In fairness, however, one should point out that psychologists have long criticised the improper or inappropriate use of intelligence tests, have exposed the many problems associated with attempts to design so-called 'culture fair' tests and have concentrated an enormous amount of effort upon better and better diagnostic tests of reading, language comprehension, memory, perceptual abilities, and so on.

All this could lead one to conclude that psychology has bestowed some very mixed blessings on education indeed. But that would be less

than fair to psychologists. The real problem is that much psychological research is necessarily exploratory and tentative, that the only easily predictable thing about human nature, the very stuff of psychology, is that it is *unpredictable* in large measure. There is also the associated problem that much pyschological research, particularly that related explicitly to education, is rarely made available to teachers at the 'chalk face', as it were, without having been filtered through the dubious medium of mass-publication, or by means of oversimplification and staggering generalisation. Certain controversies or issues take on the appearance of hardly annuals in the way that they 'pop up' with great regularity over many years. Typical examples are the issues briefly discussed here. The first concerns the researches of Rosenthal and is usually referred to as the 'Pygmalion' effect,[5] that concerning the self-fulfilling prophecy. The second, more recent, is concerned with teaching tactics, or 'styles', but is often broadened out into a consideration of the type of school ambience that seems most likely to enable all types of pupils to progress. There have been many well-intentioned attempts to classify and examine those key artefacts of classroom climate and school organisation which seem most conducive to efficient pupil learning. Of the more recent in England are those by Rutter *et al.* and Galton *et al.*;[6] one of the most notorious, that of a few years back by Bennett,[7] and some of the most thorough, reported in the US review of research by Good, Biddle and Brophy.[8]

Studies of the various effects of expectation on outcome have a long and fairly respectable pedigree in the brief history of psychology, and expectations of success or of failure can act as powerful selective devices in the interpretation of human behaviour. There is little doubt that in psychology (as in other sciences and social sciences) experimenters do often *expect* certain results, as well as possibly *desire* certain results. Indeed, much hypothesis formulation rests upon the tacit assumption of the former even if framed in the conventionally 'objective' null form.[9] Rosenthal and his associates have carried out a substantial volume of research which purports to indicate that even Experimental Unintentional Expectancy Effect (EUEE) is surprisingly pervasive in human learning situations. Though, as Barber, among many others, has pointed out, the studies do not clearly demonstrate whether the expectancies of experimenters unintentionally or intentionally influence response.[10] Furthermore, studies such as the well-known *Pygmalion in the Classroom* have not been particularly well supported in the subsequent reviews of associated research, and they have also been shown to be somewhat technically inept or possibly even 'fudged'.[11] However, the original Pygmalion hypothesis, while still not totally supported, has gathered confirmation and credibility over the years, and has now become legendary in education to such an extent that it has led to an increasing focus of attention upon the way

that teacher expectation *may* influence classroom outcome. Maehr says,

> Out of all the effort and emotion that were embroiled in the dialogue on this phenomenon, certain understandings seem to have emerged. First, there is evidence that teachers readily slot children into certain categories, much as people who are placed in certain positions or levels in any social group are slotted. With the slotting goes a set of expectations for each person's performance and actions that will work toward insuring the realisation of the expectations held.[12]

When one couples such aspects of teacher behaviour with the perhaps natural tendency which many of us have to regard our past failures to learn as the result of not getting on with a particular teacher, one may see how attractive and powerful such 'half-myths' may become.

Nowadays, and perhaps understandably in a time of extreme economic constraint and (in some cases) an oversupply of teachers, the accent in teacher-training, in school teaching and in school organisation seems to be one of accountability and utility. These terms have become the by-words of official pronouncement and have been aided at times by concomitant community concern over vandalism, school discipline and what one might loosely term 'instrumentality' (or lack of) in subject matter. Education may sometimes be conveniently blamed for not fulfilling the promise of a materialistic society's vision of better things to come. Those who detect a 'fault' tend to see it as resulting from soft or child-centred approaches to the learning situation.[13] As such they may quote Bennett's findings[14] with approval, as if those somehow proved that only highly structured, teacher-initiated approaches had any chance of furthering the advance of the nation. There is little doubt that, in England, Bennett's study and report were extremely timely. Research on classroom processes, while acknowledged to be notoriously difficult, was and still is vitally needed. But anyone entering such an arena at such a time in England (the late 1970s) could not be so naïve as to be ignorant of the use to which such research might well be put. Undoubtedly, in the last twenty years or so several books on psychological and sociological aspects of education have shifted public thinking on key processes.[15] Bennett's book may well prove to have been one of these. More recently still, the work of Rutter and his associates[16] stressing the fundamental importance of school for the child's achievement has had similar wide publicity. In many ways (and despite methodological and statistical shortcomings) this recent work has been particularly timely in that, based upon the meticulous documentation of some six years' research in twelve secondary schools, it has re-emphasised the importance of the school and the teacher in the child's learning. Buildings did not appear to affect performance, but

teachers did. High achievement seemed to depend upon what sort of people the teachers were, on their creating and maintaining certain norms, on their ensuring that there was logic and consistency in the value systems of the schools and on their acting as models congruent with such values. Rules and expectations formed an important part of a coherent message engendering success.

Two pieces of English work have been touched upon simply to illustrate that psychological and social-psychological research can be peculiarly powerful in educational ideology. Like the US Pygmalion research, such key findings can sometimes seem to act as catalysts, or at very least confirmation of beliefs and revised commitments such that educational policy changes. The picture is, of course, in reality much more complex. There are formidable research problems for one; there are the multitudes of variables to be considered, and one must also be sensitive to the complexities of recording and interpreting naturally occurring events and to the unlikelihood of any omnibus generalisations being of much use to practitioners or teacher-trainers. In particular, teaching styles cannot be defined very precisely, and have been defined differently by different researchers. In reality there are probably as many styles as there are teachers. Even if one can classify teachers into types relating to teaching tactics and classroom organisation, such knowledge may not be very effective unless one has an indication of possible cause and effect factors in the learning process, some detailed theoretical model, particularly in relation to the individual child rather than the class as a whole. Somewhat like the original Pygmalion work, the truth probably lies half way. Like that earlier research, Bennett's too is weak in certain respects for, among several statistical infelicities and plain confusions, he and his colleagues failed to indicate clearly important composite factors, such as length of teaching experience, the difference between urban and rural schools, and so on. It is true that an ideological battle ensued, that the technical weaknesses in the research were pounced upon with enthusiasm by many educationists and statisticians. But the overriding impression in the public mind now seems secure just a few years later. Child-centred approaches are 'less efficient' than any other more formal approach and formal teaching styles foster greater pupil progress than informal ones.[17] In reality the position is almost as obscure as it was before Bennett's research; and style, method and organisation for effective learning are still areas of considerable complexity and uncertainty. Moreover, as Boydell points out in a balanced and careful appraisal of the research, [18] 'large areas of children's learning were left totally unexplored, for instance high-level cognitive concepts, affective development and social skills' such that argument based on such research can be meaningless and of little practical use to teachers. Perhaps all that one has learned is that concepts of 'style', classroom 'climate' and, to some extent, those of

teacher expectation are extremely difficult ones to encapsulate. However, what one must emphasise is that the individual's perception of the context and psychological meaning of the transaction is probably the most fundamental factor in the effectiveness of learning. This, as it will be appreciated, is *not* necessarily the same thing as the teacher's perception, nor as the quality of the interaction (though it may be associated), nor the same as overall classroom ethos. Perhaps the sane subtle approaches are those which emphasise the learner's characteristics, as well as the styles of interaction. There are, of course, always the problems of generalisation to the sorts of classroom situations which teachers recognise. The methodological issues are serious, and are as Brophy states in a recent summary paper on the research and problems: 'Findings with practical significance are likely to appear only if investigators use settings and treatments with enough ecological validity to allow generalisation to ordinary classroom teaching and use treatments powerful and extended enough to produce nontrivial differential effects.'[19] It is this last viewpoint in particular which always crops up when teachers themselves discuss the importance of social-science researches for educational practice. The gap between 'front-line' research and teacher experience is often neatly highlighted by references to such things as class size and performance. Research in England seems to suggest that size of class is not a particularly significant factor in pupil achievement. Every teacher 'knows' it to be otherwise. One of the main journals of education in England (*Educational Research*), which attempts to place current research findings before the teacher in a non-technical way, is clearly *not* much read by teachers. The journals relating the more technical or detailed aspects of educational psychology are (within my experience) totally unknown in school staffrooms.

Despite all this, there does seem to be some slow process of feedback from psychology to education. That feedback may occur on in-service courses, in initial training, in more detailed form on advanced courses, or in the 'gobbetised' manner in which it is usually presented in the daily press. Each of the broad perspectives – behaviourist, cognitive and psychodynamic – has its adherents and frequently acts as a framework for explanations of human behaviour offered by teachers. Let us look, therefore, at these frameworks and some of their principal contributions in just a little more detail.

BEHAVIOURISM AND THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM

It has been said that behaviourism seems to be more than a mere approach to psychology; by many it is considered to be psychology itself. Certainly, in the past, there have been many who have thought that all individual differences could be explained by differences in

learning. Behaviourism has a long history, but basically it can be defined as a viewpoint which seeks to ascertain consistency in human behaviour in the context of external events occurring in the interaction of man with his environment. This does not mean that only psychologists have been influenced by behaviourism. Philosophers, sociologists, biologists and historians have all been influenced by its explanatory power, by its elegance and sometimes by its parsimony. Thus, a sociologist enamoured of behaviourism might well seek to explain social behaviour solely in terms of normative pressure which he perceives to be operating in interpersonal settings. His problem would no doubt be in part concerned with devising a system for the noting of all those observable events of social intercourse which it was necessary to chart before he could attribute causal mechanisms with any certainty. (There are other problems, too, associated with perception and consensus, but for many a social psychologist, and especially those concerned with, say, classroom interaction, the above mentioned would be pressing and central concerns.) The psychologist similarly will place stimuli at a premium and attempt to interpret human behaviour in terms which imply causality (or at least high salience) in certain sets of those stimuli. For him, learning is probably the most important determinant of human behaviour and the role of conditioning will be regarded as vital in the process.

J. B. Watson[20] is often referred to as the father of behaviourist psychology. Not perhaps strictly true, since Watson's behaviourism was based upon almost pure Pavlovian approaches to classical conditioning. But from the beginning of this century, he has had the most profound effect upon US psychology in particular. Initially he worked on methods for studying animal psychology, stressing the primary importance of observation. From this earlier work, he became convinced that it was the only *scientific* way to proceed and that human psychology should be based upon extreme objectivity and upon the importance of careful observation. His stress on observing behaviour ran counter to the views of those (growing) groups of psychologists who were interested in imputing motive to the act by reflecting on the private, or imagined private, mental life of subjects. In some senses he was anxious to transmute the study of psychology from an imagining, hypothesising study to one more akin to the physical and natural sciences. He rejected the instinctual theories and the early Freudian notions then prevalent. He attempted to formulate explanations of complex aspects of personality on the ground that cumulative conditioning explained all. His effect was certainly catalytic. He triggered a vast amount of experimental work which continues to this day, preparing the way for B. F. Skinner and others to provide us with many convincing parallels between the effects of reinforcement on pigeons and on human beings. Equally important, Watson provided a basis for psychology which,

though deficient in considering what Polanyi has termed 'knowing more than we can tell',[21] has certainly caused all students of psychology to espouse elements of the behavioural methodology in their attempts to wrestle with any scientific respectability. Students of cognitive or psychodynamic psychology are as anxious as any 'mere' behaviourist to offer exemplars of concurrent validity (usually in terms of observable gobbets of behaviour) to their theories of stages in intellectual growth or to the universalism of certain symbols in dreams.

Watson's views and indeed those of other behaviourists have been subjected to considerable scepticism and scrutiny, particularly his earlier rather extreme environmentalist views, his belief that human behaviour was the sum total of what had been learned from the environment. Nowadays, in fact, few people would take seriously the sort of extremely dogmatic and exaggerated claims which Watson made on behalf of learning. Many psychologists of different persuasion have looked at the problems of dealing with 'behaviour', especially since such behaviour usually represents only an outward manifestation of complicated internal factors. There are many associated problems, too. Observing and recording human behaviour is by no means easy. Do you take what the man does or what he says he will do as an indication of his 'true' state? And anyway, how do these two aspects relate to each other? – a perennial problem for those specialising in, say, attitude research or attribution theories. Nevertheless, much of the work which stems from the behavioural school of thought has been very successful. The malleability of human behaviour has been demonstrated over and over again.

Psychologists and ethologists of a behavioural disposition have, as has already been mentioned, a tendency to be strongly influenced by biological research strategies and have attempted to apply physiological techniques to much of their work. Much of this latter has been centred upon laboratory observation, frequently with primates other than man, but more often still with mammals and birds less complicated in cognitive and social behaviour. Success or failure in goal attainment becomes a significant factor in the determinants of behaviour. Recently, much work has been carried out with small infants and the principles of reinforcement and conditioning considerably enhanced by the knowledge that, in many respects, the new-born human infant can be regarded as a largely reflex organism 'awaiting' the stimulation of his internal organic processes or those of external circumstance.[22] Some of this work clearly has its roots in Watson's work of the 1920s; some has developed from other early exponents of conditioning, such as Pavlov or Thorndike.

Undoubtedly, the person most responsible for the extension of knowledge about learning in the Watsonian tradition is B. F. Skinner. Skinner, frequently misunderstood, still so often dismissed as a

'Watsonian behaviourist', for the last forty years has been painstakingly building up knowledge on instrumental conditioning and has provided a steady stream of information concerning reinforcement both in terms of reward, and of punishment. Skinner has never claimed to be a 'theorist', but the ideas underlying much of his work do constitute a theory which is deceptively simple and may be summarised as follows. An organism arrives at a given pattern of behaviour through a series of approximations that secure the desired end-result for that organism. Success consolidates the responses in the form of greater and greater efficiency. Failure causes the dropping of the response associated with failure. This system can be shown to work in the laboratory and appears to work in other situations as diverse as the therapy and treatment centres for maladaptive behaviour and the classroom.

Gradually others (notably Liddell in the USA, and Eysenck in England) have provided more and more evidence that forms of behaviourism can be applied to theories of neurosis and more importantly, perhaps, to the practical applications in treatment of depressed and anxious human beings. Skinner has often been misunderstood and possibly misrepresented. He is not a strong advocate of punishment; his work is much more subtle than earlier classical conditioning; and his work does have strong implications for education. Moroever, it must not be thought that Skinner is not interested in the self. He has said that he is as much interested in himself and in what makes people 'tick' as in rats or pigeons. In his book, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, Skinner seems to be concerned to argue that man must take control of his environment before it takes control of him, before it is too late.[23] Evolution must be controlled by the conscious shaping of the roots of our behaviour. Survival depends upon recognising the power of the cultural forces which condition us and in attempting to design an entire culture which can benefit all mankind. To do all this requires an act of recognition. This recognition is crucial and it consists in the realisation that man cannot be afforded the freedom or dignity of absolute autonomy (in a totally individualist sense). It is an environmental thesis in the extreme. To change and adapt human behaviour, you have to change and control the environment in a much more systematic way. According to Skinner, man is very slow to give up attributing responsibility to others for the bad behaviour they show towards us. Until we can recognise how powerfully shaping external circumstances (including *our* actions) can be, we are not likely to achieve a science of behaviour which can be effectively coupled with technology in an attempt to solve world problems. This is not to suggest that Skinner is a lone voice crying in the wilderness. He has many followers and an impressive list of successful demonstrations to prove his point. Over the last forty years of active contributions to psychology, he has

developed and demonstrated techniques which clearly do modify many sets of behaviours. Among other things he gave impetus to the follow-up of earlier work by Pressey[24] on so-called 'teaching machines'. For, in many respects, it was Skinner's careful formulation of what is termed *operant conditioning* which led to more skilful attempts to create environments for learning which looked into the dynamic factors that make an organism act upon his learning environment in such a way that the environment, in turn, affects the learner. Of course, programmed instruction, self-instruction and teaching machines were not entirely new ideas. Pressey had devised a system of evaluation not dissimilar to some present-day teaching machines, and as early as 1943 Richards[25] was a firm advocate of the careful stage analysis and sequencing of material used for instruction.

In 1958 Skinner described his work on programmed instruction.[26] The arrangement and management of learning tasks depend upon the careful analysis of the material to be learned. This requires an awareness of the various objectives to be achieved and of the means of supplying feedback of information at various points. This feedback is absolutely vital, since it is the knowledge of results which in part acts as a further motivating force, as well as being the focus for determining the next sequence. Feedback is also highly significant if the material to be learned is to be used by the child or student without the aid of the teacher. 'Teaching machine' is, of course, a misnomer. It is not the machine or programmed text which teaches, but rather the skilful presentation of material in such a way that it relies on the principle of operant conditioning. Well-designed, branching programmes of material, when used in conjunction with some of the more sophisticated computer-linked machines, do allow for individual differences in the characteristics of the learner to a much greater extent than might otherwise be possible with conventional teacher-child interaction. Unfortunately, there is also the considerable likelihood of boredom setting in sooner or later, if some human interaction is not involved.

Operant conditioning is not simply restricted to physiological, autonomic responses. It is much more sophisticated than that, and Skinner argues that most human behaviour consists of the accumulation of series of operant responses in the absence of detailed knowledge of the stimuli. Stimuli that an animal seeks are reinforcers. There are different levels of reinforcers. Some, like food, the alleviation of thirst, the achievement of sexual release, are innate, that is, unconditioned. Negative reinforcers are those which animals seek to avoid. These should not be thought of simply in terms of punishment; they are not the same. I might avoid large social gatherings because I am shy, or because I can't dance, not because people have the *intention to punish* me when I arrive. When we enjoy success at a certain game, enjoy getting a puzzle

solved, enjoy coping with a difficult piece when playing the piano, these can be seen as positive reinforcers.

What is it, though, that determines the value of reinforcement? Is it simply that success (that is, getting the next sequence right, or successfully mastering the next stage) engenders and enhances the motivation to complete the learning tasks? The answer is that it all depends upon the psychological and to some extent physiological situation. For example, in Skinner's original experiments, the degree to which a rat would work at a task for food was in part dependent on how hungry that rat was. With human beings, it is often much more complicated. For instance, various attractive features may exist within a learning situation and some may act as reinforcements to behaviour not intended or planned for by the teacher. The child, learning a series of mathematical equations set out in some carefully sequenced (programmed) form, may well receive stimuli from a variety of sources such that they override his attention and devotion to the learning in hand. His needs, which may have developed as the consequences of other reinforcements, some of which are biological in origin, may now be primarily concerned with hunger for human attention, friendship, or the need to assert himself over others. Thus, the need will be expressed in the form of a collection or association of behaviours which the teacher recognises. As a rule these needs will have much more motivational power and salience in the child's eyes than particular programmes of school learning. Capitalising upon them in terms of the child's own learning is something which most teachers have to learn to do slowly and by accumulating experience of both the individual child, and of children in general. From this point of view, one can see how complex it would be to apply behavioural theory in the classroom. But, of course, this does not mean that Skinner is wrong. What one would really need to do, if one was to follow the theory zealously, would be to see that the *total* evironment for this or that child was set out to take account of desired behaviour and appropriate response, and *controlled accordingly*. This would be an astonishingly difficult, complicated and, perhaps, soul-destroying task. To many educationists the notion of programming the total environment is anathema. It would clearly destroy much that is held dear, since freedom of choice and independence of action would become severely limited. Such a deliberate learning environment would also become precious close to indoctrination. Certainly, it could become open to manipulation by the unscrupulous, though probably that risk is no greater than the existing ones in our much more haphazard systems. Yet the idea is not so outrageous. We know that the culture shapes the man, and Skinner would simply point out that culture is simply another name for the social environment and that the controls of that environment ought to be in our hands. As cultures change, so new practices and behaviours arise. Skinner has also pointed out that a

culture which has explicit aims is more likely to survive than that which does not. He suggests that *explicit design* in the culture promotes the good of the culture and accelerates the evolutionary process, that a science and technology of behaviour, if thoughtfully and carefully adopted, could make for a better design.

In *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* he says, 'The problem is to free men, not from control, but from certain kinds of control',[27] that the notion that all control is wrong (and such notions are deeply ingrained in much of our literature and tradition) is unwarranted. Skinner talks of the great achievements of science and technology being the freeing of men from the dangers of famine, exhaustive labour and disease by changing some of the environment, by changing the nature of the dependence, by redesigning those elements of our environment and culture which are inimical to our survival. His arguments are persuasive and stimulating. Many people seem convinced by them.

The beauty of using well-designed, carefully programmed material, either in conjunction with teacher or machine presentation, is that it relies upon operant conditioning (sometimes termed *instrumental conditioning*) and immediacy of feedback. Wrong responses and mistakes are not reinforced, whereas in conventional class situations, errors can sometimes be compounded, built upon and thoroughly internalised by the child before the teacher ever gets round to looking at the work or responding to the child's query. There is little doubt that this immediacy of feedback is a very important asset in the learning situation. The child does not have to wait his turn for a response to a right or wrong answer and there is no queue of children clamouring 'Please sir . . . *sir, please*' and then being disappointed when for the fiftieth time their responses go unheeded. The child employed on a machine or with an attractive well-matched programme may also progress as fast or as slowly as he wishes. The questions in each programme will be so devised as to attempt a diagnosis of various possible 'needs' at any given stage and the material will be presented in ways that allow fast or slow (or different) routes in order to match those needs. In other words the programme will be a *branching* programme, rather than a straightforward end-on or *linear* programme. But the programme will only be as good as the programmer. The analysis and sequencing of material may easily be done badly and, if it is, boredom is the inevitable outcome. Furthermore, such programmed texts or teaching machines, while very useful for the expansion of learning along fairly easily ascertainable lines, can rarely cope with the more creative and open-ended styles of learning. At the present stage of educational technology the materials in existence seem rather unlikely to develop imagination, enhance exploratory behaviour, self-awareness, sensitivity, and so on. One of the key problems in the use of programmed instruction, especially if it is entirely self-activated, is that of sustaining motivation. For, though

feedback and self-pacing are important aids to motivation, it is clear that for many human beings those aspects are just not enough. It is very easy for the programme designer to think only in terms of the contiguity of his programme (the articulation and sequencing of material), and this can easily lead to dull, repetitive, mechanical and ultimately 'disengaged' responses from the learner.

Clearly, the work of Skinner and of his associates has been of great use to institutions of formal learning. Schools and colleges all over the world have made use of self-instructional material and machine presentation based upon the methods suggested by Skinner. Skinner's work has also acted as a catalyst to other approaches to learning. For an important feature has been that greater attention has been paid by psychologists and educationists to the presentation and sequencing of textbooks and instructional material generally.[28] In particular, greater attention has been paid to the stages or hierarchies through which the learner must pass as he moves from one concept to a more sophisticated one. Also attention has been focused not only upon the importance of positive reinforcement and of rewarding responses with speedy feedback of information, but on the realisation that whole subject areas may be entered at a variety of different points or levels of sophistication. Much of the terminology which has developed from the vast amount of research on learning is, to the non-specialist, somewhat confusing; and much that is specific to theories of learning seems to be somewhat remote from the everyday world of the classroom and the curriculum. Psychologists have tended to want to examine learning under neatly and carefully controlled circumstances and this has usually meant experiments taking place in the laboratory, using cats escaping from puzzle-boxes or fish swimming towards lights. The teacher, naturally enough, is more concerned with teaching Johnny to read or in finding a stimulating way of presenting the life of Hereward the Wake. Nevertheless, the connections between Skinner's researches and the schoolroom are perhaps more immediately appealing than many; and certainly many people would concede that any technical system of education which encompasses principles of behaviour analysis and attention to reinforcement by appropriate response owes a great deal to the work of B. F. Skinner.

Of late, and particularly in the USA, considerable attention has been paid to setting out the classroom as an environment concerned with the total behaviour of the child. (This is especially so in respect of early childhood education.[29]) The classroom is considered to be an environment of stimuli which can be planned, altered, matched and maintained in respect of a desired set of behaviours to be elicited from the child. To some extent Ferster and Skinner[30] paved the way for the viewpoint which maintains that continuous reinforcement is particularly desirable in the early stages of learning. This does not imply

a necessarily mechanistic approach, however, since it appears (and as no doubt many teachers have known for centuries) that social stimuli are especially important for young children. The important thing is for those social stimuli to be systematically and carefully developed in relation to the overall learning of the children. Other psychologists[31] have categorised types of reinforcement most appropriate to learning and a considerable amount of this work has been adapted to approaches to compensatory and early-childhood learning in the USA. An offshoot of all this, termed *behaviour modification,* already has a long history in the USA and Canada, particularly in respect of pre-school and primary education, and in some areas of the treatment of maladaptive behaviour. Evans lists some twenty-one separate representative studies in this field which relate to children's academic behaviour, and comments that hundreds of studies relating to older subjects also appear in the literature.[32]

Another psychologist close to the behavioural tradition and possibly even more directly concerned with school learning is Robert Gagné. His work has obvious and close links with that of Skinner. He proposed four basic conditions which had to be met, if learning were to be effective.[33] Although Gagné does talk of factors internal to the learner, he is primarily concerned to stress the appropriate analysis of the material to be learned and to examine the competences to be achieved. He emphasises the desirable *conditions* of effective learning as follows:

(1) *Stimulation.* For which (*a*) the state of the learner's own experience, background, knowledge and attitudes must be known, and (*b*) the material to be learned must be arranged in appropriately matched and sequenced form, so that the motivation of the learner is enhanced. (Stimulation includes controlling the stimulus situation in such a way as to provide careful instruction and to provide information about eventual outcomes, goals, and so on.)
(2) *Response.* This refers to what the learner does; carefully matched sequenced work should afford him the maximum opportunity for making meaningful and successful responses which help not only in evaluation, but also in sustaining motivation.
(3) *Assessment and feedback.* This should also enhance motivation, wherever possible, and should be immediate, positive and informative.
(4) *Transfer.* The knowledge gained may have generalisability. It may add additional weight in the same field of knowledge (what Gagné terms 'vertical transfer', or it may have applicability to a variety of different situations ('lateral transfer').

Gagné's notions of transfer are extremely important and have direct relevance when considering the learner's acquisition of a clear, well-

defined and well-organised body of knowledge. Vertical transfer, in particular, is of considerable use as a concept when one is dealing with an analysis of the material to be learned and thinking of which knowledge (cognitive structures) might be prerequisite. Subordinate sets of knowledge provide *capability* in Gagné's terms; capability to meet the next class of problem-solving tasks and thus to increase the level of vertical transfer. There is little doubt that many complex aspects of school learning (including the acquisition of reading skills) can be, and have been, analysed in terms of the hierarchy of their component parts or sets of 'subordinate capabilities' required. The pity of it is that, though Gagné may receive mention in the occasional lecture to teachers in training, practice at curricular analysis of this sort is rarely provided at college. Many teachers eventually build or acquire some notion of important steps and interrelationships in the subjects they teach. But a lot of this comes through trial and error rather than through training; and in the meantime many children will have suffered. Gagné's views appear to have had quite an important effect upon those concerned to relate theory with practice, particularly those researchers looking at articulation of tasks in learning sequences, or in examining causes of learning breakdown. As Ausubel says, 'Serious breakdowns in learning can often be attributed to inadvertent omission of a logically essential component unit from the total task or to its inadequate integration with other components'.[34] Some of the approaches based on the work of Gagné have been termed 'systems approaches' and many modern instructional packages have benefited directly or indirectly from the work of Gagné. Although approaches vary, in general the following stages in task and provision analysis can usually be clearly identified.

Phase 1: identify needs, specify the related goals and objectives and see if it is possible to identify any alternative mode(s) for satisfying those needs. Set out the resource needs and the principle components of the instructional system, instructions related to the system, any rules appropriate to the sequences. Be especially careful to check that these latter are clearly related to the ability levels and entering characteristics of the learners.
Phase 2: examine instructional sequences to see if any additional resources media, and so on, are necessary, then prepare the evaluation system. The evaluation must include both diagnostic and attainment checks. Field testing and revision then follows, after which stage the material can be disseminated in conjunction with suitable teacher education and training.

In effect, much of the work of the Schools Council (in England), of local curriculum resource centres and of manufactured learning schemes goes through such phases, though emphasis in teacher

education and training is often late and insufficient. One of the problems is that such systems approaches are often viewed (even if erroneously) as far too mechanistic by many teachers. Others prefer the speed and flexibility of less formally laid out systems, though in fact the systems approaches can be adapted to quite small elements of work, such as a six-weekly project in an infant school, integrated day approach, or even to stages *within* reading progression. Certainly, it is noticeable that the cumbersome and slow centralised approaches of the Schools Council projects of the early 1970s have given way to much more flexible, constantly monitored, within-school/within-area approaches. These latter appear to win much more support from teachers, partly because they involve the teachers more, but partly because they take account of the realities of the day-to-day system maintenance in which the teacher is involved.

Overall, however suspicious one might be of the apparent naivety of the jargon and seemingly mechanistic systems of the behaviourists, the work of Skinner and of his associates represents a conscious effort to develop new modes of instruction, an attempt to see that learning is more truly individualised than is commonly the case in many a schoolroom. In many respects the aims of the behaviourists are not that different from those of other psychological persuasions. The ardent psychodynamicist is probably just as keen to see that the individual receives material appropriate to his interests, aptitudes and 'needs'. But the behaviourist and the psychodynamicist start from quite different ends of the continuum. The former tends to focus upon match between desired behaviour and tasks; the latter on match between individual and (presumed) needs. Somewhere between the two, however, come a group of psychologists, those cognitive and developmental theorists, who may with some justice claim to have had an even greater impact upon education and particularly that of young children than either the behaviourists, or those of psychodynamic persuasion. The influence of this particular group is profound, especially in terms of protocols for curriculum development, in its immediate and obvious relationship to language learning and in its implications for classroom organisation.

THE INFLUENCES OF COGNITIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL THEORISTS

The brief discussion in the last section of some of the main contributions of Robert Gagné does, among other things, highlight the arbitrary nature of the division of psychological schools of thought. For instance, because of the affinity of Gagné's views with those of Skinner and some other behaviourists, Gagné is often classified as a 'behaviourist' rather than as a 'cognitive' psychologist. (Some people prefer to see him as a straightforward empiricist concentrating as he does on the conditions of learning.) Yet Gagné's direct focus upon cognitive structures both in the

logic of task instruction, and in the learner's approach, clearly bears considerably on the following discussion as well.

Chief among those commonly referred to as cognitive theorists is Jean Piaget. His researches spanned over sixty years, until his death in 1979, and much of these has been concerned with accounting for changes in the quality of the child's thinking. Piagetian epistemology has profoundly affected all discussions on cognitive development in children. The developmental psychology derived from such epistemology has certain snags. For a long time there have been criticisms that it is idiosyncratic; insufficiently generalisable; too situationally specific, the psychology of middle-class urban children in the West; and so on. Margaret Boden says that, as well as research showing Piaget to be wrong on specific points (such as inability to deal with transition inference at an early age), there is the general criticism that Piaget fails to take account of possible alternative theoretical models and explanations. But, for the last ten or fifteen years, cross-cultural psychology has also provided some considerable verification of much of Piaget's work, despite the well-founded criticisms of particular aspects.[35]

Piaget has attempted to show how the child progresses from egocentricity and subjectivism to an awareness of his own thinking and an ability to distinguish between his own experience and the external reality of the world around him. Much has been made of the fact that, in Piaget's terms, children pass through stages of thinking which can be relatively clearly defined and, though there is still much controversy over the nature of these stages (or indeed whether 'stage' is really an appropriate term at all), there is little disagreement over the basic point that children do show changes in the quality of their thinking as they grow older. 'Even Piaget's severest critics concede that there is a gradual improvement with increasing age in the quality of children's causal thinking. [But] much overlapping prevails between age groups. All kinds of causal explanations are found at all levels.'[36] Piaget's work on stages of cognitive development is still by far the most well known of his research and that which has proved most readily, though not always the most accurately, transcribed into situations which seem of immediate relevance to teachers. But there are problems, and these are very succinctly expressed by Satterly when he says, 'Far from representing a conscious and logical extension of developmental stage psychology into practical teaching it seems far more likely that Piagetian snippets have been used to underwrite existing practices and, even, to reinforce what might be termed "the discovery ideology" '. He goes on to say,

> Indeed, there is evidence that uncritical acceptance of Piaget's theories has served to exert a depressing effect on teachers' expectations of the competence of young children. The experiment by

> Bryant, for example, presents a serious challenge to Piaget's belief that inferential ability does not appear in children's performance until about seven or eight years of age. Since the value of Piaget's work seems at present unclear it might be preferable to advise teachers of the potentially powerful effects of the culture of the school rather than of the apparent limitations imposed by an ambiguous 'stage of development'.[37]

This last comment is perhaps unnecessarily astringent, but is well worth quoting as a warning and to prepare teachers in particular to look very carefully at the reasons offered for specific curricular expectations and organisation associated with age or development. At a rather different level, it is also interesting to view it in the light of the work by Bennett or by Rutter *et al.* referred to earlier in the chapter.[38]

As stated at the beginning of this chapter, few teachers can attend a course of teacher education (and especially a course associated with the education of the prepubertal child) without hearing something of the Piagetian stages. Whether such stages do more than confirm existing hunches or prejudices is, no doubt, a moot point. In Satterly's opinion, they clearly obscure more than they reveal. There are other problems, too. According to Piaget, and with substantial support both from his own experiments, and those of others, children below 6 or 7 years are highly egocentric and much of Piaget's work in this area has focused upon tasks associated with decentring. Yet, as I have indicated, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that Piaget is wrong, that the child is capable of taking account of someone else's perspective (decentring) and that, provided the tasks imposed allow for what Donaldson terms 'human sense',[39] there is good evidence to show that children as young as 3 years are perfectly capable of perceiving things from another's perspective.

Overall, however, and notwithstanding some considerable body of well-informed criticism, in teaching textbook terms and actual curriculum packages, Piaget's stages of development are often used as broad guides to sequential planning (see Chapter 6). Perhaps the greatest emphasis in England has been upon the period of concrete operations, since this has led to an ideology firmly wedded to a belief in the necessity of first-hand experience and active involvement. Typical of curricular extrapolation is the following:

> Children should explore, discover and work out the solutions to problems and build the related thinking processes into their own cognitive structures. The pacing of instruction should be in accord with the child's own self-regulating (equilibration) processes. Activity and time should be provided for the child to organise and apply learning. Meaningful practice should be provided so that the child can assimilate and refine skills and processes.[40]

Not that there is anything excessive about such exhortation. It clearly relates to the period of concrete operational thinking as set out by Piaget. One could as easily quote from the Plowden Report[41] or from almost any textbook on early-childhood education[42] to support notions of school work which parallel Piaget's comments on pre-operational thinking (very roughly 2–7 years of age).

In Piaget's three broad stages of cognitive growth, *sensori-motor, concrete operational* and *formal operational,* each stage is considered a necessary prerequisite or step to the next stage. (Concrete operations tend to be divided into two substages – pre-operational and operational. The former which lasts until the age of 7 or 8 years prepares for the 'concrete operations' such that they are consolidated and extended during the next three or four years to age 11 or so.) All this does not imply that there will not be considerable overlapping, or that aspects of thinking apparently related to one stage will not be *situationally specific* – a term usually used to describe the results of cognitive operations which are totally bound up with and in part a result of the particular context and circumstances in which they are set. It is perfectly feasible (and indeed it has been demonstrated) that children of different age levels may be operating at different levels of thought, and that a child may operate at different levels within different areas of thinking and experience. This does not mean that an operation of the mind will be isolated from the general class and level of operations achieved by the child, but rather that the child may successfully 'operate' at a higher level within one set of experiences and principles than in another, especially if the latter context provides insufficient concrete experience and evidence with which to work.

Just prior to adolescence the child is beginning to deal with abstractions, to make propositions and, in a primitive but methodical way, to set up hypotheses and to attempt to test them. One must remember, however, as Piaget and Inhelder say, that 'propositional operations are naturally much more closely related than the "concrete" operations to a precise and flexible manipulation of language, for in order to manipulate propositions and hypotheses, one must be able to combine them verbally'.[43] Teaching by talking, explaining and offering the chance to argue or discuss, has an increasingly important role to play in education as schooling progresses. Siegel, among many others, has suggested that 'instructional inputs must be matched to the developing structures of thought',[44] and almost all writers on Piaget emphasise the crucial role of language in synthesis and proposition.

Piaget appears convinced that man's capacity for logical thought is embedded in the individual, but that these rational tendencies will not of necessity mature unless they are used. It should be remembered that Piaget was not particularly concerned in his experiments with individual differences in maturity, *per se,* that 'some six year olds will be

functioning entirely at the pre-operational level while other six year olds will be reaching forward, in some of their interactions with the environment, towards the concrete operational stage'.[45] Piaget was concerned with the child as a logical thinker, that is, with the mental operations involved in classifying, sorting and relating phenomena. Similarly, we should be particularly cautious when using age/stage terms like 'adolescence' or 'pre-adolescence', since adolescence does itself commonly act as a catch-all phrase, covering ages 10–18 years at extremes. As Young remarks, too, Piaget's stages can be dangerous as well as useful as guidelines:

> Children do not arrive at a stage and stay there until moving to the next. No stage is independent of those before or after, nor sharply marked off from them. Moreover, children's cerebral capacities develop at different rates, though rather closely in the same sequence, just as they do in other physical respects.[46]

Many criticisms have been levelled at Piaget, and one should approach them with great caution, for it is important not 'to throw the baby out with the bath water'. Americans have criticised the so-called 'méthode clinique' (and there is little doubt that much of Piaget's work does rely rather heavily upon what children say and how they explain their actions). Many psychologists have noted that Piaget tends to avoid the use of statistical methods and controls and that much of his work appears to have been carried out with atypical samples of children. Nevertheless, supporters of Piaget outnumber his detractors. Replication of Piagetian experiments has exposed weaknesses, but also yielded corroborative evidence and it would appear that children of other cultures show similar developmental patterns. While Bryant[47] and Satterly,[48] among others, have illustrated certain problems associated with Piaget's stages of intellectual development, and while it is clear that some researchers would wish to emphasise the importance of specific experience more than Piaget, none of the criticisms has resulted in more than relatively minor reservations in the acceptance of his overall theory. Despite limitations and problems, it is important to recognise how great a service Piaget has rendered to the study of children's thinking. The more easily assimilable aspects of this theory of intellectual development form an educational 'leit-motiv' throughout infant and junior-school learning. They have certainly passed into the rhetoric of progressive primary education, though it should be pointed out that rhetoric and practice are not always congruent. Even if there has only been a partial understanding of what the man has said, an awareness of the necessity to attempt to match the learning task to the presumed needs and intellectual levels of the child *in relation to the task in hand* has helped the teacher in many a school to realise that a child

cannot be forced to develop understanding *faster than his absorption of related experience*. This is not the same as those woolly notions of 'readiness' which have sometimes bedevilled infant-school literacy. Knowledge of the Piagetian stages has also helped many teachers to perceive intellectual development both as an interactive and as a cumulative process. Moreover, it could easily be asserted that the contribution of Piaget has helped the teacher to appreciate the joy and zest which many children apply to their learning. Certainly, if there is an ideological battle, Piaget's researches have helped to supply the 'ammunition' to many teachers already dedicated to more autonomous forms of learning and learner direction.

Both the Nuffield mathematics project (sponsored by the British Schools Council and financed by the Nuffield Foundation) and the later much more successful Science 5–13 project have been, among many others, directly related to Piagetian approaches to learning. The former even had its first volume dedicated to Jean Piaget and was entitled, *I Do and I Understand*. The evaluative guides to the series were developed in Geneva under the direction of Piaget and his colleagues. The maths project, which was set up in 1964 in England, was devised as a radical and contemporary approach to mathematics for children aged 5–13 years. The material was primarily addressed to teachers as a resource, a stimulation pointer to varieties of ideas (complete with examples of children's work), but it was *not* regarded as a textbook. It depended, at least in part, on the understanding of the principles by the teachers; the prime principle being that the problems should arise out of the child's everyday experience. It thus presented no threat to teachers, provided they really did understand what they were about. (Unfortunately, there is ample evidence to suggest that maths is a relatively weak area in the expertise of primary teachers, and this makes one not so much a critic of the project as fearful of its misuse in the wrong hands.) Similar sorts of criticism have been directed at the Science 5–13 project. These criticisms are not so much criticisms of Piaget or of schemes of learning based upon broadly Piagetian approaches, they are more usually reflections of concern based upon a realistic appraisal of some of the problems which many primary teachers have in teaching maths and science.[49]

Another particularly strong influence upon theories of cognitive development, and directly upon education, has been that of Jerome Bruner. In Piaget's own words,

> It is very difficult to explain the difference between Bruner and me. Bruner is a mobile and active man and has held a sequence of different points of view. Essentially Bruner does not believe in mental operations while I do. Bruner replaces operations with factors that have varied through his different stages – Bruner's stages, not the child's. Bruner uses things like language, like images. When Bruner

> was at the stage of strategies he used to say that his strategies were more or less Piaget's operations. At that time our theories were closest. Since then he has changed his point of view.[50]

Whether this is a fair interpretation of Bruner's changes in approach is perhaps open to question. But it does emphasise important differences. Bruner is concerned not so much with the capacity of the child's mind as *with the unlocking of that capacity by the use of appropriate techniques.* Probably the most often quoted comment of Bruner's is the one taken from *The Process of Education* (and often misquoted!). 'We begin with the hypothesis that any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development'.[51] Such an hypothesis makes sense when considered in the light of Bruner's earlier writing and experience. For Bruner speaks of 'recoding' information, so that it can match the learner's experiences and in terms of each child's own unique previous experience. Bruner sees the development of the mind as dependent upon the mastery of techniques. These techniques are transmitted by the culture in which the person is reared. The culture has a powerful mediating effect. But no matter what the culture, the techniques operate through the same vehicles: action, imagery and language. More precisely, these techniques are modes of representation of the culture. They have been termed *enactive*, that is, the representation of experience through physical motor responses of various kinds; *ikonic*, dealing with events by the use of imagery and perceptual models; and *symbolic*, the use of a symbol system of words and numbers. Relatively little seems to be known of the enactive mode of representation, though a good deal of research has been conducted into the other modes.

Like Piaget, Bruner sees the child as passing through the modes gradually and integrating and combining past experience in the transition from one to the next. When organising and manipulating past experience, each individual is dependent upon his own unique cognitive structure. But the extension of this cognitive structure can be assisted by emphasising the person's own recombination and discoveries for himself. Thus, for Bruner, one of the main emphases in learning has been upon the use of *discovery* as an aid to problem-solving. He sees discovery as a highly motivating factor in learning. The more that children discover and reorganise within their own cognitive structures, the more likely they are to generalise modes of problem-solving and lines of inquiry which will serve them in further learning. Bruner has suggested that certain key elements ought to be included in any worthwhile theory of instruction. These 'keys' are concerned with trying to ensure that the child is predisposed to learn effectively, with the optimal structuring and *integration* of knowledge, so that the basic concepts and generalisations are clearly emphasised and, thus, that the

structure and bones of the subject area are visible in some meaningful form to the learner. This is to be coupled with sensible sequencing of material so that learning becomes cumulative, and with the careful pacing of rewards so that motivation is enhanced and continued.

As well as research into ways that adults and children attain certain concepts, Bruner and his associates have also contributed significantly to our knowledge of cognitive development in other cultures. He has been a notably strong critic of the cumulative deficit hypothesis (concerning the apparent cognitive and motivational deficits in groups subject to economic and social deprivation), arguing that one must talk of cultural difference not cultural deficit. Bruner's position is essentially that of an environmentalist, and of one seeing ways of organising knowledge and experience as arbitrary. In this way 'the dominant view of "cultural deprivation" may simply be an artefact of the way that the majority culture experience is organised', and 'groups, ordinarily diagnosed as culturally deprived have the same underlying competence as those in the mainstream of the dominant culture, the differences in performance being accounted for by the situations and contexts in which the competence is expressed'.[52]

Bruner's impact is perhaps best caught in that comment quoted earlier from *The Process of Education*. But, more than that, the comment has itself had a considerable impact upon primary education in England and the USA. In both countries it can be said to have become incorporated with the rhetoric of the progressive movements in the education of young children and has also acted as an antidote to any oversimplified notions concerning the need to wait for the ripening of ability in the child. Furthermore, the 'spiral curriculum', as Bruner calls it, based upon the notion that one can introduce the child at an early age to those 'ideas and styles that in later life make an educated man',[53] has been the basis for a great deal of work in mathematics and humanities. It is exemplified in the now-famous MACOS (Man: a course of study), which is a 'curriculum' capable of almost infinite variation and development in relation to child and culture. In short, it typifies some of the main features of a Brunerian approach, that 'a curriculum ought to be built around the great issues, principles, and values that society deems worthy of the continual concern of its members'.[54] Such ideas can be said to have been at the heart of many curricular packages for schools in the last fifteen years or so.

Many other psychologists and paediatricians have provided information on the growth and development of children which has direct relevance to the planning of the school curriculum. This is not to deny that there has not been ample information provided by sociologists and social psychologists. Methods of child-rearing and patterns of socialisation can be examined from almost any perspective within the social sciences. The work of Bernstein and his colleagues has

particularly affected ideas about language teaching and also drawn attention to the subtle expectations of teachers in relation to social class in terms of selection, control and interaction within the classroom.[55] Such work has had a 'ripple' effect right through the curriculum, creating in part an atmosphere more conducive to the matching of reading primer material (and pre-reading material) to the interests and social background of the children, and also having a notable impact on secondary-school approaches to language across the curriculum.

Overall, the general drift of research in child development is clear. More and more research is being focused upon early childhood and infancy and, equally clearly, every infant is from his earliest days considerably more competent than had previously been thought. Some of this research may result from the stimulus of sociologists and educationists concerned over the underachievement of certain groups in school; some from research on such aspects as 'critical periods' in development; and some from advances in evaluation and assessment techniques.[56] Concern has also 'quickly spread down the age scale to become public and scientific concern over the effects on young infants of deprivation, of missing or inappropriate early experience, and of malnutrition'.[57] In England the work of the National Children's Bureau has been usefully inclusive in this respect, as have various national child health and education surveys. These large-scale inquiries have demonstrated beyond doubt how clearly related physical and social hardships are to continued fall-off in educational achievement.

Thus, the teacher does have a wealth of information on which he can draw in order to help him establish indices of the entering characteristics of children (developmental, local, national and comparative) and to assist his decisions on the matching of appropriate cognitive tasks. He has, if he cares to read it, information on the physiological skills and development of children to an extent undreamed of half a century ago. He may consult research on children undertaken in virtually any university in the world and his inquiries will be taken seriously. He may, in a variety of ways, and particularly through study for advanced diplomas or higher degrees, compare his own observations with those of the most thorough and systematic researchers. He could then hardly fail to notice that much of the published and broadcast curriculum material available to schools relies upon such research findings, or takes particular views of child development as its framework.

PSYCHODYNAMIC INFLUENCES

Arguably, though many are convinced, one of the greatest and most consistent influences upon the education of children and adolescents has come not from direct researches on spatial or manipulative skill, or from research on stages of cognitive growth, but from theories of emotional

health and development. In the forefront of these theories have been the immensely flexible, subtle and complex ideas of Sigmund Freud. Freud's teachings about the unconscious, his gradual analytic exploration of apparent motives and his formulation of theories concerning the mechanisms of repression clearly inspired the early experiments in progressive education over sixty years ago; and many of his ideas still seem of profound importance for the humane education and understanding of children. Freud portrayed the person as the pawn of instinctual, often unconscious, motivational drives. It was not necessarily a popular viewpoint, especially coming as it did hotfoot behind the lingering ideologies of 'self-help' and Lutheran notions of individual responsibility. Yet in many ways it was a constructive approach, since it focused the initially somewhat enraged public opinion upon the impact of early childhood experiences on later personality development. Freudian or psychodynamic theory as it is sometimes termed has become a powerful force in the development of psychology, leading through a complicated jungle of interrelated perspectives, such as individual autonomy, interpersonal psychiatry, ego-psychology, the (currently popular) transactional theories and those of humanistic psychology. Of one thing there is no doubt, Freud and his subsequent followers have continually emphasised the *person* and his self-development; above all the focus has been upon the achievement of mental health.

In both Freudian and Piagetian psychology there is an emphasis upon the extreme importance of early stages of development. Freud was able to show that merely keeping the infant dry and comfortable, well fed and properly shod was not enough, that childhood was full of serious dilemmas for the parent and the child, that collisions and discontinuity were not always easily resolved. Reward and punishment, breast-feeding, exploring the body and autoeroticism, toilet training and attitudes towards parents were all important issues which Freud was able to bring before adults in a way that demonstrated the fundamental conflicts which lie beneath family relationships and common socialisation practices. Freud devoted much attention to the concept of identification, an extremely 'slippery' concept and one which is clearly polymorphous in application, if not in meaning.[58] Basically Freud appeared to see two main forces operating in the process. The first concerns *anaclitic identification*, that is, the process of forming a strong object relationship with and dependency upon the mother. The second is the result of *fear*. Father is a threat, and the boy eventually identifies with the father in order to diminish the fear of him. For girls, according to Freud, the first process is the major one. For boys, the second process springs from the Oedipal dilemma, the period through which boys go when they seek to attain and hold the mother's affection and when they have vague sexually implicit fantasies about her. The resulting eventual

identification with father involves the repression of the sexual feelings for the mother and of the fear of and aggression towards the father.

Thus, in Freud's view, the period of infancy and childhood was a fraught one characterised by infantile sexuality. This sexuality reached its height during the phallic stage, a stage of development said to come roughly between the second and about the fifth year of life. Subsequently the sexuality is repressed and children are relieved from any conflict they feel by a mechanism of repression and amnesia. This resolution results, according to Freud, in a period called the latency period, roughly the middle years of childhood. It is a phase which nowadays is regarded with some scepticism and is anyway considered much more situationally specific and much more related to social circumstances and context than Freud may have thought.

These many important and revolutionary issues of human development, relational, psychosexual, social and cognitive were without doubt placed before the public in a way which engendered scorn, annoyance and intense interest. Here were theories which, while emphasising the critical nature of the early years, also seemed to tell one something about the human condition, about the feelings, needs, interests and motives which were underlying much adult behaviour. It has become trite to remark that the greater openness about sexual functioning and need, which one may currently perceive as characteristic of Western society, is in some large measure due to the teachings of Sigmund Freud.

It is, perhaps, unwise to suggest that particular aspects of Freudian theory were especially catalytic to changing concepts of socialisation and education. Certainly, Freud's concept of repression figured large in the attention which Homer Lane and A. S. Neill (the founder of Summerhill School) paid to psychoanalytic theory. But, for many students of both education and psychology, the Freudian conceptual sequence of phases in psychosexual development and the consequent changes in sources of gratification and in objects of affectional attachment have held great power of explanation. Unfortunately, Freudian theory also attracted those educationists less knowledgeable than Neill or Lane and some highly garbled versions resulted. Indeed, it is possible that some of those versions still pass to the public at large and to student-teachers in training. Garbled versions do Freud and his associates great mischief. They have especially harmed the many serious advocates of 'being on the child's side'. Selleck has shown how misconstrued some Freudian theory has been by saying, 'Teachers were no better versed in Freudian lore than other Englishmen of the period for whom the master's teachings could be summarised in Oscar Wilde's words: "Never resist temptation"'. Ben Morris says somewhat less astringently of Freud: 'His ideas too lay behind the work of many of the progressive schools which sprang up after World War I, and, while

much that was done in these schools was based on misconceptions of Freud's views, the attempt to gain a deeper understanding of childhood which inspired these efforts has had a not inconsiderable and valuable effect on schooling generally.'[59] Hadfield (a founder-member, and first director of the Tavistock Clinic) is another psychologist who has noted the misconceptions which arose about Freud's views, and particularly those on repression, and said that the educationists, who should perhaps have known better, produced some very distorted and extreme views on repression. He tells a very amusing story of a headmistress who apologised to a visitor because of a child's politeness, saying, 'You must excuse him, he is just a new boy'.[60]

Freud wrote of many aspects of the human condition which had been considered taboo, if acknowledged at all. He wrote of neuroses being caused by sexual maladjustment. He used his early developed techniques of free association[61] and attempted to explore and explain the motives of his patients. His theories of infantile sexuality were in part derived from numerous convincing experiences during the psychoanalysis of patients. The concepts of the ego and the libido, that of the Oedipal complex and of identification, all resulted from his early clinical experiences and reflections. Throughout the years he developed and expanded his ideas, coming to the notions of life and death instincts more clearly in the 1920s and changing some of his earlier views on sadism and aggression; and, later still, somewhat modifying the polarity of the ego/libido motives. Among his contemporaries both followers and heretics arose, some of the latter (like Jung or Adler) themselves making significant contributions to psychology. Many later interpreters and students of Freud have developed ideas which have continued the mainstream of psychodynamic interest. Foremost among these is undoubtedly the US psychologist Erik Erikson. He, like many modern neo-Freudians, has placed greater emphasis upon the individual's capacity for conscious choice than did Freud. But almost all have had to use (or found it helpful to use) those 'parts' of the psyche defined by Freud and eventually termed the ego, the id and the superego. Such concepts have been of immense use to psychologists of many complexions besides orthodox Freudianism. The terms, like many others, such as narcissism and hysteria, have taken on a much wider validity, becoming part of the basic *lingua franca* of modern psychology. Nowadays, a certain, perhaps well-founded, suspicion surrounds his early stage theory (oral, anal and phallic) and many psychologists regard the concept of latency as in need of radical revision, in view of changing patterns of socialisation and of the shifts in *mores* and attitudes which surround our psychosexual development. Nevertheless, there is some consensus that Freud's view of the attachments of early childhood being essentially erotic in nature still holds good.[62]

Many of the progressive educationists drew upon Freudian principles

and from them (and sometimes the erroneous interpretation of them) extrapolated educational ones. However, it is important to keep all this in perspective. Not *all* progressive educationists were influenced by Freud and many were influenced equally by Froebel or by Dewey.[63] One of the greatest advocates of Freudian theory did have a particularly powerful role in the development of English primary education, however. This was Susan Isaacs. She was certainly not given to misinterpretation of his ideas. But even here it is important to set the record right. She did not expect teachers to play the part of psychoanalysts or therapists. Her school (Malting House, 1924–7) was the origin of the records which she produced in the early 1930s concerning the intellectual, social and emotional growth of young children. It was not, as she was quick to point out, 'a psychoanalytic school'. She claims to have been influenced by Dewey long before she was influenced by Freud. Nevertheless her painstakingly collected observations and comments were and are useful psychodynamic interpretations of the behaviour of nursery-age children. Many teachers have been influenced by them and not a few have seen them as offering considerable validity to Freudian theory concerning emotional development in young children. Susan Isaacs, along with Neill and Lane, wrote specifically for teachers and parents. Her two major books were derived from the experience of Malting House; and she writes clearly about the sexuality of her charges in a manner which is both sympathetic and objective. She says, 'I was just as ready to record and to study the less attractive aspects of their behaviour as the more pleasing, whatever my aims and preferences as their educator might be'.[64] Selleck sees her as coming to distinctly Freudian-oriented conclusions which were both specific and elaborate.[65] Writing of the social development of children Isaacs talks of the teacher as the 'super-ego', enabling the children, by virtue of their trust in her and her non-repressive behaviour, to develop from defiant repressed obstinacy to a phase of friendliness, warmth and co-operation.

During the 1930s and early 1940s she produced a number of books which were extremely influential in educational and child-rearing circles. She was stimulated not only by Freud and Dewey, but also by Piaget. She admits that Piaget's work was important to her, though what she termed somewhat 'contrasuggestive'.[66] Overall, she was a masterly commentator on child development and, using a largely Freudian terminology, became a potent force in English primary education. Her comments on destructive impulses and phantasy were quickly incorporated in other educationists' advice (for example, textbooks like that by Hughes and Hughes which had a long vogue in the English colleges);[67] and her comments on the years of latency are still read and influential. Appendix 3 of the 1931 report on the primary school (written by Cyril Burt)[68] acknowledges her influence in the discussion of

emotional development in children and, *inter alia*, of the psychoanalytic school of thought. Furthermore, Susan Isaacs's connections with the Froebel Educational Institute, her early interest in Piaget, her letters of advice to parents, her friendship with other pioneer lecturers and college principals (such as Lillian de Lissa at Gipsy Hill College, Nancy Catty at Goldsmiths', Evelyn Lawrence, who taught at the Malting House School and Eglantine Jebb at the Froebel Institute) helped her influence to spread far and wide. Freud may have put psychosexual development before the world, but Susan Isaacs put the sound interpretation of it and of other aspects of Freudian theory before teachers and parents. In her *The Children We Teach* (a book incidentally which ran into many impressions and which was in constant use during the 1930s–1960s), she was anxious to show the children as she saw them, as seeking, questing, curious, puzzled individuals; and she doesn't neglect the curricular implications. She was quick to underline that the child needed make-believe and phantasy, that he became increasingly oriented outwards towards the middle years of childhood and was concerned with things and activities. Adults might parcel up the curriculum into separate disciplines, but for the child *unity* and his *interests* ought to lead us to see the value of an integrated curriculum, she proposed. The beauty of Susan Isaac's writings lies in part in her intellectual skill and precision, her objectivity when commenting on children's behaviour, but also and most importantly in her willingness to be prescriptive; in short her ability to make those very connections between theory and practice which are so often lacking in the more bland texts of educational psychology seen in colleges today.

Many other psychologists and educationists have followed Freud's writings with great care. Not a few have modified and extended certain aspects; and many of the more recent writers on feminism have emphasised the incredibly male-oriented and sexist position often assumed by Freud to be universal and unchanging when it was in large part a situational and contextual factor of the times and circumstances in which he wrote. Educational writers, however, have gained a lot from Sigmund Freud. Of these, in England, possibly one of the more influential has been Ben Morris, for many years professor of education at the University of Bristol. He is one of the important latter-day neo-Freudians devoted to education and unquestionably 'on the child's side'. His writings span the last thirty years or so and continue the Freudian tradition of such noted educationists as George Lyward, A. S. Neill and J. Hadfield, to mention but a few.[69] Morris, like Hadfield, has been interested in interpreting and developing ideas in an educational and developmental context which in some respects parallels the classic mainstream psychological writings of Winnicot, Bowlby, Bettelheim and Erikson in a more overtly educational vein.

No student of education or human development could have failed to

notice the significance of Erik Erikson's writing during the last quarter of a century. There is virtually no study of adolescence which fails to refer to his work. Erikson pursues and modifies the teachings of Freud. He takes concepts such as *adaptation* and, while still emphasising emotional processes, both conscious and unconscious, as being the prime motivational forces in life, develops a comprehensive and logically cohesive stage theory of human development which is of considerable significance to educators. His ego-psychology, as it is sometimes termed, has attracted wide audiences: counselling, psychoanalytic practice, nursing and early-childhood education, all being considerably affected. Erikson's ego-psychology is a psychology of needs and goals, whereby the achievement of the developmental goal of each stage represents the culmination of that phase. During the years of the Second World War Erikson was involved in the well-known California longitudinal child guidance study. He focused his attention on three major areas: sex differences in child play, the resolution of conflict during various phases of life and cultural anthropology and child development. His first major book in 1950[70] was the culmination of years of study, reflection and writing (he had been publishing papers since 1936). In it he weaves psychoanalytic theory with ideology, cultural anthropology and history to develop a fascinating study of the ego, the core of the individual. He established eight clear phases of human development in the context of modern society. These are infancy, early childhood, play age, school age, adolescence, young adulthood, adulthood and mature age – and each phase is discussed in relation to its dominant goal orientation. A psychosocial crisis is said to occur within each of these phases, and Erikson sees the development of the person as a hugely creative enterprise in which the individual must learn to utilise his inner drives in such a way that they match and fit environmental pressures and opportunities (adaptation). But while this is going on,

> The developing personality falls victim to hazards of living by a combination of instinctive, parental, communal, cultural and environmental forces which fail to undo successful development because success depends upon channelling innate tendencies in a direction which will serve the need of the individual and community and will assure both a continued cultural heritage.[71]

Three phases are now discussed to give some indication of Erikson's stage theory. It should be pointed out that this theory forms no more than a part of one of his major books. Furthermore, he himself sees his theories as changing and developing in the light of experience:

Phase 1 – During the first phase the general developmental tasks are

focused upon the bodily functions. The child is seen as clearly egocentric. The overall goal is the establishment of trust as opposed to mistrust, and to achieve this the child has to be able to satisfy his basic physical/emotional needs in an atmosphere noted for the reliability of the attachment relationship (normally mother/child).

Phase 2 – The second phase of early childhood is concerned with the overall goal of establishing some degree of autonomy as opposed to shame and doubt. This phase is said to last about two years or so, from about 18 months to 4 years, but Erikson does not place a great deal of weight on age demarcation. It is a period of rapid growth, mastery of physical skills and the establishment of and increasing sophistication in the communication skills of language. It is a time when the child is reaching out and extending his horizons; a time when the exigencies of circumstance and the bases of social and self-control become very important to the child. During this phase the child has to learn some sense of independence. He must learn to ask for those things he needs, to control his body and certain bodily functions, to begin to be aware of reciprocal aspects of relationship with others. Yet he is of necessity still very much a dependent being. Parents control his environment, his meal times, his clothes; and his little essays into and experiments in freedom may often be frustrated or ignored. In his striving for autonomy the child is bound to come into conflict with his parents as well as with the world of objects. His own limited skills become apparent, or partly so, and this may result in frustration and anger. He may often be determined to do things utterly beyond his power. Somehow, amid all this, the child has to move towards the achievement of a measure of autonomy. To help him accomplish all this, the family atmosphere and attitudes must likewise change and develop . The child's mother and father, therefore, need to know when to be able to stand back and allow the burgeoning independence to assert itself safely. Many nursery and infant teachers are very familiar with this problem. They can observe the child in a tantrum because his scissors 'won't control themselves', or see the results of frustration when grandiose schemes do not come to fruition.

Phase 4 – for Erikson, the fourth phase is the period of the middle years of childhood, coinciding roughly with the Freudian period of latency, and is of particular importance. The goal orientation of this phase is *industry* as opposed to inferiority. In the discussion of the period Erikson comments briefly on the concept of latency and is clearly not in disagreement with it, since he refers to this period as being different from the previous ones, in that there is no 'inner upheaval' and as 'a lull before the storm of puberty'. Perhaps more tellingly for the educationist he goes on to say, 'This is socially a most decisive stage, since industry involves doing things besides and with others, a first sense of the technological ethos of a culture develops at

this time'; and in the same vein, 'Many a child's development is disrupted when family life has failed to prepare him for school life, or when school life fails to sustain the promises of the earlier stages'. [72]

Erikson's theories of psychosocial development, his case studies and his cross-cultural comparisons have led him to some highly significant conclusions concerning the nature of the sex roles, of fear, of identity and of the martial drives in man. He differs from Freud on at least two major issues. For Erikson, it is essential to see human development as a life-cycle process. The human personality must meet and adapt to the changing social circumstances *throughout* life. The important processes do not occur solely in infancy. Furthermore, for Erikson, it is not only the nuclear family situation which is important; he stresses the powerful effects of *other socialisation agencies* within the culture. Much of his work has focused upon adolescence in respect of such cultural pressures in Western societies. Almost all writing on adolescence would be incredibly thin in theoretical background and lacking in plausible explanatory power without reference to the work of Erikson. His emphasis on mutuality of understanding and of a recognition of the seeds of hate and exploitation are couched in terms of the clinician, yet have ethical and philosophical overtones of some considerable importance. For him, the psychoanalyst 'can only advise to the extent to which he has grasped, in addition to the infantile origins of adult anxieties, the social and political safeguards of the individual's strength and freedom'. [73]

The psychodynamic school of writers, perhaps especially Erikson, have created an ambience in which one may well question who is educating whom, and in what way and for what purpose?

> Children are exposed to a wide variety of situations and categories of knowledge in school; but for whose benefit? and, if the result appears immediately satisfactory, is that any assurance of a healthier future for mankind? Further, studying psychoanalytically orientated theory may be interesting, but does it automatically ensure greater sensitivity to himself on the part of the teacher? The progressives would have us believe that the answer is unequivocally 'yes' to this last question.[74]

Overall, educationists allied to psychodynamic theories have emphasised consistently that it is the quality of the relationship which most often affects the learning processes in a classroom. For these educationists teaching is *not* either child-centred, or teacher-centred; it is *transaction-centred*. Teaching may be to do with children, but it is also about the teacher. His emotional health and the children's are often interrelated. Implications for the curriculum are legion; yet catering for them in courses of teacher-training is difficult. Chiefly one is concerned

to stress that it is important that children should be exposed to adults who are not only sure of how this or that might be done, but *who* they are themselves: adults interested in learning, exploring and discovering what it is to be human. 'Mutuality is partnership', says Ben Morris, and 'Reason can only function as a decisive influence in the wise conduct of life within a personality which is not at the mercy of unconscious anxieties and identifications, but which has achieved a level of integration such that its primitive components no longer function autonomously'.[75]

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

The interaction between pupil and teacher is clearly of paramount importance in the learning process. It is sometimes forgotten, however, particularly by curriculum theorists, that this means that the medium may well form the message. There can often be little or no practical distinction to be made between communication processes, classroom climate and curriculum content. To the child the psychological context of interpersonal relations and of the interplay of his teacher's and colleagues' personalities may be the most crucial factors enhancing or hampering his learning. Even though this may be the case, he may also be totally unaware of it. The teacher needs to know, however. For being concerned with the curriculum means being concerned with human development, with theories of personality and of structure of the mind. This is not, of course, a new idea. As we have seen in Chapter 1, writers as diverse and as far apart as Locke in 1690 and Benne and Muntyan in 1951 (amongst many others) have had something to say about the importance of human development in education.[76] Assumptions about children, about their nature, character formation and cognition are also as much a part of educational ideology as they have ever been. Central to many modern notions have been the attempts to detail and appraise psychological development in terms of steps or stages of increasing complexity in our growth and behaviour. Such stages have been a recurring theme in this chapter, for it can be seen that Piaget, Freud, Erikson and to a limited extent Bruner, may all be seen as having based their theories upon such conceptions of change. Though particularly significant, they are by no means alone. The most complete of the developmental continua is undoubtedly that of Erikson, whose eight stages attempt to show progress or resolution of certain goals that take man from birth to old age. Erikson's work has been notably useful to students of adolescence. Hardly a current work on adolescent development can ignore his contribution; and, indeed, there seem to have been few other theoretical and descriptive frameworks to have found favour with writers on this stage of human development. This is not to imply that other psychologists not considered in this chapter have

not used approaches to human development of a stage or phase-theory type. Robert Sears, a well-known US psychologist, has used a stage theory which attempts to take account of conditioning and social experience by building up clusters of appropriate behaviour typical of different stages in life. For the most part his theories are confined to the years before puberty. Harry Stack Sullivan was a noted psychodynamicist who tried to relate his social and anthropological interests in a theory of development primarily based upon the achievement of self-control and independence and the resolution of anxiety. Rarely are the implications of his work spelt out for educationists. Yet, as Klein has said, 'if a child has learned persistence, self-control, independence and his own value as an individual, then his anxieties can be allayed by effort and – given that society does not change too drastically while he grows up – he has been successfully socialised for high achievement.'[77]

For the educationist, therefore, some understanding of psychology is essential if one is to get the most out of learner, task and teacher. The *entering characteristics of the learners* must be diagnosed (however crudely) and catered for if a curriculum that matches the child's needs and abilities is to be attempted. Do the ideas fit together in ways that lend them to provision of a variety of 'discovery' routes for the child? Is it better that the material be handled more didactically for this particular group of children? What of the *task*? Is the subject matter itself appropriate to the children? Does it build upon concepts and areas already known? These and other such questions should be asked as preliminary ones in any formulation of the curriculum. The third 'factor', the teacher, and his or her *personality, 'style', interests and attitudes,* can be especially critical.

Does the subject matter interest the teacher? Does he or she appreciate the children's perspectives? The general organisation of plant and personnel in the school also requires some understanding of the psychology of one's colleagues, of the effects of interpersonal relations among staff, of feelings, ambitions and interests. In considering even these three very basic elements and the way they interact to form a curriculum or learning environment, one must attribute cause and effect, diagnose apparent levels of understanding and employ the rudiments of psychological knowledge. But as one might expect, a curious mixture of theories and beliefs obtains in most school staffrooms and classrooms. Some teachers may never read pedagogy or psychology after leaving college years before. Some even deny its importance and then go on to make judgements about child behaviour which illustrate an acute observation of children's feelings and perceptions over many years! Others are subject to the latest whim or fashion of educational pundits without taking time or care to analyse or reflect. Almost every teacher has his or her own theory of teaching.[78]

Many teachers have used positive reinforcement for years, usually through the immediate feedback of results to the children. Many will agree that responding to or marking a young child's work long after he has done it has little if no value to the child at all, yet will dismiss theories of motivation. Many teachers do not bother to give the children some idea of the dimensions of the subject matter and its relationship to other areas of knowledge in the way that, for instance, Bruner clearly envisaged as essential. Commonly, at the primary-school level, teachers will cite Piaget's stages of cognitive growth as being the prime factors in affecting this or that curriculum without their being able to specify more than the crudest outline of, say, concrete operations. One must bear in mind, however, that the education of British infants has been based upon considerable child choice and the benefits of play for some thirty or forty years. It has appeared in various guises, sometimes supported by Froebelian theory, at other times by reference to Dewey, Montessori, or Freud. There is little doubt, though, that of later (post Second World War) years the writings of Piaget have been of fundamental concern to teacher-trainers, if not to students in training. And, as Bassett puts it, the theories of Piaget even if only half-assimilated often accord with the 'commonsense' notions of infant teachers in particular. Piagetian theory

> is in harmony, too, with the main features of infant education, and so helps to bridge infant and junior work. And it stresses the importance of the interaction of the learner with his environment, and of self-generated interests – restoring the confidence that many had in projects by which they had later been disillusioned.[79]

Lastly, one should again emphasise that, despite the fact that most college curricula include work on Piaget and perhaps on Erikson, few in my experience make the connections between theory and practice seem sufficiently explicit and observable to the students in training. Through experience many practising teachers become sensitive to the need for a series of awareness 'checks' which, rather like the pre-flight check by a captain of an aircraft, must be made prior to take-off. Thus, for the beginning teacher, and as an aid to recall for the experienced one, the following checklist (Figure 3.1) is provided as a postscript to this chapter. It might be reflected upon before taking a new class or group, or before proposing a fresh set of topics, subjects, or ideas. It also shows, and perhaps underscores the burden of this chapter, the points of impact between psychology and the classroom. Ideally any serious consideration of these factors entails an attempt by the teacher to revise his impressions, to read, to relate the theory with his own observations of children. Above all, those factors should be related to the child *as an individual*, rather than in terms of the group as a whole. In practice an amalgam of both individual and group diagnosis is usually necessary.

Pilots have to carry out rigorous pre-flight checks before take-off. Treat the list of items in Figure 3.1 as a 'pre-flight' check for your teaching. Are you able to answer the questions or meet the conditions suggested?


Prior learning
Age and 'stage'
Conceptual level of pupils' thinking
Has this been effectively diagnosed?
Are individual differences catered for?
Motivation
Are you exploiting known motivation?
Can you plan to sustain it?
Self-Esteem
Is it work designed to enhance this?
Are positive attitudes and independence encouraged?
Thinking
Are processes such as interpreting, generalising, hypothesising envisaged?
How much practice and transfer are required?
Discovery/guided learning
Is there adequate opportunity for both?
Are both envisaged?
CURRICULUM
Sequencing
Does the area have sufficiently clear articulation within it?
Does it lend itself to certain approaches (e.g. discovery)?
Classroom climate/grouping
What is the optimum form of organisation of groups for this subject? Is interaction an integral part of planning?
Evaluation
How does this subject area suit self-evaluative and diagnostic procedures?
Teacher knowledge
Is this an area easily analysed by teacher ?
What help is necessary?
Teacher personality
Is this an area you enjoy?
Can you deal with it in a way which suits *your* personal style without diminishing children's?

Figure 3.1 *Curriculum planning and awareness check (resulting from a consideration of psychological factors affecting the curriculum).*

NOTES AND REFERENCES: CHAPTER 3

1 Isaacs, S., *The Children We Teach* (London: University of London Press, 1932), p. 11.

2 Tibble, J. (ed.), *The Study of Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (SLE), 1966).

3 See in particular Part 2, 'The perspective of the personal', in Morris, B. S., *Objectives and Perspectives in Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972).

4 Bodmer, W., 'Genetics and intelligence: the race argument', in Halsey, A. H. (ed.), *Heredity and Environment* (London: Methuen, 1977), pp. 312–22; see also Vernon, P. E., 'Intelligence testing and the nature/nurture debate, 1928–1978: what next?', *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, vol. 49, pt 1 (1979), pp. 1–14. In this context it might also prove useful to read *A Balance Sheet on Burt*, supplement, *British Psychological Society Bulletin*, vol. 33 (November 1980).

5 Much has stemmed from the catalytic effect of Rosenthal, R., and Jacobson, L., *Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils' Intellectual Development* (New York: Holt, 1968). There is much argument about the validity and reliability of such research and subsequent experiments. See, for instance, the acceptance of the research in Verma, G. K., and Bagley, C. (eds), *Race, Education and Identity* (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 5, 6; compare this with P. E. Vernon's bleak assessment, op. cit., p. 4. Over the years the argument has been that there is some evidence that pupil achievement may be in part a function of teacher expectation. The whole area of allied research is really concerned with various aspects of labelling. See Delamont, S., *Interaction in the Classroom* (London: Methuen, 1977); and Nash, R., *Teacher Expectation and Pupil Learning* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976).

6 Rutter, M., Maughan, B., Mortimore, P., and Ouston, J., *Fifteen Thousand Hours* (London: Open Books, 1979); Galton, M., Simon, B., and Croll, P., *Inside the Primary Classroom* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).

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9 A null hypothesis is one which states that there is likely to be no significant difference between two or more parameters, and the experimenter may refute or reject the null hypothesis if he finds that the apparent difference is greater than that merely attributable to the results of some sampling error.

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11 When results are slightly altered or omitted, or when figures are somewhat misrepresented in order to make results appear clearer than they really are.

12 Maehr, M. L., 'Sociocultural origins of achievement motivation', in Bar-Tal and Saxe, op. cit., p. 215.

13 For a useful US overview, see Handleman, C., 'The curriculum: the public media versus the professional books and journals', *Adolescence*, vol. 13 no. 52 (1978), pp. 563–73. There is a wealth of such material on either side of the Atlantic: some particularly emotive. See, for instance, Kitwood, T., and Macey, M., *Mind that Child* (London: Writers & Readers Publishing Co-Operative (CASE), 1977).

14 Bennett, op. cit. Bennett's major conclusion was that 'formal teaching fulfils its aims in the academic area without detriment to the social and emotional development of pupils, whereas informal teaching only partially fulfils its aims in the latter area as well as engendering comparatively poorer outcomes in academic development'.

His data were reanalysed and reintegrated by him in 1980. The original findings are now regarded as highly suspect.

15 For example, Douglas, J. W. B., *The Home and the School* (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1964); and Jackson, B., *Streaming: An Educational System in Miniature* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964).
16 Rutter *et al.*, op. cit.
17 See n. 14, above.
18 Boydell, D., *The Primary Teacher in Action* (London: Open Books, 1978).
19 Brophy, J. E., 'Interactions between learner characteristics and optimal instruction', in Bar-Tal and Saxe, op. cit., p. 136.
20 John Broadus Watson (1878–1958).
21 Polanyi, M., *The Tacit Dimension* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967).
22 Schaffer, R., *Mothering* (London: Fontana/Open Books, 1977).
23 Skinner, B. F., *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973); but see especially Nye, R. D., *What is B. F. Skinner Really Saying?* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980).
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25 Richards, I. A., *Basic English and its Uses* (London: Routledge, 1943).
26 Skinner, B. F., 'Teaching Machines', *Science*, vol. 128 (1958), pp. 969–77.
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29 See especially Evans, E. D., *Contemporary Influences in Early Childhood Education*, 2nd edn (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975).
30 Ferster, C. B., and Skinner, B. F., *Schedules of Reinforcement* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957).
31 Bijou, S., and Sturges, P., 'Positive reinforcers for experimental studies with children', *Child Development*, vol. 30 (1959), pp. 151–70; and Meacham, M., and Wiesen, A., *Changing Classroom Behaviour* (Scranton, Pa: International Textbook, 1969).
32 Evans, op. cit., p. 112. For a brief discussion of applications of behaviour modification to education (and the appropriate references), see Charles, C. M., *Individualizing Instruction* (Saint Louis: Mosby, 1980).
33 Gagné R., *The Conditions of Learning*, 2nd edn (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971).
34 Ausubel, D. P., *Educational Psychology: A Cognitive View* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), p. 139.
35 See especially 'Introduction', in Dasen, P. (ed.), *Piagetian Psychology: Cross-Cultural Contributions* (New York: Gardner Press, 1977). For a concise and up-to-date, easily assimilated overview of Piaget and of the relevance of his work, see especially *New Era*, vol. 59, no. 3 (1978). The entire issue is devoted to Jean Piaget and the application of his researches to education. See also the masterly brief appendix, 'Piaget's theory of intellectual development', in Donaldson, M., *Children's Minds* (Glasgow: Fontana, 1978); and Boden, Margaret, *Piaget* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1979): 'despite all the criticisms, there is a rich store of psychological insights and theoretical speculation, and a profusion of intriguing empirical observations and remarkably ingenious experiments, to be found in Piaget's pioneering work . . . Remember that he is usually vague and often wrong, and that there are still uncharted dimensions of structural and procedural complexity within the mind that he seemingly has little inkling of. But yes – read Piaget.' See in

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57 Stone, J. *et al.* (eds), *The Competent Infant: Research and Commentary* (London: Tavistock, 1974), p. 7.
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59 Morris, B. S., *Objectives and Perspectives in Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 223
60 Hadfield, J. A., *Childhood and Adolescence* (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1962), p. 20.
61 Free association is a technique used in psychoanalysis whereby the subject is to respond with the first word which comes to mind when he or she is presented with a stimulus word.
62 Brown, R., and Herrnstein, R. J., *Psychology* (London: Methuen, 1975), p. 558.
63 See especially Selleck, R. J. W., *English Primary Education and the Progressives, 1914–1939* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972).
64 Isaacs, S., *Social Development in Young Children* (London: Routledge, 1933), p. 19.

65 Selleck, op. cit., p. 108.
66 Isaacs, S., *Intellectual Growth in Young Children* (London: Routledge, 1931), p. 354.
67 Hughes, A. G., and Hughes, E. H., *Learning and Teaching* (London: Longman, Green, 1937).
68 Board of Education, *Report of the Consultative Committee on the Primary School* (London: HMSO, 1931) (appendix 3 is by Cyril Burt, then psychologist to the London County Council, but section iii of this appendix acknowledges and recommends the work of Isaacs; and the footnote on p. 269 contrasts the views of the behaviourists and those of the psychoanalytic school of thought.)
69 Ben Morris was Professor of Education at Bristol University (1956–77). Educated in Scotland, having been a science teacher and taught in both primary and secondary schools, he came under the influence of men like Bion during the war-years. After the Second World War, he studied psychoanalysis and was on the staff of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations. He became Director of the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER), then entered academic life. He had a considerable influence upon the shape of education courses throughout the country, especially in relation to the contributions of psychology to education.
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74 Gammage, P., and Greenwald, J., 'Human Development and the curriculum' in Lawton, D. *et al.*, *The Child, the School and the Society*, Units 5–8 (Milton Keynes: Open University, 1976), p. 88.
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Note: For a broad and fairly up to date survey of the scene in psychology, it might be worth consulting Chapman, A. J., and Jones, D. M., *Models of Man* (Leicester: British Psychological Society, 1980). This is the result of a wide-ranging and discursive conference held in 1979. The book is somewhat poorly organised but illustrates the current mechanist/humanist divide (and other issues) very clearly.

Chapter 4

Language, Communication and the Curriculum

I do not share those current views which regard as axiomatic that schools are doing a poorer job today than they did yesterday. Rather I take the view that, by and large, schools have never been all that marvellous or 'relevant' for the vast bulk of the populace and that, except for a significant but small group of the fortunate (or wealthy), most of us could be classed as 'victims of institutionalised education'.

If one looks at autobiographies containing anecdotes of schooling, one can find few written during the last century or two which portray school as a place of happiness, of relevance, or of excitement. Indeed, many autobiographies seem to demonstrate that, even for the famous members of our institutions and of government, school was very much a place of boredom, misery and timewasting. One went to school because one had to, or because it led to an interesting career. Contemporary schools are not necessarily greater failures than they were; at times, especially at the primary level, they may be a great deal better. But society now expects so much more of its schools than it did in the past. The family is rarely regarded as the important or sufficient educator. In these days of the advanced technological society, of necessary labour mobility, of the information-processing media, it is convenient and sometimes essential to keep children, adolescents and young adults in institutions and then to manipulate and cajole those institutions into releasing the right number of appropriate 'products' for the right industrial process at the right time (still as yet a rather haphazard process in Western democracies). In short, schools are part of any modern society's organisational structure and are, of course, an integral part of the labour market. They serve as a strange mixture of what one might term 'freezers', 'dams' and 'taps' in our information-rich and institutionally complex society.

Paradoxically, while schools and teachers still seem to be teaching children in such a way as to try to expand children's knowledge, they less often teach children to function as socially responsible and caring adults. It is only in a few peripheral areas of the curriculum that attention is focused upon goals that to my mind really matter: education in personal relationships, education in strategies for making sense of society's information overload, education in politics, community welfare, ecology, even in talking and thinking, rather than listening and

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watching. These strike me as some of the often neglected but fundamental areas of knowledge which are so often left to incomplete and random sources outside the classroom. It is true that there are schools whose curricula include such activities and experiences; it is true that some schools go further and recognise that children may perhaps benefit more from contributing to outside social and welfare enterprises as participators, rather than from learning mathematics. But it may be that schools are failing because they are too much consumed with wholly individualistic goals of learning, concerned that schools should be places where children listen to adults rather than where they can work with them or talk to one another, concerned with *product* rather than *process*. It is, perhaps, not so much a question of few or inexplicit goals, but simply inappropriate and conflicting ones.

Another problem seems to arise from the unresolved conflict resulting from too literal an interpretation of equality of opportunity, especially when such a notion runs up against attempts to individualise learning. Indeed, these two well-established traditions in English education, *equality* and *individualisation*, can often make a mockery of any curriculum which recognises the need for differential access to different subject areas or modes of teaching. A preoccupation with equality may result in attempts to view widely disparate abilities and interests as somehow homogeneous. At the same time current theories about individualisation tend to gloss over the resulting difficulties by expecting the impossible of the teacher – that he tailor, alter, or facilitate a vast number of approaches to a subject or idea, while holding the interests of a particularly varied and diverse group of pupils.

Since language is the primary medium through which culture is represented and interpreted, it can be seen that all these questions raised above are mediated through or dependent upon aspects of language usage and communication. At the centre of the experience of schooling, and the latter is now the main vehicle of institutionalised socialisation in all post-industrial societies, is the use and misuse of language. This fact is all too often obscured by the exponents of the verbiage of 'communication' theory and by the couching of so many classroom interaction studies in the jargon of social psychology and sociolinguistics. In this chapter I want to highlight briefly some of the main features of thinking and research about language, and to place these clearly in relation to the socialisation of children and to the shaping of the school curriculum.

Most psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists would today probably agree that the process of socialisation is one which slowly imposes certain attitudes, social roles, skills and perceptual frameworks upon the growing individual. In this process culture and cognition become inextricably linked and the language of any group becomes shaped around that group's dominant concerns. It is also a well-known

paradox that language both expands horizons and confines them; and that our experience of life is in part determined by our language and determines it. This is the so-called 'linguistic relativity' theory, which in the extreme form is sometimes known as the Whorfian hypothesis (after Benjamin Lee Whorf). Clearly, categorisation and naming are central to our socialisation and are enormously dependent upon the development and use of language. Language is perhaps *the* fundamental tool in a man's shaping of his environment, in his prediction, control and recording of events. The categories, labels and names we employ as part of our perceptual and cognitive processing of the world aid us in shaping our destiny but may also delimit and destroy. Poets, for example, have always been acutely aware of the limitations of language and, in wrestling with limitations of structure and tradition, of syntax and grammar, they have usually tried to expand, reassemble and relocate words in order that they gather a strength and import not common to normal prose commentary. But for most of us the paradox remains. The precise and careful juxtaposition of words may aid our communication, but there is always the chance that the message will be almost as much diminished or destroyed by the vehicle of language as conveyed or enhanced by it.

In early childhood language is the prime medium of repression and control. How a child behaves in a given situation is very much dependent upon what the situation means or signifies to him. Much of the meaning will have been conveyed within a particular psychological climate usually that of an early nurturance/dependence relationship with a parent. Words will have been employed by the parents almost from the outset and the *selection* of those words as well as the context in which they appear means that our perceptions of the world will be selective – initially selected for us. Thus, as Ryan says,

> The process of acquiring language in itself constitutes a form of socialisation. This is particularly true of the very earliest stages of development when the child first comes to participate in dialogue with others, and when she first uses signs whose meaning is socially rather than individually determined.[1]

Communication, however, is not language. The employment of command or demand words and even the verbal exchange of information are only aspects of communication. Communication is much more. It includes all those contextual clues that go with language and all behaviour both conscious and subconscious which people employ to influence others. Furthermore, it entails at least three basic elements; a communicator, a recipient (who registers receipt) and something to communicate. It can often be the 'cargo' of meaning surrounding the words which constitute the message which the person

(child) receives. The meaning of the word or words employed may become critically dependent upon their context. It is this, too, which linguists refer to when they talk of the wider implications of linguistic relativity. And there is yet another aspect. The child is learning to categorise and examine the phenomena of the world around him in terms which, though apparently almost infinitely flexible, are in reality very much along the lines of our parents' perceptions and, later, dependent upon the perceptions and attributions of our social groups. Thus, subcultural values and the *emotional* context of language learning are also extremely important. Of course, many will point out that socialisation is a two-way process. The child socialises the parents to a not insignificant extent at the same time as his reality is being shaped for him. But for the most part he faces a linguistically packaged world. The linguistic package, forming part of the total communication, is embedded within the values and attitudes of the family, group, or class into which the child is born – as well as located within the concerns of a particular ethnic, linguistic and geographic domain. As the years progress and due to the processes of social interaction and cognitive maturation the child gradually acquires a system of communication which is common to his social group; his cognition and culture become fused and interrelated.

Language is, thus, both the controller and the great liberator. It enables generalisation and abstraction to become the important linchpins of an hypothesising and extending inquiry into the phenomena of life. According to most psychologists, with the exception perhaps of Piaget who saw thought as rooted in processes deeper than the acquisition of language, our cognition is dependent upon language. Our language both represents and transforms experiences. It occupies a central role in our perceptions of the world *and* of ourselves, since it also becomes the medium of control, repression and the organisation of the psyche. In the early stages of life rules are presented to children as the way life is and these are then developed or changed as language and understanding become more sophisticated. Many psychodynamic theorists believe that the personality is to a significant extent formed through reactions to approval or disapproval expressed verbally by the people who have greatest salience in the eyes of the child. This means that the development of the personality is in large part the result (if not the sum) of verbal interaction with significant others. Harry Stack Sullivan, for example, is one of the psychodynamic theorists who lay great stress upon the importance of language in the process of developing self-knowledge and self-integration.[2]

Normal children acquire language in a very short period of time. Within something approximating two to two and a half years, most children have acquired a working foundation in their mother-tongue. Thus, between 18 months and 3–4 years of age the child achieves

mastery over an area of considerable cognitive complexity. With language as his prime tool he learns to organise, comprehend and challenge the world around him. Vygotsky has, unlike Piaget, emphasised language as the prime basis of the conscious and subconscious structuring of the world through the child's thought processes. He suggested that the processes of developing thought and developing speech can be thought of as two intersecting circles such that 'inner speech' becomes the 'verbal thought' of the child.[3] This verbal thought is initially non-existent in the new-born and early infant, since thought and speech are completely independent of one another. The child is in its early 'natural' or 'primitive' period when thought is non-verbal and speech (babbling) non-cognitive. From then the child moves through subsequent stages of increasing awareness and complexity until, according to Vygotsky, he reaches the point where synthesis and analysis can be carried out at an abstract level. In this progress language is the vital force which gives power to the mental processes.

It should be pointed out, however, that Furth,[4] a psychologist responsible for a considerable amount of research on deaf children, has found that in both hearing and hearing-impaired children the thinking processes appear very similar. The hearing-impaired children did almost as well in problem-solving exercises as those children with normal hearing, though, as Conrad[5] reports, 'degree of hearing loss itself is a weak guide to the availability of internal linguistic resources'. There is, however, little doubt that language *aids* thinking and problem-solving and, though Piaget and Vygotsky differ in their orientation towards the relationship between thought and language, they do not differ in their recognition of the interdependence and importance of those two cognitive processes. Indeed, that interdependence is now a commonplace and a common meeting-point of many differently oriented social scientists. Thus, the integration of the child into his social world is, in large part, an integration into a cognitive and perceptual framework with language as the principal medium.

The implications of the complex relationship between cognition and culture are far-reaching, and the consequent focus on language as both shaping and being shaped by culture and values almost inevitable. Much of this attention of the last fifteen or twenty years appears to have had a particular fascination for educationists. The connection between language and social class (however described) has in part led to many of the interventionist curriculum programmes both in England and the USA. Those who, for instance, accept that middle-class children consistently perform better in certain aspects of school work than do working-class children, may attempt to explain such superior performance in terms of some superior language capability. It has been argued, to put it crudely, that the differences in language development

between middle-class and working-class children may be classified in the following way:

in terms of vocabulary differences: middle-class children appear to have the larger vocabulary;
in terms of effectiveness of use: middle-class children appear to be able to use language more effectively in certain situations (explication, de-contextualisation) than do working-class children.

(see Appendix A for outline)

There are a variety of reasons commonly put forward for such apparent differences. For instance, there does seem some evidence that working-class mothers have less time to spend in talking with their infants than middle-class mothers. There is also some suggestion that middle-class mothers are more careful over 'labelling' and, indeed, play vocabulary games with their children which associate parts of the body or particular actions with specific words. But the relationship between social class and language use is clearly *much* more complex than this and the weaknesses in emphasising global differences are that they may obscure much that is situationally and contextually beneficial in the communication *other* than language. Wells puts this very succinctly in a discussion of Joan Tough's position, in saying that 'the polarising procedure of the researcher may lead to a possibly erroneous conclusion that there are two different kinds of human beings, one being superior to the other'.[6]

It would appear that, in general, descriptive studies of language development both in England and the USA have revealed marked social-class differences in language usage by the age of 5 years or so. These differences have in some cases been viewed by educationists in terms of 'deficiencies' of one sort or another on the part of the working-class children, and have thus led to attempts to compensate by implementing systematic language-training schemes at an early stage of schooling. Such compensatory programmes are less than helpful, however, if they predispose teachers to a view of the world which focuses on certain aspects of language production, rather than upon the context and reciprocity of the total communication. It is perhaps worth emphasising the view of Cazden *et al.*: 'Irrespective of idiosyncratic and sociocultural variations, most authorities believe that all languages and dialects are inherently equal in terms of structure and complexity and that systematic deviations from any one formal, standard language form do not indicate inherent intellectual differences.'[7]

Ginzburg,[8] among many others such as Rosen,[9] has criticised the general hypothesis that working-class children are in some way 'deprived', that is, they cannot use language as effectively as middle-class children. Indeed, Bernstein's[10] conclusions have been frequently

criticised on the grounds that he does not sufficiently distinguish between language production and language comprehension. Rosen maintains that the relationship between social class and language is not easily or well described using conventional sociological methods and that 'working-class speech has its own strengths which the normal linguistic terminology has not been able to catch'.[11] (See also Chapter 5.) In all, the issues concerning the relationships between language and social class remain unresolved, or at best not fully understood. Certainly there is sufficient evidence[12] that one is excessively simplistic, if one assumes that school learning difficulties common to particular sociocultural groups can be necessarily overcome by increasing practice in 'labelling', 'question-asking', or by teaching such 'deprived' children standard middle-class forms of language. This is not to say that there are no differences in language production or in usage and comprehension, but to reiterate Wells's point, 'If learning takes place through communication, and communication requires collaboration between the participants in the negotiated construction of a shared reality, it seems that it will be in the further exploration of the complex nature of linguistic communication that the contribution to educational success will be found'.[13]

Everyday experience, the stuff of normal everyday life, this 'shared reality', needs descriptions. We attach labels, we attribute different qualities and we categorise events and objects according to the beliefs and values of a particular sociocultural group. Language, though not the only component in our registry of perceptions of the world, is central to the socialisation process; and with its aid, we structure our world and assign meanings according to 'rules' derived from home, school and peer-group experience. The influences of home, school and peers are not necessarily congruent. Schools are, in a sense, commissioned by society to perform tasks of education, selection and training, in such a way as to ensure a reasonable 'goodness of fit' into a particular type of adult society. Usually, or at least overtly, such fitting is expected to be accomplished without too much violence to the child: such is the current fashion. But, ultimately, schools exist to inculcate knowledge, skills and values which have some traditional 'validity' or reputation in the existing culture. As such, and in the broadest terms, the school curriculum is related to political and ideological concerns. Different societies exert different forms of pressure upon their children, and in the democratic societies of the Western world, many of these pressures are haphazard and result from the market forces of capitalism. In totalitarian societies the pressure may be more clearly channelled through schooling and may be more congruent with the wishes of the political masters, but may be no less reprehensive than those arising from peer preference or the vagaries of the mass-media. In almost any society there seems a vague and ill-defined line between education and

indoctrination. Schooling, however, never starts with a clean slate (unless one classifies kibbutz-type socialisation as 'schooling' and totally disregards the contributions of inheritance to the development of the child). It has to build upon existing habits, attitudes and labels derived from earlier family experience. It may potentially confer, alter, or markedly conflict with the former and existing patterns of socialisation experienced by the clients.

Most teachers are acutely aware of the problems and difficulties inherent in their role, and few practitioners can afford the luxury of assuming that socialisation is merely a process imposing certain easily agreed perspectives upon the child; far from it indeed. For socialisation is not merely the business of learning and training in a passive neo-behaviourist sense; it is a process to which, as stressed earlier, the child may very actively contribute. The child is no mere passive imbiber of received wisdom and conventions. Also, and especially nowadays, when large numbers of sophisticated and media-conscious teenagers are compelled to attend school, an adolescent may be more in touch with the dynamic and changing forces in the society than the arch-priests of culture themselves. All this makes for strain and tension, with different groups and different communities holding very different views about modes of child-rearing, pedagogy, curricular content and evaluation, as well as giving rise to potent disagreement over the inculcation of values and attitudes and of the role of language in all this.

It is not merely the problem of different perceptions of the environment, however. While many psychologists acknowledge that the child's view of the environment critically affects his reactions and behaviour, they also point to the relationship between success in school and identification with teachers' perspectives. Some, like Goodman[14] and Holt[15] suggest that schooling may actually serve to alienate and block aspirations of many children. Schools tend to enhance the identities of those few children who do well, but unfortunately almost always expose the children who are unable to compete. The latter may well be in the majority in many schools.

Nearly ten years ago, Barnes provided clear demonstration of the way that teachers so often fail to appreciate fully that the ways they use language in classroom interaction may close off rather than open up avenues of approach for the child. His partners, Britton and Rosen,[16] have also exposed the weaknesses in many curricula and ways of teaching which are encapsulated in stereotyped notions of 'standard English' and in classroom communication which demands *less* thinking and talking, rather than more. The National Association for the Teaching of English (*NATE*) and the Schools Council have been fecund in the ideas they have put before teachers (particularly secondary-school teachers) for stimulating and broadening the role of English in the curriculum. But the developing traditions of flexibility of pedagogical

approach (and these have a long history in England, particularly in infant schools) have recently come under considerable scrutiny and, despite the lack of firm evidence concerning optimum ways of curricular organisation and transaction, there seems to be a fairly vociferous lobby demanding a return to the methods and possibly the content of yesteryear.

In summary, then, it would seem that in recent years the school curriculum and its relevance to the ways in which we socialise our children have become central concerns in the social science and philosophy of education. The selection and management of the 'stock of knowledge', the values and attitudes of the teachers, the relationship between language and social control have taken on new meaning since the work of Bernstein,[17] Wilson,[18] Davies[19] and Young,[20] to mention merely a few. Changing views of education have in part led to different patterns of orgnisation both nationally, and within the institutions themselves. Some of these changes have intensified and complicated the presentation of knowledge, skills and values (the curriculum) in such a way as to make the following issues of immediate practical concern to teachers:

(1) Given the demand for heterogeneous groupings of children of wide ability ranges throughout all levels of education (up to and including the sixth form); how does one provide *differential access* to the curriculum, that is, different points of entry according to ability and interest, while at the same time developing ideas logically and systematically so that they can be evaluated in fairly traditional modes by examination bodies respected by public employers?[21]

(2) Given a curricular organisation which allows children to be engaged in different levels of work at the same time, how can evaluation and the diagnosis of learning problems be handled speedily and efficiently without taking too much valuable teaching time away from the teacher?

(3) With all the current concern for accountability and standards, is it possible to allow different language registers to be employed in the classroom, yet at the same time to provide for a reasonably high level of working oracy and literacy in all children?

(4) How does one communicate a love of precision, elegance and intellectual rigour without (*a*) alienating many children who may see no relevance or social purpose in such learning, and (*b*) at the same time too rigidly selecting only that view of the world which is firmly rooted in the socialisation of the teachers themselves?

(5) How can schooling and the curriculum be adapted to the kind of people the children *are*, rather than frozen into organisational traditions which resist change?

(6) Ought all children, regardless of ability or interest, to follow some sort of nationally agreed core curriculum in oracy, numeracy and literacy?

(7) Can enthusiasm, love of subject matter, liveliness and charisma (even supposing most teachers *did* have such qualities) provide sufficient basis for teacher authority and power within school groups or larger communities holding views which are hostile to or at least non-congruent with the teacher's main purpose?

It is not unduly optimistic to say that most of the above questions can be answered and the associated problems accommodated (if not solved) at the prepubertal levels of English schooling. This is partly because in England most primary and middle schools are small and allow for great flexibility of organisation, as well as intimacy and general ease of communication; partly because prior to adolescence even today's sophisticated children still seem to be excited by learning and oriented favourably towards adults and teachers in particular. By mid-adolescence the story can be quite different. Many teachers of 14-year-olds tell of the rapid alienation which seems to set in, particularly among certain social groups, at about this age.

To communicate a set of ideas to any child, the teacher normally employs language. He may not employ it as openly or as flexibly as he thinks, but during the course of any school day he will engage in various types of communication. As Barnes and many others have pointed out, the tragedy is that these forms of communication are often much more closed (and often less communicative) than the teacher believes. Indeed, so rigid and inflexible are some forms of language employed in classrooms by the teachers that one might be forgiven for demanding that a legitimate part of all student-teacher courses include observation of the teacher's language usage. Equally, it seems fair to say that many children would benefit from a course in understanding and practice in the type of language employed during the teaching process, since some seem particularly bewildered by it. Closely related, a major goal of any secondary-school language curriculum might be to sensitise children to the concepts and language usage of the different areas of study, such as the sciences, the behavioural sciences, humanities and the arts. At the infant or remedial level the teacher's understanding of the function of language as a teaching instrument is absolutely vital, otherwise the language used may prove to have precisely the opposite effect. But the dangers are there throughout the age range. Too many youngsters are already 'cooled out' of the system by 13 or 14 years of age, as much by the medium as by the message.

In *The Relevance of Education*, Bruner develops a line of approach which, while not unique (it is for instance one of the principal themes of Bramelá in 1965), nevertheless emphasises that education is not and

never can be a neutral process.[22] Knowledge is power; access to information so often spells leadership or the ability to gain and exploit further knowledge; knowledge implies action and commitment; and Bruner would have us both recognise and emphasise this. Teachers have the job of ensuring that children grasp the structures of the knowledge imparted in such a way that they can rapidly distinguish the 'significant' information from the 'insignificant'. According to this view, teachers must endeavour to structure knowledge in a way that leads to 'optimal comprehension' and the 'true' value of any knowledge area depends to a large extent on it being 'coded', so that it is *usable* by children both now and in the future. The cynic might suggest that so much of what is taught in school may still be classified under the old infant-school heading of 'busy work', that is, work which has no real significance other than that it occupies the children and prevents them from directing (or misdirecting) their energies elsewhere. This is not to take a strong Illich or de-schooling line, however. It is simply to restate the obvious and to add weight to the reminder that the power of external or extrinsic motivation rapidly declines in its ability to shape behaviour,[23] and that, in being both attractive and highly motivating, it would appear that learning which is to do with coping with real and everyday issues is likely to appeal to many adolescents.

There are, of course, serious problems. For one thing formal knowledge, especially that knowledge which in the past has been designed for an elite, is bound to seem so often inappropriate and out of touch with the needs, aspirations and interests of the vast bulk of the populace. However, schools as institutions should not take too much notice of this, to do so would render them inactive – paralysed by doubt, by ambiguous and conflicting messages from members of their role-set (managers, governors, parents and advisers). Schools, in fact, dare not deal in the day-to-day stuff of life except in terms peripheral to their central concerns. To be imaginative, too outrageous, too concerned with areas not centred on the *traditions* of knowledge, would be to invite criticism, ridicule and very close scrutiny. Such a situation means that, to be safe, most school knowledge must be held relatively inert, its potency concerned only with those areas for which there is already public approval. Thus, the school curriculum may only marginally deal with issues of greater moment than long-division or the Peasants' Revolt. It may not devote too much time to health education (despite the fact that stress, inappropriate diet, lack of exercise, the motor car and smoking kill millions in our advanced industrial societies every year!). It may not be too overtly concerned with ecology, child-rearing, citizenship, advertising, house maintenance, role-stereotyping and a host of other aspects of useful knowledge. Nor can schools spend too much time on the aesthetic, moral, or even erotic in the arts or humanities, despite the enriching effect such ideas may have had for mankind.

If schools could risk only some of such vitalising input into their curricula, it is likely that they would capture the increasing interests of the disaffected children, especially among the adolescents, who are for the first time truly 'socially inspired' human beings. But to do this would almost certainly alienate a large number of adults. Caught between the Scylla of socially approved knowledge and the Charybdis of those who desire 'relevance' at any price, the struggling teacher so often sticks to the safe, traditional, the impotent and the largely 'useless'. Meanwhile our adolescents are caught by the seeming relevance offered by the mass-media and the pulp magazines; and they fall prey to the dubious influences of market forces on a large scale. From the dull, the seemingly useless knowledge of equilateral triangles or iambic pentameters, they turn gladly to the glib, packaged and ersatz attractions of the salesman and the disco. Strangely, some matters of moment are easier to inject into the primary curriculum. Partly this is because primary teachers are, for the most part, less possessive and parochial about their knowledge (which, as Wilson[24] says, is 'spread very thin'); partly it rests on the now well-established recent traditions of integration together with those past traditions of 'usefulness' which are part of the elementary inheritance. But mostly I suspect that, as Ted Sizer implies, it is much easier to introduce even radical changes into the elementary/primary schools because people tend to think primary schools do not have much impact upon our social structures, upon society itself.[25] Certainly, their products do not have the same immediate import for the job market, the labour exchange, or the voting booth as has the adolescent school-leaver.

Socialisation in our society is still very dependent upon schooling. Yet during adolescence especially, many children perceive the curricula as frozen in the traditions of the past, as irrelevant to their needs and as socially unattractive. If some of this may be due to those 'natural' processes of adolescent development, to the increasing attention paid to the peer group and to the problems associated with their own burgeoning power and sexuality, these are factors which schools should surely be able to exploit more fully. For a healthy society youth needs to be involved in the wider activities of that society, not isolated and insulated from them. Youth needs responsibility and power; and the school curriculum has to ensure a genuine introduction to the concerns of an adult society, as well as basic knowledge and skills.

But perhaps as trends are, it is necessary to reiterate that it cannot be taken for granted that the more schooling there is, the better off the children are likely to be. Raising the school-leaving age may, for many children, be a bad preparation for later life. In England, it is greatly to the credit of the teaching force that ROSLA was incorporated so smoothly into the curriculum, though at what real cost to teachers and children few can say. Young people, and perhaps especially those who

are underprivileged, have to be helped to take part in the decision-making processes of society. The adult public (or politicians, as their representatives) may demand the incarceration of their adolescents without fully realising that many schools have organisations and curricula which call for the acceptance of paternalistic and authoritarian views of society, which demand that much of the day is spent in 'busy work' of precious little use to the adolescents involved. Consequently, many adolescents vote with their feet. ROSLA caused a sharp peak in the rates of truancy[26] and many fifth-year pupils are aware of what Buxton[27] referred to as the considerable mismatch between adolescents and school knowledge; furthermore, many schools seem unwilling or incapable of realising how fundamental this mismatch is. Perhaps the real problem is most succinctly put by Ward in his brilliant and perceptive study of adolescent girls. The greatest difficulty (apart from the case with the naturally gifted teacher) is that the teaching profession has itself become an autonomous one, detached both from the frontiers of knowledge and from the artisan and professional occupations where the teacher's knowledge is usable in the real world.[28]

Writing in the mid-1970s Coleman, in the USA, referred to the Presidential Science Advisory Committee Panel on Youth (1974), which suggested considerable reforms in the US school system. Among those reforms was the suggestion that, at post-puberty in particular, schools should pay much more heed to the problems of society at large, that there should be a fundamental reassessment of the aims of the schools and that it is essential that children learn to be accountable by being *involved* in the community. The Committee emphasised three major points concerning the aims of schooling. These were:

(1) that schools as currently conceived tend to restrict experiences of children to those of their own subcultures and of age-stratified (peer) groups, that they therefore need to provide greater experience across social groups and age ranges than at present;
(2) that social maturation implies the experience of having others dependent upon one's own actions, that schools fail to ensure this and tend to encourage passivity and dependency;
(3) that involvement in interdependent and shared activities leading to (for instance) such things as community projects ought to be a major school aim.[29]

At about the same time Eggleston, in England, was summarising the results of a five-year survey of the Youth Service in which he found that adolescents were not, by and large, sufficiently involved in decision-making processes, even when those decisions affected them directly. He noted that the institutions which served youth over the age range of approximately 14–20 invariably demonstrated and demanded the

acceptance of a school-like paternalism and rigidly hierarchical views of society.[30] (A condition to contemplate in the light of comments on the relationships between children's internal and external orientations and achievement; see Chapter 7.)

The Department of Education and science (DES) includes personal and social development of secondary pupils as its proposition 12 in a recent discussion document on the secondary-school curriculum. One wonders whether the authors read Coleman's material or that issued by the Presidential Committee, since one notes how *passively conceived* is that curriculum outlined by them in the propositions thus presented. True, it is meant to be a discussion document and the Inspectorate do see the need for a broader curriculum base. But the breadth briefly outlined seems very much the mixture as before. 'It implies' they say, 'a substantially larger compulsory element than now',[31] but with some provision for choice and differentiation. It is not so much the notion of 'compulsion in breadth' that one finds distasteful, as the tone of a document produced five years after the Eggleston survey of the Youth and Community Service and which takes little account of the plethora of reports from the USA and Europe on the need to *involve* adolescents in their education; a document which takes little account of recent work on the attitudes of youth towards schooling,[32] of the pioneering work of, say, Dickson with VSO,[33] of the cumulative reports of Bronfenbrenner on schooling in Western societies,[34] to mention but a few. Yet in 1977 Hemming wrote, 'The principle of involvement in education, to which people are turning more and more, is based on the conviction that education should be a mutual activity, in which the adult part is not to do something *to* children and adolescents but to do something *with* them'.[35] Success or failure in the secondary school, even more than in the primary school, would seem to depend so much upon shared goals and shared realities, rather than otherwise. This is not to see the curriculum simply in terms of 'openness', or of greater child/student control and simple beliefs in the enhancement of pleasure in learning. There are undoubtedly many variables at play. But it is to state that a participation in a curriculum which has some obvious meaning for living seems essential for effective adolescent motivation. Adolescents do need and deserve to see what results are clearly contingent upon their actions, much as expressed by the US Presidential Committee. Futhermore, whatever the methodological weaknesses of current research, or the concomitant fashions which tend to emphasise home, or school, or teaching style virtually to the exclusion of the others, it does seem as though schooling post-puberty is quite commonly detached from the needs and aspirations of many ordinary pupils. From a psychologist's point of view, schools ought to be concerned about communicating *with* pupils, ought to be concerned about human relations and citizenship, as much as about basic skills. ('Basic' is perhaps a misnomer anyway for skills that

are basic to human survival, and the quality of relationships may be even more basic than those currently designated as such.) Indifference towards school is a common enough attitude among present-day adolescents within my recent experience, and effective communication with them only takes place when it involves cognitive and emotional motivation such that they feel responsible or 'engaged'. The research of Rutter *et al.* showed that schools in which children were given responsibility were likely to have higher examination success and show more co-operative pupil behaviour than were schools where responsibility was less frequently shared with pupils.[36] Such criteria are by no means the only or even sufficient ones for measuring the success of schooling, but they fit much work from diverse sources (see Chapter 7). They fit neatly with the current work of Brophy or Aronson[37] and especially into the stream of work by de Charms, who enhanced children's motivation by demonstrating clearer patterns of responsibility and success in his classroom-intervention studies.[38] The issues are, however, neither simple to investigate nor to present. They tend to involve repeated value judgements about the purpose of schooling in society. Does one encourage passivity, group obedience and loyalty (an active feature currently being researched in Poland and Hungary in various social-psychological studies)? And might this lead to eventual alienation and rejection? Does one wish to enhance individuality and personal responsibility and power? And might that lead to anarchy? The relationships between such dimensions of pupil personality and behaviour are in part the results of the systems and styles we adopt. As yet many curriculum-planners have not begun to comprehend the messages implicit in the work of psychologists like Bronfenbrenner or Rotter,[39] that much of the problem about shaping and content of the curriculum lies in the type of transactions, in the contingencies and predictabilities of the child's learning, rather than in content itself.[40]

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This chapter is an extended version of 'Language, communication and the curriculum' which first appeared in *New Universities Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 3 (Summer 1978), pp. 353–68.

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Chapter 5

Socialisation and Achievement

THE WORK ETHIC: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND SOCIOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

> To the Marxian the individual man is made by his economic environment; the revolutionary, the artist, the inventor is pushed up like a bubble out of seething economic need. The Freudian likewise, though on very different grounds, puts the genetic endowment at discount, and sees man's achievement from the point of view of his adjustment or maladjustment to his particular experience.[1]

Almost all theories of human behaviour have, at some stage or other to take account of the question 'What is it that appears to motivate a man or woman?' and, while the idea expressed by Barlow is somewhat simplistic (for instance, Freud held that the *id* never changes and therefore cannot properly be regarded as putting the genetic endowment at total discount[2]), nevertheless it epitomises two extreme points of view which may be considered along that continuum of theories which are commonly embraced by social psychologists. How a person develops a desire to do well in all or certain activities is often the subject of enormous inferential leaps. After all, it is often difficult enough to decide why the person standing next to one in the queue has trodden on one's toe! Was it accidental? Did he do it deliberately? Is he trying to say something? We go through life attributing motive and cause, often on the slenderest of evidence. People, we are told, internalise certain views of the world. These views appear to be related to childhood experiences, to early socialisation, to the values and social norms of the groups to which the children belong. Also, while acknowledging the prime importance of the family in this process, it is clear that the school plays a not insignificant part, as recent work by Rutter and his associates (despite methodological weaknesses) would confirm.[3] Since schools are themselves concerned with what counts as 'valid knowledge',[4] some link between school and culture must be assumed, if not always apparent. Lines of connection are tenuous and diffuse at times, at others immediate and obvious. Diagrammatically a static illustration of the arena (that is, one which cannot show the changing shifts and emphases, pressures and feedback which are constantly taking place in the real world) would resemble Figure 5.1.

The adaptive, creative and 'plastic' nature of human behaviour is sufficient warning in itself to anyone intent upon tracing, however

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

Figure 5.1 *The links between the institutionalisation of 'valid knowledge' and culture.*

briefly, the immediate historical antecedents of what has been loosely termed by psychologists and sociologists 'achievement motivation', a widely generalised wish to master or desire to do well. But to any educationist, the burgeoning of state provision of education in nineteenth-century Europe and North America and the fact that

particular tasks or emphases were laid upon schooling must surely be significant.

Many psychologists have examined the psychosocial origins of individuals or groups in terms of familial antecedents.[5] Sociologists have at times been preoccupied with questions of the grosser social differences in provision of opportunity. Consequently, any attempt at a brief overall or 'panoramic' view must take account of evidence both from the culture in question, and from personal dynamics.[6] But, in either case, and under whichever 'umbrella' the evidence is eventually classified, it is often only within the early stages of schooling that many differences in human behaviour become glaringly obvious, and that expressed motivational forces become public. It is only really the school which so effectively embodies the social-psychological interplay of family and society in such magnitude and which displays it so publicly in terms of certification and examination. Three themes constantly emerge in various forms. These are:

(1) the interdependence of cognition and culture;
(2) the relationship between socioeconomic background and educational attainment;
(3) the perceptions of the achieving self held by the individual.

The three are complexly interrelated and traverse a gamut of variables, from those clearly conceived in terms of individual psychology to those more usually associated with the analysis of social systems. Few writers attempt to encompass the whole range, though some have argued that sociological research would benefit from the use of psychological theory as an important element in sociological analysis.[7] Finlayson puts it plainly when, remarking that processes of internalisation and learning are essential to socialisation, he says, 'The problems of how to conceptualise the learning processes which are integral to socialisation are not strictly those of sociology and [that] sociologists might reasonably look for help to that discipline which has devoted considerable attention to such processes, viz. psychology'.[8]

Time, too, is an important factor in the process and one generation's norms are by no means necessarily those of another. Even history changes from generation to generation, as new evidence and understanding permeate the culture.[9] But the dominant concerns of any society must be implicit in its educational provision.[10] In industrial and technical societies, such as those which developed in England, the USA and parts of Europe in the nineteenth century, education rapidly became a social necessity. The diffusion of basic skills, such as literacy, and the provision of technocrats and entrepreneurs for the nation's economic expansion were of prime importance. The school

was also expected to stimulate certain social values and to help in the control and selection of talent appropriate to societal need; also the amelioration, absorption, or prevention of class conflict may have been, and still may be, a vital function of the school.[11] The aims of education appeared then to be very differently emphasised according to the social level of those to be educated; sex too was an important differentiator in terms of both opportunity, and the curriculum. Nowadays the aims appear to be threefold and somewhat more uniform across the sexes. They involve dimensions of both specialist and general education as the 'root' of the culture, but with emphasis changing according to the ideology and assumptions of those involved. In broad terms these aims can be expressed as:

(1) education as an aid to the perpetuation and reinforcement of existing patterns of economic and social arrangements;
(2) education both as a vehicle for modifying, developing, or responding to changes in the established socioeconomic system, and as a means of self-development and fulfilment;
(3) education as a revolutionary agency involved in preparing/encouraging the reorganisation of the society in a fundamentally different way from those of the present.

The different aspects stressed within what might be termed broadly social reconstructionist theories (group 2, above) in the nineteenth century are very much the same as those discussd today: education for individual understanding and education for social commitment of a specific kind. Indeed, an uneasy ambivalence concerning these two elements can be traced in most statements about the role of schooling in Europe and North America during the last two centuries. Such ambivalence is still evident in current writings (and particularly so in 'official' publications, such as the English *Trends in Education*, and in Department of Education and Science papers on the curriculum),[12] and was clearly exhibited in the preamble to the Education Act, 1944, 'to educate all individuals, from cradle to grave, to participate in a democratic and technological society and to serve their country loyally'.[13] Inevitably, as well as in the more obvious tension between church and state in England, the educational movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reflect the tensions between individual and societal 'need' as perceived in different theories of education.

More often, however, and especially in the age of rapid industrial expansion, the prevailing emphases were upon aims closer to those expressed in group 1, above, that is, upon order and economy for the benefit of the existing social structure. While in the USA men like Horace Mann and later John Dewey stressed developing understanding

and individual growth, and in England Owen and Shaftesbury had advocated social reconstruction, the arrangements for state education in the nineteenth century (including the overriding ethos of children's books[14]) appear to have been underwritten by the maxim 'God's in his heaven: all's right with the world'. There was therefore considerable emphasis upon the necessity for and the dignity of striving, and a nationalistic pride which in England and the USA quite overrode the budding 'child-centred' ideas emanating from the more progressive wing of European educational thought. Such assertions are, however, at best sweepingly simplistic. What one is concerned to suggest is that the predominantly Protestant flavour of the developing state schooling in nineteenth-century England and America was of itself bound to stress those elements of economic capitalism and personal striving mentioned by Weber as arising from the Calvinist doctrines of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and over which the great political and cultural struggles of Europe were fought.[15] It seems reasonable to maintain, as Butts and Cremin have done,[16] that the history of education must be as much concerned with the broad sweep of ideas (which helped fashion and give rationale for pedagogical provision and practice) as with documenting the changing social conditions which aid or accompany them.

In Western and Central Europe during the nineteenth century one might perceive the gradual movement towards democratic government, or at least the adoption of universal manhood suffrage for 'parliamentary' elections of various types. This was less a matter of philanthropy or of middle-class thinking, than the result of agitation by working-class leaders. Such movements were 'usually acquiesced in, and even applauded by, liberals ... [everyone] might be expected to share the basic concern of the bourgeoisie for industry and commerce, for property rights and material prosperity'.[17] This necessarily led to an increasing state interest in the education of its workers for a machine age, an education which echoed the tenets of the governing classes and the rising bourgeoisie. Hayes points out that in many ways protestantism appeared demonstrably more adaptable than catholicism to the 'modern civilisation'. Not only were there repeated emphases upon and exhortations towards progress, sober thrift and individualism, but there was also the fact that Protestants were able to employ the 'right of private judgement', could justify, explain and interpret their ideas about religion, science and social structure without rejecting their Christian beliefs or official creeds.[18]

As is now well known, the Protestants were also much more open to the various impacts of Darwinism and to the pressure from the emerging intellectuals and scientists. This led to some major conflict and to the support of quite different positions within protestantism, from which emerged such totally polarised viewpoints as fundamentalism and

positivism (this latter, it should be noted, reflects a marked change from the earlier Calvinist doctrine with its emphasis on predetermination). No one in his right mind would present the Protestant Ethic as some unified whole. This would be to flout historical evidence.[19] But undoubtedly an ethos of independence, self-control and striving led to notions of life dedicated to a succession of good works, and these ideas may easily be represented as part of a roughly unified system which had become common (even as early as the Reformation) to all forms of protestantism. Goldstein and Oldham in talking of the social history of the USA refer to the religious legitimation and significance of 'our pre-eminent social doctrine and guiding myth'; perhaps, one of the best ways of describing the Protestant Ethic.[20]

The admittance of differing shades of protestantism was one of the vital aspects which particularly distinguished the evolutionary or 'moderately progressive' attitude of the nineteenth-century Protestant towards religion and Christianity, and which involved this 'shift of emphasis from "faith" to "good works"'.[21] Whether that modernist attitude was in part responsible for the striving, competing ambience now associated with the Weberian Protestant Ethic, whether that ambience had something to with the *national* nature of the Protestant religions, as opposed to the supranational nature of catholicism, is perhaps a matter of conjecture. Certainly, a cluster of notions thus derived has become labelled – a convenient shorthand since Weber's essays, and one which has been employed by a great variety of social scientists for the last seventy years or so. And one notes with interest that a combination of nationalism, belief in material progress, upsurging concern with education, an emphasis on duty and work in the education of children *and* protestantism were all part of the common mixture of ideas prevalent in nineteenth-century England and North America. An optimism, too, was also present; a belief that material and spiritual advance lay before them is epitomised in Belamy's statement, 'The Golden Age lies before us and not behind us, and is not far away. Our children will surely see it, and we, too, who are already men and women, if we deserve it by our faith and by our works'.[22] One still cannot do better than consult Karier[23] for a discussion of this belief in relation to the impact of Darwinism and of Spencerian thought upon that admixture of achievement and competition. Further, to assert that this was entirely a period of optimism and belief in material progress is to exaggerate. Certain people, from the impoverished farm labourers to the poetic establishment, were far from hopeful. Woodhead,[24] in an essay on Arnold, writes of the sense of loss and dissillusionment often characteristic of Victorian poets, saying that there was a nostalgic feeling 'of something irrevocably lost. Clearly there were those who did not subscribe to the notion of the spiritual advantage of material progress. Whilst many Victorians may have regarded progress as a

substitute religion – there were still plenty who opposed it (including the Catholics). Pope Pius IX listed progress as the eightieth error in his *Syllabus Errorum* of 1864'.[25]

As a prelude to the 'Golden Age', the USA for example was seeking, and to no little effect, to weld her immigrant inhabitants into one homogeneous nation. English was the unifying language, protestantism (and its variants from New England pietism onwards) the predominant religion, and above all, *education* was the vehicle for implanting common ideals and traditions. The Americans began more and more to equate personal achievement with moral excellence. 'From log cabin to White House' came to signify something more than mere material advancement. Such a work ethic or ideology, whilst no doubt an important unifying factor in American society after the Civil War, resulted in a marked upsurge of materialism. There was also, as Coveney points out, an increasing number of books on childhood. This was 'the surest sign of the prevalence of that arrested moral development which is the result of the business life, the universal repression in the American population of all those impulses that conflict with commercial success'.[26] Coveney extends this view, quoting Mark Twain, and says that for the private as opposed to the public Mark Twain the reality of the nineteenth century was one of intense materialism and redolent of the air of everyone striving for material success. 'All Europe and all America are feverishly scrambling for money . . . Money-lust has always existed, but not in the history of the world was it ever a craze, a madhouse, until your time and mine.'[27]

It may well be unwise to take Twain's bitter statement as yet another piece of evidence linking present-day achievement motivation with the burgeoning capitalism of the USA and Europe of 100 years ago. Yet such a thesis is very well known and there are many hundreds of references to it in current English social-science literature. It is explicit, as regards the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in particular, in Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*;[28] it is implicit in a host of cognitive-attitudinal expressions on the purpose of child-rearing, in educational curricula of the nineteenth century, in the poetry and story-books beloved of private and state schools alike, in the mottoes adopted by Victorian schools and their masters. Haviland [29] and Stickland[30] both provide specific evidence in this respect. The former presents a selection of essays showing major trends in children's literature and its different *genres*, whilst the latter has collected letters, comment and advice to and from children during the period 1700–1914. Stickland talks in terms of dynamic evangelism binding children to the work ethic, and says, 'The emergence of a new industrialised society necessitated a literate labour force. This made it essential to educate children, and for their parents to work for their support'.[31]

Weber attempted to show that the Protestant Ethic as an identifiable

ethos was in large part responsible for the development of those economic activities which he describes in their concrete settings. One of Weber's main contentions was that this ethos, which had its roots in protestantism and its variants, had broadened and become secularised. Work had become a duty. Much later McClelland and others[32] suggested that this work ethic had so permeated the cultures of Europe and the USA as to give impetus to the establishment, during the nineteenth century, of state educational provision and the persistence and dominance of certain perceptions of one's moral duty to strive. Children thus became 'soaked' in a culture of work-related values in which independence and pride took such a strong hold that even poverty could be regarded as a sin.[33] For instance, the Newcastle Commission, set up in 1858, was asked to consider the measures required for a sound and cheap elementary education; and following its report, the system of 'payment by results' was established. 'Assistance given by the State to education should assume the form of a bounty upon the production of certain results'.[34] Results were interpreted in terms of marks which children obtained in the 'three Rs', and Lingen (secretary of the Education Department at the time) clearly conceived education as a business in which measured achievement was to be the overriding principle.[35]

One should not forget that this particular thesis of Weber has caused, as Eisenstadt says, 'A continuous force of scientific controversy'.[36] Details of its worth have been many, and the controversy still abounds. The dominating feature is that Weber's ideas in this respect, like some of Freud's, are still invoked as a convenient explanation and classification of something very central to understanding in the fields of psychology and sociology, and as an appreciation of 'how it is like it is'. Eisenstadt highlights the ambivalence felt by many who have examined Weber's thesis, saying that with the exception of the 'extreme negativists' everyone simply has to admit that there is a good deal of explanatory power in the old Weberian picture of events. For him, the core of Weber's postulations is that part concerned with the developing role of the economic entrepreneur, the way in which labour was prepared and used, and the way in which the role of the entrepreneur was becoming sanctioned and institutionalised. In effect Weber stated that Luther and Calvin had emphasised the sanctity of working to some purpose, that they had made virtues of industry and thrift. Wesley, too, it will be recalled, had taught that the fruits of labour were the signs of salvation. The result of such a strong ideology arising from the Protestant Reformation and the period which followed was to give divine sanction to the motive to achieve, to the desire to better oneself and to excel.[37]

Weber's work on the place of the Protestant Ethic in the development of European capitalism is probably the least factual and the most speculative of any of his writings on ideology.[38] His arguments were basically of two kinds:

(1) those concerned to suggest that capitalism could only arise from groups of people of particular beliefs and traits – and that certain creeds particularly inculcated such traits;
(2) those based on the accumulation of evidence derived from the observation of countries where protestantism and catholicism dwelt side by side. These purported to show that Protestants were much more successful in terms of business and positions of economic prominence.

Both arguments have weaknesses. First, there does not seem much face-validity in the notions of a direct linkage between belief in forms of predeterminism (albeit, heavily modified, as they became) and success in the here and now. Secondly, there is perhaps sufficient evidence from observation of minority groups to show that the very defensive closeness of such groups could activate determination and endeavour. Now while it is clear that in the early stages Calvinism and the roots of protestantism might look like this, they can hardly have been described as such by the late eighteenth century. There would be many smaller sects for candidature on this score. (One might make out as good a case for any ethnic or religious group in similar circumstances. What might a 'Jewish ethic' look like in these terms? The Jews have been possessed of an enormous number of very talented and successful members even when in an oppressed minority situation.) Both Little and Fischoff [39] argue that Weber's thesis has been frequently misrespresented; they feel that too much attention has been paid to its tentative causal hypothesis, but both agree, as Little puts it, that 'Up to a point, when Puritanism appears, the moral pressure will be on for voluntary, self-initiated economic behaviour'.[40]

In his two original essays (1904 and 1905), which later formed the the whole century, it was not merely one more nail in the predeterministic to state clearly what he felt to be the *psychological* conditions leading to capitalism. But in such a brief overview as this, it is as well to note Tawney's rather wry comment in his foreword to the English translation of Weber's book, 'It is the temptation of one who expounds a new and fruitful idea to use it as a key to unlock all doors, and to explain by reference to a single principle phenomena which are, in reality, the result of several converging causes'.[41]

Silver, in a study of ideas and social movements in early nineteenth-century England, says that there are useful indications of major ideological changes and of the ways that they affected education. Certainly, ideas of education as an avenue to social reconstruction figure quite large in Owenism and in the later rise of the Chartist movement. But Silver also suggests that such ideas and 'popular movements' rarely had the effect of shaping education 'from below', that primarily one must record that the education of the masses was for

the most part clearly directed towards *usefulness* rather than culture. Knowledge grounded in the 'ideology of middle-class utilitarianism', Silver calls it.[42] Even as late as 1940 Sir Fred Clarke could write, 'The elementary school of today struggling towards a more adequate cultural conception, is still under the influence of this *damnosa hereditas* operating strongly even in minds that would call themselves liberal'.[43] But while Sir Fred Clarke's unusually sharp comment is probably fair, it is equally fair to say that visions of education as a social ladder, as a means of bettering oneself, began to appear with just a little more frequency and clarity to the labouring poor during and after the impact of Owenism and the franchise movement of the Chartists.[44] The English government's later implementation of 'payment by results' merely gave impetus to such notions. For the most part the middle-class officials concerned were convinced of the rightness of their approaches: an attitude epitomised nicely in this comment by Houghton: 'The Victorians might be, and often were, uncertain about what theory to accept or what faculty of mind to rely on, but it never occurred to them to doubt their capacity to *arrive* at the truth.'[45]

By the middle of the century (1859) Darwin's views on determinism were made public. These were to act as a catalyst to a totally new view of nature in which man, too, could be seen as simply part of continuous phylogeny. The Darwinian theory of evolution necessarily involved perceptions of the continuity of man and beast. The experience was shattering for the Victorians. It had wide repercussions throughout Europe and North America. Fitting into the stream of consciousness of the whole century, it was not merely one more nail in the predeterministic coffin, it was a whole handful! The guiding hand of God on Nature had been somewhat overshadowed. When seen as part of a complex pattern of shifting ideas, when added to the growing technological revolution of the Brunels and Bessemer (Bessemer and Siemens invented methods of making bulk steel in 1856. This had a rapid effect, making steel abundant by the end of the nineteenth century and virtually superseding wrought iron), when added to the view of Spencer (1870) that pain and pleasure were the principal determinants of human behaviour, it contributed to a movement, arguably (in Weber's terms) springing from Luther, which influenced all the sciences and religion and which was applicable to psychological and sociological phenomena in a way not hitherto perceived. Perhaps many of the present-day motivational concepts can be said to have stemmed from the lessening determinism of nineteenth century ideas, for men sought new modes of explanation. Particularly one must see Darwin and Spencer as giants in the quickening pace of ideas. Spencer argued that, 'With the evolution of man different things became pleasurable. This is the antecedent of the survival model of reinforcement, which assumes the postulate that the species that derive pleasure from what is good for them have survived'.[46]

Weiner, in a contemporary book on motivation, says that both Marx and Piaget can be said to have been influenced by biological models and by Darwin in particular. Weiner reminds one that Marx dedicated *Das Kapital* to Darwin.[47] Atkinson in looking at the historical antecedents of achievement motivation suggested that there have been three main implications of Darwin's work which have critically affected studies of motivation:

(1) The notion that animals may be capable of intelligent behaviour or reason.
(2) The idea that human behaviour may be influenced by instinct.
(3) The importance of individual differences.[48]

Both Weber, and later Merton,[49] relate Protestant beliefs to the increasing effort applied in fields of economic and scientific activity and neither thesis is unique or uncontested. Shipman, among many others, had noted the attempts at 'direct historical investigation' in the work of Bradburn and Berlew.[50] These writers attempted to measure achievement motivation by connecting (somewhat tenuously) comments made in a selection of writings over a considerable time-span with any subsequent rises in the production of coal. Their suggestions were that the urgings and exhortations towards achievement thus indicated in the writings of a given period later affected industrial growth. There are many more studies, however, which perhaps more successfully link the child-rearing practices of different groups and the achievements of their children, though these too suffer from the weakness of being retrospective studies.[51]

There are also many writings concerned with the social processes that influence the learning of the child. Chief of these is still that of Parsons (1959), who characterised achievement orientation in school as being in broadly two dimensions, 'cognitive' and 'moral', and said that these two primary components could not easily be differentiated at the elementary stage of education: 'the "high achievers" of the elementary school are both the "bright" pupils who catch on easily to their more strictly intellectual tasks, and the more *responsible* pupils who "behave well" and on whom the teacher can count in her difficult problems of managing the class'.[52] 'Responsible' is usually taken by teachers I have spoken to as meaning that the child exhibits: (*a*) a high degree of self-control; and (*b*) an ability to self-direct work effort.[53] It also suggests distinctively affiliative aspects of teacher–pupil relationships. After all, teachers have to work with what they have, motivating the here and now, not changing the antecendents of the child's background, even if they could. They, therefore, rely on having some (preferably many) children who seem interested and who persist at their work with the minimum of cajoling. When the class is largely composed of those

demanding constant pressure and exhortation, then the teacher's task becomes an exhausting near-impossibility. Parsons suggests that his use of the term achievement when discussing the conditions of the classroom would seem very close to that of McClelland. In a later work McClelland concentrated attention on the achievement motive as a major source of economic effort;[54] and several psychologists, such as Strodtbeck,[55] and sociologists, such as Drucker or Goodwin or Terkel,[56] have attempted to connect the need or motive with the levels of aspirations of parents, and have taken this through to adult work occupations. Such approaches, however, have to be careful not to overlook the importance of *school conditions*, including the classroom organisation and climate; and it would seem particularly inappropriate to label home environments which do not correlate well with indices of high achievement as necessarily 'deficient'.[57] What does emerge of interest, though, is that, as well as material conditions and associated value systems (and perhaps because of them), it would seem that self-reliance and self-regard are important traits in those with high aspirations. Musgrave emphasised that self-reliance, and other 'Protestant' virtues such as thrift, were all character traits that could be appropriately stressed just as well in home or school as in church.[58] He added that, since the time of Arnold of Rugby, teachers in England had devoted considerable care to the inculcation of certain character traits in pupils (usually boys), those very traits necessary to ensure the maintenance of a capitalist system of economy. While it might be true that in the 1850s one could have seen 'in the microcosm of a great school [Rugby] the intellectual ferment that was seething in the country',[59] it would be very foolish to regard that school as any more than marginally expressing an ill-defined ideology or group of beliefs which had been developing for at least half a century in England and elsewhere. As Drucker mentions,[60] a point also dealt with by Silver when writing on the rise of the Mechanics' Institutes of the last century,[61] educational development *and* educational competition have often been seen as essential twin elements in national development. While a supply of highly educated administrators, politicians, clerics and, at the lower level, technicians was an important factor in the increasing power of the nineteenth-century England, the Newcastle Report showed how officialdom was even more wedded to beliefs in laissez-faire and rigorous competition for the labouring poor.[62] That position, as English educationists know, was somewhat undermined within the space of ten years, and on 17 February 1870 W.E. Forster introduced a bill into the House of Commons providing for compulsory attendance at school for all aged 5–13 years (this, however, to be a matter of local option and enforcement through bye-laws).

Tenuous associations formed in part with the benefit of 'hindsight' do not make history, nor necessarily good social science. But the Protestant

Ethic has stayed with us. It is still a theme with powerful emotive value, and McClelland's attempt to relate achievement motivation to economic growth is simply one of a large number of sociological, sociopsychological and anthropological investigations supporting the association. Weiner, like Tawney speaking of Weber, says, 'One is tempted to accuse McClelland of trying to explain extremely complex and overdetermined phenomena in an oversimplified manner'.[63] But for all that, Weiner recounts it, and McClelland's study of the relationships involved is convincing, especially when placed in the context of the gradually developing stream of work from a variety of disciplines. Work in sociolinguistics, in sociology, in early-childhood education, in child-development and in social-psychology, may be fairly said to contribute myriad links between socialisation and achievement.[64] What Rutter calls the 'external' factors, that is, those home and group value associations and facilities, 'do not act independently of the school. Rather they constitute one set of elements in a complex pattern of ecological interactions'.[65]

McClelland's now-famous series of relationships linking the Protestant Ethic with the need to achieve are:

(1) protestantism and early independence training;
(2) early independence training and the need for achievement;
(3) need for achievement and economic growth;
(4) protestantism therefore leading to economic growth.

Diagrammatically this is represented as in Figure 5.2. Weber's line, you will remember, was one chiefly linking A and D in the figure but McClelland maintains that changes in family socialisation are implicit. In the main McClelland was interested in relationships 3 and 4, above; as Weiner says, those expressed in 1 and 2 are equally indeterminate and should not be assumed; it is certainly difficult to characterise them or



Figure 5.2 *McClelland's series of relationships linking the Protestant Ethic with the need to achieve.*

investigate them.[66] Furthermore, as already stated, the achievement motive is not easily isolated or separated from a host of closely associated constructs. Not least there have been studies associating need for achievement with personality measures in general, namely, need for power, autonomy, independence, self-regard, self-esteem, self- control, anxiety, and so on; nor can it be easily dissociated from perceptions of causality, or from aspects of social learning and attribution.

While one may, with McClelland, simply have to accept the evidence of *some* historical association between the variants of protestantism and the rise of capitalism, the links between those beliefs and levels of aspiration remain confused, confused by complex factors and variables which do not easily yield to simple causal hypothesis-probing. Levels of aspiration have been linked with social mobility, with advertising, with changing levels of affluence, with 'consciousness-raising', with education itself; and Catholics, it is suggested, may well be internalising substantially the same ethic as Protestants nowadays![67] The confusion is further confounded by the various value systems of different groups, by those broadly 'adopted' by different social classes, by the pervasive effects of polity and economy, by the mass-media, and not least by sex, birth-order and by fashions in child-rearing and schooling. Moreover, levels of aspirations are to some extent 'age-realistic' and age-related. Clearly, too, the feelings of success or failure, or of having a measure of control over one's own life chances do not depend simply upon absolute levels of achievement, nor are they obviously and directly related to overall feelings of powerlessness, nor to apparently class-consistent attitudes of alienation. If they were, most of us would feel pretty much failures in life. To take a closely associated construct, Seeman, in an examination of four types of alienation, 'self-estrangement, feelings of powerlessness, social isolation and cultural estrangement',[68] cast serious doubts on conventional global explanations of alienation, showing quite clearly that powerlessness in particular can have very different sources and quite different consequences. He equates powerlessness with feelings of being externally controlled. While acknowledging, moreover, that numerous studies do report different social-class attitudes in types of aspiration and in the deferment of gratification, he says that extreme caution is necessary in the observation and interpretation of such findings. Current models appeared no less simplistic than earlier ones. Too often they are shown to possess flaws of considerable magnitude as soon as any real scrutiny is applied.[69]

In discussing sources of achievement motivation, its apparent importance in school and the plethora of related constructs, one does need constant reminding of the seductiveness of such ideas and of the relative ease with which a series of ill-founded assumptions may pass for a theory. Social science has many such examples. Yet, for all that, to appear too anxious to preserve technical rules, to be too reluctant to

extrapolate can lead one to adopt a sterile and uncreative approach to investigation. Because the social sciences are very interdependent, we need all the cross-linking of ideas we can get, and this includes attempts at creativity and speculation. At its simplest all we have been discussing so far is that one's concept of the future is in part dependent upon one's status, values and feelings at the present; a not unreasonable suggestion, and a topic not unimportant to those concerned with the education of children.

All in all, the complexity of these shifting sands of ideology, culture and personality underscores the naivety of any thesis which would attempt to reduce or stereotype the vast number of subtle associations between the developing person and his environment. Terms like 'Protestant Ethic', 'achievement motivation', 'alienation', 'middle-class values', 'deprivation', and so on, are dangerously seductive and must often obscure as much as they illuminate. All contain at their core the notion that certain values, attitudes and dispositions are internalised (learned) to such an extent that they become the often unconscious wellsprings for later human behaviour, and that the substance and context of certain sets of early experiences have important consequences for the whole of our lives.


Self-Concept
(self-regard, attribution of responsibility, perceptions and expectations of self, persistence)
Interests, abilities, attainments
(value of these by self and others)
Achievement
(school, job, life, relationships)
Resources
(SES, modes of child-rearing, value systems, sociocultural definitions)

Figure 5.3 *Principal variables associated with achievement motivation.*

SOCIALISATION AND CHILDHOOD

'You say I am repeating
something I have said before. I shall say it again.'[70]

It is very tempting, when observing differences in human behaviour, to see behind idiosyncratic response a uniformity which becomes amenable to sweeping generalisation. For instance, the ways in which children are reared to their different sexual and social roles depend upon so many aspects of culture and values, that almost any uniformity could be perceived by a student ardent enough in his beliefs or subtle enough with his theory. Equally fruitful and equally confusing has been that area of research associating social-class differences with child-rearing practices. Conflicts in research findings abound. Some research suggests that 'middle-class' parents are 'more rigorous than working-class parents in training their children',[71] while later research findings have presented middle-class mothers as more permissive and tolerant. Discussions of such controversies and particularly of how they relate to educational success can be found throughout social-science writing, in for instance the work of Bernstein,[72] Himmelweit,[73] Bronfenbrenner,[74] Newson and Newson,[75] Douglas,[76] Hargreaves[77] and Musgrove,[78] to mention merely a few commonly encountered by educationaists.

Klein, after an extensive analysis of research on child-rearing practices generally, emphasised the role of anxiety in child socialisation, saying, 'If a child has learned persistence, self-control, independence and his own value as an individual, then his anxieties can be allayed by effort and – given that society does not change too drastically while he grows up – he has been successfully socialised for high achievement'.[79] But children are not passive in all this, and as most parents and teachers will tell, the process of bringing up and educating children involves interaction which may have as lasting an effect upon the adult as upon the child! Too often socialisation is thought of as a one-way process, something adults do to children. This is very far from the case. Living with active adolescents can be a more rigorous *rite de passage* for the parent than for the adolescent.

The somewhat passive concept of socialisation in its modern sense appears to have its origins in the late 1930s and early 1940s.[80] It does *not* stem from the writings of G.H. Mead, as some have suggested. He may, perhaps, have overemphasised the importance of language, but he did see the socialisation of children as a highly creative, flexible and interactive affair.[81] The trouble is that the concept has so often been employed in a way which itself has led to a distinctly deterministic view. For instance, it has often been seen as a process of 'moulding'[82] and Brim has written of the purpose of socialisation as being that of transforming the raw material of humanity into good working members for society.[83] The goal of socialisation, says Danziger, 'as conventionally

conceived, is to bring the individual into a proper regard for the limits of desirable and acceptable behaviour in various situations and relationships'.[84] He then criticises such views for their narrowness and for their lack of concern with interaction and reciprocity. There are, however, also serious limitations to notions of reciprocity in socialisation. Berger and Luckman have reminded us that after all a child has no choice in the matter of significant others, nor does he choose his parents. Significant others are 'imposed upon him'; and they define the situation.[85] In particular, the power to define situations is largely in the hands of parents and other adults, especially in the early stages of childhood. While this does not prevent some reciprocity in the process, it does severely limit it. Thus, the term socialisation is normally used in this rather limited and somewhat mechanistic manner, that is, as the process by which the child receives the collective ways of society around him, becoming acculturated. Not only are there problems in how the process is defined, the process (whatever it is) is also extremely subtle and complex, and different perspectives are adopted by different schools of thought in psychology and sociology.

The psychological perspectives of socialisation are broadly classified by Lavatelli and Stendler as listed below.

(1) For learning theorists: the development of and control of certain drive systems, such as dependence, sexuality, aggression and achievement.
(2) For psychodynamic theorists: the development of a super-ego, canalising one's energy into socially acceptable activities and learning to postpone immediate gratification.
(3) For interactionists: an 'emphasis on interaction between the nature of the child and his environment and on the reciprocal relations between the child and significant others'.[86]

Most sociological studies of child socialisation have been concerned with the social setting of the family, however described. Geographic, ethnic and political factors all play a part, but unique value systems peculiar to different groups and which critically affect the upbringing of the child are still most often described in terms of social class or SES. Family status of itself, in terms of wealth and prestige, would appear to become translated into social experiences, values and norms and become internalised in each individual. Elkin in his 'preconditions for socialisation'[87] distinguished the sociological perspectives thus:

(1) socialisation viewed through the analysis of norms and values, those patterns of behaviour which are common to given social groups and those ideas of right and wrong appropriate to a given group;

(2) socialisation perceived in terms of *status and role*, that is, with the position in the social structure and the dynamics of behaviour associated with that position;
(3) the *institutional* perspective, which focuses on the functions of the school, the church and the hospital;
(4) the perspective according to which cultural or group subdivision, such as *social class* or *ethnic group*, is viewed as the major factor;
(5) the perspective of *social change* (such a perspective has been employed in a predominantly social-psychological way by Bronfenbrenner, for example).[88] This perspective can also cause problems in comparative psychological studies which have a time-sampling or longitudinal basis for data collection, since the *context* of the studies changes as well as the foci themselves.

Readers of contemporary sociology and education texts might be forgiven for assuming that the most important perspective must be one centred upon language acquisition and usage. Certainly, it can and does nowadays form a vital perspective in itself. But one can recognise that the differing cognitive and verbal complexities of parental communication and of normal human intercourse combine and interact with the powerful specialised agencies of socialisation to provide that total 'process of control, whereby a particular moral, cognitive and affective awareness is evoked in the child and given a specific form and content'.[89] Indeed, if such readers are familiar with the arguments of the last decade or so in the sociolinguistics field, they may grant credence to Musgrove's opinions that the 'uncritical acceptance' of G. H. Mead's ideas on the *central* importance of language may well have misled Bernstein and many others into misrepresenting socialisation processes somewhat, especially in respect of the middle-class 'attack' on working-class language.[90] Be that as it may, it is too early in the debate to enter other than a verdict of 'not proven' when discussing the implications in terms of *teachers'* language. The teacher's language in the classroom is not necessarily highly elaborate, nor quite the same as the formal language of the school. Indeed, many teachers I have observed would seem to employ a 'restricted code' full of implicit meaning that was well understood by the whole class.

LeVine has pointed out that 'socialisers are at best imperfect engineers'; that there can be considerable 'slippage' between the type of environment in which the child is reared and his or her eventual behaviour.[91] Yet, as evidence from the different disciplines accumulates, it becomes increasingly apparent that variations in human development and behaviour are in some way associated with cultural differences in the upbringing and education of children, that different perspectives, different goals, reveal differences in emphasis and methods of socialisation. Not unnaturally these are frequently interpreted in terms

of their economic and social context. Some writers, such as Bordieu, place particular weight on the school's role in all this, attributing to the school a deliberate perversity in the transference of values such that particular forms of hegemony are maintained. Others have attempted to examine the relationship between child-training and subsistence economy adaptation. Indeed, in one such well-known study data from observations of over 100 societies led to the identification of the method of accumulating food resources as the common variable underlying the relationship between economy and socialisation. The researchers suggested that children were 'pressurised' into *obedience* and *responsibility* in societies with high-accumulation economies (that is, economies in which the supply of food had to be developed gradually and protected throughout the year). Societies with what was termed a low-accumulation economy tended to emphasise *self-reliance* and *individual achievement*, however; and this was in line with the more venturesome modes in which the adults daily wrested food from nature.[92] In similar vein (and echoing once again the Weberian thesis) Evans states that ample data exist throughout the world, showing a link between industrialisation and the modes of socialisation adopted.[93]

Common to both the psychological and sociological perspectives one may discern a consistent theme, that of the establishment of control sanctions upon those being socialised. LeVine puts the position very clearly when describing socialisation in respect of three different groups. In the so-called 'primitive' or non-literate family the primary goals are concerned with submission to recognised authority for the good of the group. The group's need for members who participate in the survival economy usually means fairly late application of those controls, at a stage of the child's development when he or she is old enough to understand. Concrete social and economic reasons are offered to the child for such changes in adult behaviour towards him. He goes on to suggest that in the case of 'a Western Protestant sect' of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries the child-rearing would have been very much 'infused with moral considerations'; in other words, that the socialisation process tends to become ideologised, that the control elements become part of the abstract, religious ideas about how a child *ought* to behave. He argues that one of the key elements in this pattern of socialisation is self-awareness and the art of defining one's own behaviour. LeVine's third example is of a contemporary group of US university-educated families. They, like the first group, are deeply concerned with the economic survival of their children, but have 'inherited' much of the Protestant ideology of the second group – a point of view I find very easy to understand when looking at the ways many sanctions and controls are sometimes expressed in contemporary English primary schools (small children are 'trusted' to be 'good', not to indulge in 'wicked' behaviour).[94] There are, however, noted differences.

The contemporary group searches the cultural environment for signs of the dynamics of the future, for that information which might indicate how adjustments should be made in order to meet the changing culture. This group relies heavily on the 'experts', the 'high priests' of our time, since it believes in science rather than religion and hence is influenced by the scientific advisers, paediatricians and educationists. Perhaps the modern equivalent of *The Mother's Role in Education* (early nineteenth-century New England)[95] is something like *The Parents' Guide to Piaget*!

In each of the three examples above the socialisation process acts in somewhat different ways with very different ends in view. Yet the core of the process is that, in each case, the growing child should take into himself the control elements of the group, so that they become his 'internal voices', the explainers of his behaviour not only to others, but to himself. Clearly, as new patterns of socialisation emerge, or existing ones adjust to fit changing ideologies and social forces, different values are internalised. To so-called 'exacting affection' of the English and American middle classes gives way to greater reliance on cognitive appeals, 'democratic' family advice, or upon institutions such as schools. But the internalisation of systems of belief still goes on in the child's mind. Not so long ago I observed a group of 10-year-olds discussing the story of Exodus with a young and enthusiastic minister. The minister was somewhat taken aback by the children's insistence that the journey through Sinai (which he explained as a 'miracle') could be explained much more satisfactorily by 'scientific evidence'. The children's assertions seemed as unwarranted as the priest's. Yet both believed implicitly in the systems of analysis employed.

One of the most well-known articles on changing patterns of child socialisation is that by Urie Bronfenbrenner. He argued that there have been major changes in (Western) parental behaviour which have affected the socialisation of children, thus:

(1) greater permissiveness towards the child's spontaneous desires;
(2) freer expression of affection;
(3) increased reliance on indirect 'psychological' techniques of discipline (such as reasoning or appeals to guilt) versus direct methods (like physical punishment, scolding, or threats);
(4) in consequence of the above, shifts in the direction of what are predominantly middle-class values and techniques, a narrowing of the gap between social classes in their patterns of child-rearing.[96]

Bronfenbrenner also said that, when taken in conjunction with other data from the social sciences, such a trend appeared to be consistent throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Bronfenbrenner called this socialisation *orientation towards adjustment*. His speculative analysis ends with the rueful comment that, since the success of the first

Russian sputnik, US society may well have taken a more positive move towards achievement in terms of directing socialisation, in order to increase the achievement drive in its people. (Goldstein and Oldham's commentary forms a somewhat more up-to-date assessment in this respect.[97])

Contemporary studies of the wide range of issues subsumed under the 'umbrella' title of early childhood socialisation have tended to assume that there is a direct relationship between parent variables (those of behaviour, personality and attitudes) and child behaviour and attitudes. A surprising number of them have concentrated upon the dimension

and few have been able to consider the reciprocal aspects, or indeed the multitude of associated factors.[98] The mother–child relationship has been the most popular and certainly that most amenable to investigation, possibly because of the relative ease of access to data (via questionnaire and observation) and possibly because of its traditional focal importance in the nuclear family, which in the past has been economically dependent upon the daily absence of a father following his gainful employment. Some studies start with assumptions derived from sociohistorical methods of investigation, and certainly several relating achievement and child socialisation specifically invoke the Protestant Ethic as some kind of basic causal antecedent.[99] Shipman has labelled those considerable number of retrospective studies which purport to make this link as 'debatable'.[100] Different cultural groups have been obvious targets for such investigations,[101] without there being as yet more than the most modest accretion of evidence pointing to definite causal factors.[102] (It was jokingly said in universities in Australia in the early 1970s that there were more social anthropologists investigating aboriginals in Arnhem Land than there were aboriginals!) There have been obvious fashions in investigation topics. The work of Adorno *et al.*[103] in the early 1950s stimulated investigations of authoritarianism in parents and associated styles of child-rearing.[104] Sex-role learning and parental identification are still extemely popular topics since the work of Maccoby and Jacklin in the 1960s[105] and have been given added impetus by the increasing interest in feminism as a social force. Maternal behaviour and personality development have been almost continuously investigated since the start of the Berkeley, California, longitudinal studies (1928 cohort).[106] Some of the more recent series of studies would appear to support Bronfenbrenner's earlier work. For instance, work of the Newsons[107] has shown that parent–child interaction is more permissive in middle- and professional-class families than in working-class families.[108] Kohn [109] has said that much child socialisation research

is ingenuously simplistic; he has endeavoured to show that the differences lie in the value systems of different groups and that these values have important consequences for the relationships built up with children and, later, by them. For all that, he was simply adopting one of the most common sociological perspectives, which interpreted socialisation thus:

social class ⟷ conditions of life ⟷ values ⟷ behaviour.

Although most social classes would appear to share many of the basic problems associated with child socialisation, such as degree of attachment, feeding habits, bowel training, and modesty and sexual conventions, there would appear to be wide variations in the more sophisticated goals of socialisation, particularly in terms of values and their acquisition through social *and* linguistic orientation. The child's life may, in effect, be depicted as one long series of informational cues; and, as the Newsons have shown, language does play a vital part in it all. (Some of the problems are touched upon in Chapter 4.) For instance, though a whole range of environmental factors appears to relate to scholastic achievement,[110] and these are enmeshed with the value systems adopted by the different groups, it has become fairly clear that mode of speech may be an important factor in the speedy acquisition of certain cognitive skills and possibly in certain perceptions of the importance of achievement itself. Certainly, it is very clear that some modes of speech will enhance expectations by the teacher in respect of certain school 'performance outcomes'. For many years it has been well documented that different groups, often broadly classified in terms of social class or SES, encourage different emphases in the socialisation of their young and that these emphases have a bearing on the children's adaptation to schooling and, hence, to the levels of success achieved.

During the last twenty years or so one of the most widely publicised and widely accepted theories concerning language acquisition and its bearing upon and part in socialisation has been that of Bernstein and his colleagues.[111] As most educationists know, he developed a detailed analysis of the differences in language characteristics of working-class and middle-class children. Bernstein distinguished broadly between two main forms of language (initially proposed as 'public' and 'formal'), which he later referred to as the 'restricted' and 'elaborated' linguistic codes. Briefly, the theory was that the elaborated code had a variation in form and syntax which could be adjusted to fit the speaker's exact purpose with precision. The child using language in this manner would tend to use it as an aid for manipulating the environment. He would be likely to employ this linguistic sophistication as an aid to problem-solving (this has been termed 'verbal mediation', and Bruner has referred to an important part of this ability as the ability to 'de-

contextualise', to employ language in order to posit and hypothesise away from the immediate context).[112] The child from the lower socioeconomic group, on the other hand, would be less likely to use language in this way. His linguistic code and his mode of socialisation encourage him to depend much more on gesture and intonation and on implicit assumptions that the listener shares or appreciates the standpoint adopted. As such the language was characterised as a language of 'implicit meaning'. Evidence that these different variants of language behaviour are not confined to England has been offered from a variety of sources throughout the world.[113] Hess has suggested that the language of the low SES mother does not provide the same informational and environmental cues for the child as does that of the higher-class mother. Consequently, since children may well arrive at school with the home language thoroughly internalised, they arrive with what is in effect classed as a 'superior' or 'inferior' set of verbal techniques to apply to their own learning situation. Some of the earlier US compensatory programmes were firmly wedded to these notions and were based on the belief that this was one of the core elements in 'cultural disadvantage'.[114] Working-class culture has been portrayed as deficient, particularly in respect of language development and usage. As Denzin says, there has been a marked tendency to assume that the children of lower-income families have failed in some way, that their 'deficiencies' need to be made good, that because the children fail to act like the norm (middle-class whites?) they are culturally disadvantaged and deprived.[115] Overall, Bernstein's views still tend to receive strong support from many educationists and educational psychologists, but writings in the sociological field (and in the humanities) are now much less supportive. Bernstein's view of social class has been criticised for being vague and his original research lacking in hard evidence. He has been attacked for being a 'myth-maker' and for fostering an already somewhat prejudiced attitude by (middle-class) teachers towards working-class children. Those antagonistic to the Bernstein research tend to quote the criticisms of Harold Rosen, who showed that there was confusion of categories in the work of Bernstein, that there was insufficient awareness of the obviously wide spread of linguistic variations, a lack of acceptable evidence concerning the elaborated and restricted codes, and the constant implicit message that 'middle-class language' was superior.[116] The linguist Labov, who investigated the logical and abstract qualities displayed in non-standard English, is also regarded as a fierce critic of Bernstein and his supporters. Labov purports to show from his investigation of black ghetto English that complicated and sophisticated propositions and relationships can be as easily explored in the tongue of Harlem as with the 'elaborated code' of standard American English.[117]

'Compensation', that is, education designed for those assigned

culturally deprived, has tended to focus on the early years of childhood. It *has* been very popular in the USA, less so in England. But both sides of the Atlantic have seen an attempt over the last decade or more to improve the children's language development and usage in various ways. The emphasis was upon language to facilitate the 'deprived' child's control of the environment. But there has undoubtedly been a quiet revolution in pre-school (nursery) curricula and pedagogy since the early enthusiastic days of Head Start. In the late 1970s there was a considerable move away from the focus upon language and its effects upon early school achievement. Other goals of early intervention have come to the fore, particularly in the USA. Current programmes are much more concerned with wider goals for the early intervention programmes, with nutrition, creative arts and emotional health. Equally, after the initial disenchantment with the Head Start approaches of the late 1960s, there is some evidence of belated success beginning to accumulate. Intervention curricula, including the language programmes, are beginning to show signs of many small successes, particularly where child-care professionals are being involved in influencing the mother at home as well as the child, and particularly where language development is seen not as a single key but a part of a whole approach to enhancing social facilities.[118]

Bernstein, it will be recalled, posited that the linguistic code acted as a focusing or channelling device, so that the user of the elaborated form took a more instrumental view of the world than did the user of the restricted form. Thus, the elaborated code-users supposedly become more and more concerned with language as a tool. The school is then able to build upon this tool usage and to shape and alter perceptions in the way most likely to lead to speedy development of measurable school attainments. There has been much debate concerning the similarity of perspective and language usage between 'middle-class' teachers and children;[119] the argument being that working-class children are handicapped by the gulf between their linguistic code, its perceptual and aspirational context and that appreciated and understood by the teachers. Bernstein clearly believes that the class system in England is one which critically affects communication and socialisation, 'the division of labour influences the availability of elaborated codes; the class system affects their distribution'.[120]

For the most part, Bernstein's work has fitted well with the findings of psychometricians, some social-anthropologists and most educationists, though what the consequences really are in terms of educational practice remain to be seen. There are, however, quite serious weaknesses in what Bernstein has proposed and developed over the years. The first is the obvious one that has been pointed out many times. Division into *two* codes, as Rosen said (see above), is childishly simple and does not in any way fit our knowledge about how human differences tend to be

distributed. The second is the insistence that the language of the reception classroom (that is, when the 'collision' would presumably be most noticeable in impact) is somehow such an elaborated one that many working-class children are puzzled, alienated, or unable to learn much from the initial experience of school. This does not easily relate to what I have seen of infant-school classrooms. The language of the teacher in the infant, junior and even sometimes the secondary school is often very necessarily 'restricted' itself, relying on context-bound instruction, unfinished sentences and a host of visual signals that have meaning for the children. Teachers may define much of the context, but this context is relatively simple, the rules obvious and the style almost always context-specific.[121] Sometimes, however, when the situation becomes very 'open' or markedly 'child-centred', the context becomes more fluid and certain children may then find the rules less obvious and the learning goals and communications unclear.[122]

From a different perspective, it is interesting to note that Miller and Swanson, who saw culturally patterned child-rearing practices as the primary factor in the development of appropriate adult behaviour, examined the practices of North American parents in two broad orientations: entrepreneurial versus bureaucratic occupational roles. They reported that child-rearing practices differed between the two groups. The so-called 'entrepreneurial' parents stressed training for independence and self-reliance. The 'bureaucratic' parents emphasised social adjustment.[123] The basic 'theory' so evinced is common to all socialisation theories, whichever perspective is adopted. This is that from the initial need for security and warmth others arise and are fostered or neglected. This process takes place in an ambient value system of a specific kind, within a set of particular attitudes and beliefs. Within this system the child's own motivational pattern develops. His aspirations are filtered through his own physical adaptation, personality and the opinions of others. Many writers have pointed out that *how* a child experiences life is greatly influenced by the way he has been taught to think, and that he is constantly adding to his perception of appropriate reality according to the notions of those around him. The child's ideas are therefore, to a surprising degree, if not initiated, at least *controlled* by the people, situations and value systems around him.

One of the common problems of research into child socialisation is that investigations of the parental antecedents of child behaviour have often been concerned with studies of maternal rather than paternal behaviour. Now this may be entirely appropriate in certain types of family where the nurturant role has clearly been assigned to, or is predominantly occupied by, the woman. But it may well be that such is not the case; also, the perception that the child has of the parent or of the situation may itself be disproportionately psychologically significant. There are other problems, too. For instance, Medinnus has suggested

that we may not be justified in thinking that poor personal or social adjustment of children is caused by their unfavourable perception of their parents or of the parenting, rather they may simply have such perceptions because they themselves are poorly adjusted.[124] Causality is not easily assigned. But data do exist concerning the way that family circumstances (for example, those relating to rural or industrial conditions, to degree of urbanisation, poverty, ethnic ties, religion, and so on) can influence the upbringing of children, though such data are not necessarily those gained solely from empirical studies. Much can be found in survey studies of the social-science field, such as those by Barry or Boehm.[125] But, equally, much may be found in literature,[126] and biography, however unreliable, is particularly fruitful in this respect.[127] Some thirty years ago Heider stressed that there were rich seams and insights into interpersonal relations to be found in novels, biography and other forms of literature; and that such a view as his was 'shared by many psychologists'.[128] The socio-historical method, too, has in such works as those by Pinchbeck and Hewitt,[129] or of Aries,[130] thrown light not only on the processes of socialisation, but on their changing emphases. The study of socialisation through time not only reveals fashions in child-rearing, but indicates changes in the value systems of a particular culture as seen in the upbringing of children. In particular, examination of the subtle factors which appear to underlie the success of certain apparently achievement-oriented groups must take account of the sort of educative reasoning which has often characterised the sociohistorical method. As we have seen, the most well known in this context is that which lies behind Weber's classic 'Protestant Ethic' and, like certain terms from Freudian psychology, the term 'Protestant Ethic' has become a catchword and rallying-cry. But taken at its simplest, such reasoning merely proceeds from the everyday, phenomenological observations by which most of us attribute purpose, motive, or concern. The existence of numerous epigrams and aphorisms testifies to this; and they are employed by many as they move through life as a sort of 'shorthand' of principle; from the tart 'what kind of people do they think we are?' to the famous remarks of history, 'to travel hopefully is a better thing than to arrive, and the true success is to labour'.[131] Indeed, the social sciences are closely linked with, if not rooted in, commonsense and common experience: this may be one of the reasons why they are often so suspiciously and cynically regarded by the general public as no more than grandfather's favourite sayings dressed up in a certain academic jargon!

In looking at an individual's or group's early socialisation experiences one cannot afford to overlook what are so often termed the 'over-arching determinants' of time, sex and social class. Change over a lengthy period of time is, of course, exemplified in sociohistorical analysis and is perhaps not quite so open to vexed controversies such as

those bedevilling the term 'class'. In England, in common parlance, 'class' is an evocative term redolent of social prejudice, group solidarity and of 'station in life', a term exploited and used so often that its imprecision is often overlooked. In the USA the term socioeconomic status is more commonly employed, but there as in the UK, the father's occupation is the prime index of the category. Gradations of social class and their relationship to styles of child-rearing and to educational attainment have preoccupied a large number of psychologists and sociologists for several decades. Many writers, for example, Byrne and Williamson,[132] Rosen,[133] and Musgrove,[134] have criticised the crude use of the concept social class as any index *in itself* of group behaviour, and some have offered other explanations based rather on availability of resources or on certain sets of values. Much recent English work has relied upon the Registrar General's (1960) classification as its major indicator of social class (for example, wide-scale national cohort studies, such as that resulting in the second report of the National Child Development Study in 1972[135]). Common though its use is, the Registrar General's classification system is extremely crude and is often criticised. Brandis and Henderson have used more specific and apparently more satisfactory measures in their language studies[136] but these depend upon knowledge of the educational background of parents, data not always easily obtainable. Discrimination between subsets and subjects within social-class groups has also been attempted, such as in the classic work of Fraser in the late 1950s with a class of Aberdeen schoolchildren.[137] Shipman suggested that one improvement in measures had been categorisation in terms of observation of 'common features', rather than the use of the single index, such as the father's job.[138] But one notes that in a later book[139] he, too, reverts to use of social class for meaningful explanation of differences in educational performance.

Dreeben, in his now famous paper on the part played by schooling in the socialisation of children, looked at the social structure of the school and the relationship between that structure and the acquisition of norms. The structural characteristics of school which, he claimed, distinguished it most sharply from other agencies (notably the family) were as follows:

(1) Those who control schools and organise the learning experiences are adults not related to the pupils.
(2) Children attend school regularly but return daily to, and continue to participate in, their family life.
(3) There are structural distinctions in schools according to their level:

    (a) changes in the relative homogeneity, heterogeneity of child-grouping in relation to size/type of catchment;

(*b*) differentiation of teaching staff according to types of subject specialisation;
(*c*) presence or absence of streaming/tracking devices in the school organisation;
(*d*) 'variations in the number of pupils that each teacher confronts daily'.[140]

(4) Children progress through school year by year, thus severing associations with one set of teachers and establishing new ones. (Such a distinction is less easily applied to English schools, since there are variations of vertical age-grouping in primary schools and since more attention is now given to continuity of pastoral care in secondary schools).
(5) Generally speaking, schoolchildren are members of relatively 'age-equal cohorts', whereas in the typical family the age dispersion is larger than that of any single classroom (even in the case of vertical grouping).
(6) Though families and classrooms have adult and non-adult positions, the classroom has a much greater proportion of what Dreeben calls 'non-guilt membership'.

Dreeben suggested that, through the structural arrangements of schools and the behaviour patterns of teachers, children come to acquire the norms of independence, achievement, universalism and specificity; and he said that many US observers regarded the first two, *independence* and *achievement*, as dominant cultural values. (He avoided calling universality and specificity cultural values, since he remarked that they were not normally included among the principles thought desirable in American life.[141])

Few would disagree with Dreeben that the basic social properties of school are so devised as to encourage the child's learning of those principles rather more effectively than if the child had been left entirely to the devices of his own family and their idiosyncrasies. It does need some qualification, however. At the level of commonsense observation, one would assume that social (class) and familial circumstances would be of considerable influence. There is sufficient evidence in terms of family language, overall linguistic and (possibly) value orientation in the work of a substantial number of American and English researchers[142] to suggest that the acquisition of certain norms as a basis for 'competent' and successful adult life is easier and more effective when there is a high degree of *congruence* between the dominant value systems of the home and those of the school.

Given that there are differences in socialisation, and given that its study is rooted in at least three different broad fields, namely, *psychology*, *sociology* and *anthropology*, it would seem pertinent to

remind ourselves that both psychologists and sociologists have become more and more preoccupied with the ways in which differences in motivation and achievement orientation are learned, and the ways in which they affect schooling and are affected by it. (This has been particularly true of language and socialisation studies.) In England the main impetus would appear to stem from the work of such people as Bernstein[143] and Fraser,[144] in the late 1950s; from the now-forgotten Crowther Report;[145] and from the work of Douglas and his associates.[146] The obvious focus of attack here, as the research evidence on social-class differences in educational opportunity accumulated, was selection for secondary schooling.[147] But some educational and social psychologists chose to concentrate on the apparent contradictions in some of the research work on motivation and achievement, particularly in terms of the relationship between personality variables and academic achievement measures.[148] Despite many unexplained features of such research, it seems reasonable to summarise the present position as approximating to:

(1) that certain measurable personality traits, for example, levels of introversion and neuroticism, levels of self-esteem and degree of internality, seem to have some relationship to academic achievement;
(2) that there are curious anomalies in traits associated with high academic achievement and inexplicable differences between associations at different levels of schooling, as well as marked differences between the sexes. (For instance, it has been said that in England at the primary-school level the stable, extroverted girl seems likely to be most successful. In higher education the unstable introvert seems most likely to be a high-achiever.[149])

To summarise this stage of the discussion, one might say that the socialisation of the child, and his eventual transition to adulthood, have become major topics in the social sciences. (This is currently especially fashionable in respect of the socialisation of girls, a topic which has increasingly preoccupied sociologists during the 1970s and 1980s.[150]) But there are curious gaps in our knowledge, for while there are differences of viewpoint corresponding roughly to the disciplinary stance taken, there are relatively few real social-psychological perspectives of childhood to date.[151] It would seem important, too, for educationists to have as wide an interdisciplinary view of childhood as is practicable, since socialisation (and much of education) involves the acquisition of norms and values, the learning of rules and roles and the internalisation of knowledge about the self and one's patterns of response in a variety of situations. Knowledge of the assocation between culture and cognition is still surprisingly hazy and incomplete, even though there are many

accounts purporting to show how we become what we are through interaction with the structures and thoughts of others.[152] Overall, it would seem essential to stress again the interactional nature of socialisation, to adopt a general perspective akin to those of social-learning theorists who see the child's cumulative cognitions as a combination of socially derived experiences responded to idiosyncratically. It would also seem reasonable to conclude that high-achievement-oriented behaviour, or the converse, is certainly associated with and is in part determined by certain factors rooted in the child's socialisation; that is, by what one may call 'positive' self-concepts, or by self-concepts such as self-attribution of low ability and of things beyond personal control. As Katz has said, the child can well be 'socialised to impose failure upon himself'.[153] This leads one to ask the question, what are the particularly crucial learned attributes which are derived from early experiences and how are they inimical or helpful to school achievement? *Some* of the answers may be found in certain fields of social-psychological research and writing and it is to these that Chapter 7 is addressed. Peter Drucker once wrote that by the time a child has reached the age of 4 or 5, he has 'been conditioned to work; . . . work is an extension of personality. It is achievement. It is one of the ways in which a person defines himself or herself, measures his worth and his humanity'.[154]

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Chapter 6

Constraints on the Curriculum: Social-Psychological Issues

Attractive though it is, telling other people what to do is fraught with difficulty. As most parents, especially those of sensitive adolescents, will confirm, knowing *how* to say it as well as *what* to say are both factors requiring judgement and skill. Schooling is concerned with communicating what society deems ought to be known. It consists, in part, of telling other people what to do and how to do it. It is concerned among other things with making chosen aspects of the culture tangible and meaningful to those who become the future citizens and creators of the culture. The main purpose of schooling is to 'exchange ideas, resources and people through a network of communication systems. The curriculum as taught is an example of such a communication system.[1] But, as everyone knows, schooling is also used as a form of social control, of distribution of life chances. Added to which, as Silberman said, the teacher is concerned with much that does not exist in hard concrete forms; with *procedures*, with attitudes and feelings which act as mediators in the moving and changing process of socialisation.[2] 'Curriculum studies', therefore, that loose area of interest to the teacher-trainer and researcher, rather than to the teacher himself, tends to be as wide and diffuse an area of study as education itself.

The diffuseness of curriculum studies and of curriculum 'theory' is probably matched by the diffuseness of social psychology. Social psychology seems to focus on those gaps, those interstices between individual psychology and social systems. It may be approached from a variety of sociological viewpoints, from psychodynamic or behavioural-psychological ones, from almost any background discipline from literature to medicine. It frequently is. Additionally, there is so much in psychology and social psychology which is part myth and part reality, so much which is not amenable to disciplined validation, that to take a 'social-psychological perspective' of the curriculum may be no more than to assert that one wishes to take a particularly human and interactive view of what is taught in school.

To study the curriculum currently fashionable in schools, one clearly needs some sort of framework for description and analysis. In my opinion the best framework does not lie with those terms and concepts employed in earlier days by Thompson, Bloom, Tyler, or Eisner. Indeed, some years ago, Sockett,[3] Pring[4] and Shipman[5] made it clear that the dominance of 'behavioral objectives' approaches to the

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curriculum appeared to be on the wane (though there seemed little evidence of this in North America in 1979) and that any such behavioural 'models' tended to rest on 'methodological behaviourism', with its concomitant restrictions, absurdities and 'implications of a verification theory for testing the learner's behavior and measuring it'.[6] While not wishing to dispose of aims and objectives altogether; and bearing in mind that we inherit or absorb many of these *prior* to our entry into the profession, let alone the classroom, I would suggest that the curriculum as a whole is best perceived as an educationist's blueprint for human development. This blueprint is not only bound up with questions of socialisation and of the validity of certain sorts of knowledge, it is directly interpreted by someone other than its designer. Furthermore, in passing it on, the transaction itself frequently overrides the content. It has been said,

> Even when the teacher acts like a broadcasting station, it is doubtful that all pupils are tuned in. A more plausible model is that the teacher is communicating with different individuals for brief sporadic periods and that these pupils are responding to other stimuli the rest of the time.[7]

Hence, any curriculum, while conceived in terms of roundness or balance, in terms of width or of depth, is unlikely to arrive at the ears and eyes of the beholder in any such complete manner. The socialisation of the young is not a one-way process – and education as part of socialisation is interpreted, selected from, adjusted to and internalised in terms of the experience of the learner. Thus, in emphasising the transactional nature of education, one is being both realistic and acknowledging that the social psychologist may have something to contribute to discussions of the curriculum. To emphasise the transactional nature of education is to recognise, to change the axiom, that one not only teaches some thing but *somebody*; that a curriculum arises from a history of perceptions of child-rearing and of our culture; that it operates within particular institutions which have real people as staff; that it takes place with today's children not yesterday's; that it is institutionalised and ritualised as an artefact of the culture.

ACTUALITY

Much of what is taught in schools may strike one as hardly worth knowing as a child, let alone as an adult. Once, when I was a sixth-former, one of my friends studying economics estimated that 90 per cent of what he was learning and had been learning over the past two years, was either out of date, in strict utilitarian terms, or was related to the immediate goal of examination-passing, of certification rather than

education. Now, of course, he could have been wrong – and children's views of what is useful are not the only criteria to employ by any means. Indeed, I would wish to assert strongly that a curriculum should always include opportunity to study the useless, as well as the useful.

Many people take an extremely 'means-to-ends' view of the curriculum. They see the curriculum in the same way that they view an assembly-line process in a factory. They apply the same criteria. Does the 'product' sell; is it good value for money? They take the view that education is of little or no value in itself. It leads somewhere; it gets you something. It makes you richer, you gain prestige, or it (at very least?) meets an expressed societal need. If it does not meet any of these requirements, you scrap it. Such views are often 'heady' and persuasive stuff. Moreover, they fall into place with many an adolescent's views of relevance (and, perhaps, are not that incongruent with an adult's, either); of themselves they can lend great weight in the shaping of a curriculum. But of themselves they can so easily become materialistic, shallow and miseducative. In actuality what happens is that the curriculum in most schools represents at best an uneasy compromise between the 'cultural repository', some considerable traditional and ritualistic time-filling, utilitarian possibility (surprisingly little) and what one might term idiosyncratic, teacher-originated academic hobbies.

The teacher walking into his classroom is usually credited with knowing what ideas he hopes to deal with in the ensuing session. If he is an experienced teacher, he will probably be acutely aware of the problems and pitfalls likely to occur in the sequencing of his ideas. He will be aware of the need to be monitoring constantly the response of his pupils, in order that he may alter and modify the level and conceptual 'match' of his material. But as an experienced teacher he will be well aware that the shaping of much of the curriculum lies outside his hands. There are constraints upon him, upon his presentation and upon his pupils' reception of his ideas. No matter how varied his pedagogical style, how attractive the packaging of his knowledge, the content will be to a large extent determined by many factors totally beyond his control. For instance, the knowledge he deals in will clearly be, at least in part, a portion of some existing cultural repository. It will have been shaped, altered, explored and redefined by many minds and many social processes. Neither a particular subject, nor the total school curriculum, just *happens*. Both depend upon a complex mixture of factors which interact in any given society. Those factors which influence the teacher's transactions with his or her pupils can be thought of simplistically in terms of relative immediacy in impact or of distance. Mr Jones, in teaching classics on a Friday afternoon to a class of bored 15-year-olds is likely to be most immediately concerned with holding their attention by convincing them of the utility of the subject or simply of the importance of 'meal-tickets' seen in terms of examinations passed. He may wish to

focus enthusiasm and encourage interest in aesthetic form for its own sake – but unless he is extremely lucky, the immediate constraints will dominate, and aims will be interpreted in terms of pragmatic consideration, rather than in terms of long-term learning. Additionally, and as is well known, any school curriculum as a whole will have been subjected to manipulation and reshaping as socially validated knowledge. Mr Jones's Latin lessons, while still regarded by some as useful bases for further education, will for the most part be disregarded and sometimes only endured in terms of relevant professional entry or access to further education. In short, his Latin lessons may well be considered by pupils, as well as by society at large, as having less immediate or obvious validity than, say, physics or mathematics, especially since the apparent instrumental use of the subject matter usually has some considerable bearing upon attitudes adopted towards that subject.

I would contend that any curriculum has to combine hard-nosed analysis (in terms of both societal *tradition* and relevance) with utopian imagination. Indeed, at its most fundamental it is precisely the balance between those two extremes which is at the heart of most statements of educational aims. It is this balance, too, which in non-authoritarian societies can so depend upon teacher skills and imagination. As Shipman has said, eventually the curriculum consists of 'accommodation and compromise, a mixture of horse trading and horse sense'.[8] And, as a large number of educationists have pointed out, even where there is substantial agreement on the core of 'teachable units' in a given curriculum, those elements taught are as much affected by the interaction (the transaction between teacher and taught) as they are by the actual content. Furthermore, there are additional complications. Any system of schooling is embedded in a system of beliefs and values. When such a system is not in harmony with beliefs and values of the children, or at least able to draw upon some of their concerns, the curriculum is in danger of becoming less effective, and at worst almost useless. Thus, knowledge of the values and attitudes of the children, while not the only information to be heeded, has long been considered essential if one is to plan an effective curriculum.

One of the more curious imbalances in curriculum studies which one might notice over recent years is the tendency for the field to become dominated by sociologists and administrators. [The recent thirty or so Open University units on the curriculum reflected this domination.[9] Only about 5 per cent of the contributions emphasised psychological issues.] To understand the curriculum, one must assuredly look at the surrounding cultural, economic and ideological circumstances; but one must also look at the 'recipients' and 'actors'[10] in the learning process. In 1946 Jersild was attempting to apply some of the findings of human development and developmental psychology to specific curriculum

problems.[11] Indeed, when one makes even the most simplistic analysis of a curriculum in terms of content, it is realised that, for all the many and complex analyses of *what*, it is the *when* (in terms of human development) which has often been the most fruitful of guides for teachers. Let us examine this in more detail.

Many discussions of the school curriculum hinge upon three closely interrelated questions. Some writers have seen them as a sort of education 'trinity' (Figures 6.1). Clearly, the 'what' is extremely complex.



Figure 6.1 *Three closely interrelated questions – the education 'trinity'.*

Moreover, it is commonly discussed at two quite fundamentally different levels. Level A(1) concerns the culture as a whole. Such discussion usually includes the purpose of schooling, the role of the school and of the teacher in a given society and (often) perspectives, both political and ideological, of that society's structure. Textbooks abound in this field; some with an avowedly political flavour, such as Dale;[12] some more obviously neutral in tone, such as Lawton or Kelly;[13] some truly seminal in my opinion, such as Warnock.[14] But such books, while often extremely stimulating, tend in my experience to have little effect upon those engaged at the 'chalk face'. This may be a pity, but the practitioners are more concerned with level A(2), that is, with the 'what', in terms of the content of a particular programme or series of programmes in a given type of school. This level is more often dealt with by administrators, learning theorists, subject specialists and curriculum theorists. 'Recipe' books abound and appear to be well used.[15] While there is an obvious interrelationship between A(1) and A(2), as demonstrated for example in Nyerere's famous paper[16] or in Bronfenbrenner's *Two Worlds of Childhood*,[17] practising teachers can rarely afford the luxury of dwelling for too long on such connections and tend to move rapidly from content to questions concerning the right timing for the child, the 'when' of the curriculum process. The 'when' is generally discussed in terms of developmental characteristics, but inevitably has overtones of both 'what' and 'how'. Indeed, for many teachers of young children this has become the central feature of their curriculum-planning, often providing in limited terms rationale and

justification for both *content*, and *transaction*. Traditionally, psychologists have had a considerable amount to contribute here and have attempted to identify key issues. Evans and others[18] have described such issues in terms of (four) subcategories roughly as follows:

B(1) *in terms of sequences of stages of human behaviour and learning.* Very differently oriented psychologists have a lot to say here. Indeed, it might be regarded as the most fruitful strand in curriculum theory. Its effects on content have been considerable. One has only to think of Piaget, Kohlberg, Erikson, or Bruner to identify theories of child learning and socialisation which appear to have had a direct effect upon the curriculum (Nuffield Maths, Science 5–13, Middle Years Project, Health Education Project, Ypsilanti Language Curriculum, MACOS and Nachalot Project, to mention but a few). Clearly, many such curricular packages or proposals have been based on theories of human development currently fashionable and employed as blueprints by the curriculum architects.

B(2) *in terms of the identification of certain learning strategies,* that is, in terms of those theories relating the cognitive style of the learner to what is being learned. Notions of timing are not so appropriate here, but tend to be employed as a part of the total explanation, sometimes again in terms of developmental sequences. Though one may find evidence to suggest a considerable amount of research work in this area, I would assert that there has been little direct spin-off for the curriculum as yet.

B(3) *in terms of timing related to the transaction, in respect of sustaining motivation and enhancing feedback.* There is much diverse work by psychologists here. Principal among the theorists have been behaviourists, but also very differently oriented social psychologists, and some psychodynamically oriented educationists, notably Morris.[19] Here, some of the Schools Council English/humanities work is also relevant; and several English local education authorities have concentrated on the issue within their revised systems of diagnosis and recording in the primary school (currently of the profile or log type).

B(4) *isolating developmental sequences of hierarchies within the structure of the subject, discipline, or area to be learned.* Gagné[20] is one of the noted theorists here. His ideas concerning task analysis–taxonomy approaches to instruction (and it should be emphasised that Gagné sees instruction as only *one* aspect of education) centre upon the arrangement of conditions which facilitate learning in terms of both vertical and lateral transfer. There are other theorists (particularly in the USA) who hold that task analysis yields suggestions concerning the appropriate sequencing and structuring

of the material to be learned. As Gagné has pointed out, this is no new idea. Its bases go back to Herbart and earlier. It is an eclectic theory drawing on work as diverse as that of Thorndike, Piaget and Pavlov.

Closely connected with the 'what' and the 'when' is the question of 'how' one carries out the transactions with the child. This does, of course, throw one back to considerations of the child's levels of cognitive development and sophistication. But it also opens up other important areas for discussion. In the last resort it may be that what the teacher teaches is *himself*, rather than his subject. This is an area of growing importance in the study of the curriculum. Teaching methods, tactics and 'styles' which appear suitable at one stage may not necessarily be suitable at the next. In this respect it may strike one as somewhat strange that, in England, one is quite likely to observe young children choosing, organising and selecting their learning experiences and sometimes even the material to be employed, while at secondary and higher[21] levels didactic exposition and limited student choice are often the order of the day. Overall this is an aspect of the curriculum where relationships and the quality of the transactions are coming more and more under scrutiny, an area where *mutality* (to use Morris's term) has become a major interest to curriculum theorists and educationists in general.

Often the most fundamental question of all in the curriculum – 'why?' – is left unasked and unanswered. Notably it is omitted in most official pronouncements, because it is so difficult to answer. Why teach this or that? Why have this content as opposed to that? Why use this timing as opposed to that? Why adopt this method as opposed to that? Furthermore, the 'why' of the curriculum underscores one of the major conflicts in rationale for education in terms of both content, and method. This conflict is perhaps best set out as follows:

> Education, and hence by implication the curriculum, is primarily concerned with preparing children for the future society. As such the momentary needs and interests of children must receive secondary consideration to societal needs. Put in its extreme form, as Stalin is reported to have said to H. G. Wells, education is a 'weapon' and teachers hold the front-line in the battle for the mind and thus for the support of a certain sort of societal structure. Clearly, the line between indoctrination and education becomes very tenuous here. It is hard not to see the force of such views when reading the educational pronouncments of developing nations, or even when reading, for instance, the preambles to English Education Acts.
>
> Opposing such a perspective are those who believe that education should be based on the immediate needs and interests of children,

that is, that subsequent responsibilities and societal needs should be subordinated to the child's needs. They argue that, for the curriculum to be effective, both content and transaction must be in tune with the potentialities of the individual.

Clearly, the first view in its extreme form underlies a curriculum based upon an analysis of what a society requires generally in order to succeed or to provide for (ideologically or economically) 'satisfactory' adult roles. Such views may be, though are by no means always, concomitant with overt politicisation. Sometimes, as is the case of Freire's methods in Brazil in the early 1960s, education and particular curricula are used as tools for the expansion of political consciousness, for what Freire termed 'concientizacao' or 'consciousness raising'. (Stress upon group identity, allegiance and duty are, however, the most usual forms of politicisation; see Bronfenbrenner.)

The second view is based upon the assumption that a 'full' and 'complete' daily existence during childhood is the best insurance for successful adulthood (a view with which I have *some* sympathy; and one which gains a measure of support from various branches of psychology and even from biography). Great problems lie beneath such child-centred assumptions, however. What are the real 'needs' of children? Who assesses them? How are they perceived? In all, and putting aside the bulk of curriculum theory, any practical consideration of the social-psychological constraints upon the curriculum would lead me to believe that the prime influences upon the curriculum are those shown in Figure 6.2.

In England, and to some extent in North America, it would seem that primary/elementary schools have, by and large, been fairly successful in handling constraints 1 and 5 in the figure. This is partly because such schools are relatively small and intimate (the average English urban primary school has about ten staff members); partly it is an outcome of the long traditions of non-specialist and polymathic teaching in such schools. Both factors have contributed to less parochialism over individual areas of the curriculum than is usually possible at later, more specialised stages of education. In such small schools the communication structure is much more informal than in secondary schools. If decisions concerning changes in pedagogy, style and content are required, these can be effected quickly and simply. Different class groupings, team teaching, the sharing of common core 'subject' concerns, all combine to produce less protective attitudes on the part of the teachers towards each particular subject in the curriculum. Added to this 'looser framing'[22] are what many infant and kindergarten teachers would describe as the 'facts of life', that children come to reception classes or first grades at such obviously diverse ability levels within a given curriculum. All this invites and indeed compels the primary teacher to concentrate continually upon the facilitation of *differential*



Figure 6.2 *Prime influences upon the curriculum.*

access to the curriculum for different children within the same class or group. Additionally, and especially in English primary schools, traditions of 'learning alongside the child' affect the role of the teacher, so that his or her position is not solely that of the 'fountain-head' sprinkling each child equally, nor that of the 'expert' whose expertise would be diminished by exploration or admissions of uncertainty. Rather, the primary teacher's talents, as Wilson[23] put it, are spread pretty thinly and modern teaching styles tend constantly to reinforce his awareness of width and shallowness rather than of depth.

It could be said, however, that primary schools have not done particularly well in respect of those constraints numbered 2 and 3. (Figure 6.2). Frequently there has been weak or ineffective analysis of the discipline or knowledge area being taught. There have been some suggestions, too, that certain aspects of the curriculum are not as systematically developed as they might be – mathematics, science and history being commonly cited especially in respect of the more able child.[24] Some general concern has been expressed as to whether modern methods, such as integrated-day approaches, ensure sufficient development of the core curriculum; and in mathematics in particular there is a little evidence, from Land's early work to the more recent work of

Griffiths and perhaps of the APU,[25] that the subject is not particularly well handled in the primary schools. Often, too, aims and objectives are expressed in vague and general terms such that translation and understanding of them by the public in respect of the day-to-day 'system maintenance' of the school becomes well-nigh impossible. Recently many local education authorities in England have instituted working parties looking into a more careful analysis and evaluation in terms of constraints 1, 2 and 3, and cumulative core-subject profiles for children are already shaping the curriculum more directly. The DES Assessment of Performance Unit is likewise seriously occupied in inquiring into the feasibility of more careful guidance and monitoring of the curriculum from the middle years of childhood on. Additionally, transfer from one stage to another has come under repeated scrutiny, and some suggest that one of the prime aims of the primary and elementary schools must be to ensure that their curricula form a firm basis for the next stage. Articulation of the curriculum, therefore, becomes of dominant concern.

Education for children past puberty has, in both England and North America, emphasised a gradually increasing specialism[26] in its approach. Consequently such traditions, when combined with greater specialist knowledge of the teachers, the nearness of school-leaving examinations, those publicly accountable 'meal-tickets' in most advanced technological societies, have led to greater success in the curriculum when dealing with constraints 2 and 3 (Figure 6.2). However, in my limited experience in a variety of countries (the USA, Canada, the UK, Spain and Australia) secondary stages of education have been woefully weak in catering for differential access to the curriculum. 'Rolling' timetables – variable time/subject commitments, free choice and curricular 'width' – are not common experiences for the 13–16-year-old adolescent. Frequently, such a child is still 'grouped', 'set', or 'streamed' according to ability, or according to a restricted choice of specialisation and combination of subjects. Indeed, in the large comprehensive, collegiate, or high school there are many factors operating within the organisation which make curriculum flexibility and differential access almost impossible to achieve. Communication structures become channelled and hierarchised, traditions and subject validation harden and most children sit through identical portions or 'gobbets'[27] of the subject. The entering characteristics of the many children, initially from different primary institutions, cannot be catered for, except in the crudest of groupings. Those of us who are familiar with the problems of resource and remedial teachers, with the difficulties which teachers of new subject areas (such as social studies or consumer education) have, are well aware that introduction of a different aspect of the curriculum into an already frozen, crowded and competitive situation may well lead to despair and conflict among the staff. (One

might, of course, see the current decline in school population as an opportunity for greater diversification, for dual-subject training of staff and for institutionalising a greater flexibility.)

Those omnibus features grouped under constraint 4 (Figure 6.2) still need a great deal more research before even the crudest of generalisations can be made about the effect upon the curriculum. Mutuality, concern, involvement, charisma, 'styles' and approaches, all affect the classroom climate to a great extent. We know that they can be important, but to what degree and in what context we know less. There is a long tradition of research in this area, but little conclusive to report, beyond the rather trite reiteration that, in the last resort, what the teacher teaches is as much *himself* as the subject. It is interesting to note that, after a period of apparent disenchantment with psychodynamics, ego-psychology and humanistic psychology, some college courses which I have examined in England and some observed in North America, are beginning to focus on the models of healthy personality as discussed in the theories of Allport, Maslow, Rogers, Fromm, and others. Maslow's theories, in particular, seem to form a quite prominent part of educational and social-psychology courses for teachers. Perhaps, too, more teachers are at least minimally aware of the work of Coopersmith, Gordon and Gergen,[28] and possibly of Rosenthal and Jacobson.[29] If the self concept is as important as such writers would have us believe, then it clearly has great implication for learning and for curriculum-planning. If children develop the self concept through interaction with those around them, they need teachers who are capable of understanding and perceiving both the child's and the teacher's views of the world. Clearly, a major aim in any curriculum construction should be to provide chances of success for the child. How can a child feel able unless he succeeds? How will he go on learning in the face of repeated failure?

A NOTE ON EVALUATION

Evaluation could not normally be considered as a social-psychological constraint, yet its modes and vehicles of employment are often such. It does not easily fit under any one label in the diagram, yet is implied in much that has been said and is an integral part of constraints 1, 2 and 3 (Figure 6.2); and often present in a variety of subtle ways in those constraints numbered 4 and 5. Unfortunately, it is most often thought of in terms of *aims and objectives* only, of ultimate certification for advancement in life, the 'meal-tickets' as they have been termed. In fact, our knowledge of, familiarity with and ready access to means of diagnosing the entering characteristics of the learners in the classroom are remarkably sparse. Most teachers have only minimal facility with forms of diagnostic evaluation, many do not understand them even where materials are available; and our knowledge of the precise skills

necessary and the problems encountered even in, say, reading primers is surprisingly limited.

In general it would seem that evaluation is taken to mean: how far 'along the road' have your children travelled, and how do they compare with one another, and in terms of everyone else of the same age. The dictionary definition exemplifies these two different aspects very clearly, since it gives evaluation as a skill to be acquired and as an assessment procedure. For Tyler in the earlier days of curriculum theory, evaluation was a measure of behavioural change, the realisation of objectives and the detection of any discrepancies.[30] But, according to Lawton and Kelly,[31] such approaches were, by and large and despite the large number of well-funded attempts which followed them, considered to be failures. Whether this was because there were intrinsic weaknesses in such early behavioural approaches (as I believe), or whether it was because of changing and competing ideologies in education is difficult to ascertain. Certainly, changes in the climate of education, notably the partial shift from subject-based approaches to more fluid, child-based approaches must have had some effect. Regarding the child as an important centre of the whole educational process, rather than focusing solely upon the body of knowledge concerned, necessitates less empirical means of assessment. Harlen summarises this shift very clearly when she says, 'Evaluation must be concerned not only with the characteristics, variables and processes relating to the class as a whole, but also with individuals, each with his own set of abilities, preferences, styles of learning, attitudes, interests and past experiences'.[32] The new mode of evaluation epitomised in this statement is nowadays usually described as 'illuminative' and apparently more clearly related to recent knowledge on classroom interaction.[33] This aims for description, interpretation and understanding of what is going on and its main protagonists seem to be MacDonald, and Parlett and Hamilton.[34] MacDonald, for instance, concentrates on the political aspects of evaluation, seeing, like many current writers, evaluation as 'embroiled in the action, built into a political process which concerns the distribution of power'.[35] Parlett and Hamilton advocate small sample studies for evaluation which would take into account the wider context in which the educational programme functions; and feedback and communication of results would need to be speedy enough to inform action as well as be accessible and intelligible to a variety of audiences. Any report to the teacher has to be expressed in practical terms, they suggest, and not full of confusing theoretical concepts.

As was said earlier in respect of the Open University curriculum course, there has been a tendency for curriculum theorists, and especially some of the writings of the new evaluators, to adopt a sociological framework. But they do not always appear too concerned to adhere to the rigours of their professed discipline. Parsons, in

particular, is critical of the parallels drawn between their own activities and the research of Becker, Cicourel *et al.* in the USA, who have adopted more conventional procedures and higher methodological standards. He suggests that insufficient attention has been given to the need for carefully trained evaluators, who are able and experienced enough to build up and interpret explanatory models of the curriculum and the associated interchange. Parsons certainly advocates caution in the adoption of the ideas and models of the new evaluators. Like Stenhouse, he appears concerned by the lack of clarity of criteria for assessment. Stenhouse provides five clear criteria for estimation of the curriculum. Questions need to be asked concerning *meaning, potential, interest, conditionality* and *elucidation.* Such criteria, if employed rigorously he says, would help to overcome the inadequacies inherent in new modes of evaluation.

Basically what one is observing both in discussion in journals, and in the practical debates by groups of teachers and advisers concerned with forming more definitive instructions on evaluation within each English local authority, are attempts to resolve the conflicts between goal-free versus goal-based assessment. The 'Great Debate', the establishment of certain initiatives by local advisers and by HMIs, the devising of mass-systems of testing (particularly at primary levels, and after a substantial period of minimal attention to recording systems) and the research of the DES Assessment of Performance Unit, are all part and parcel of the current climate. Clearly, whichever perspective is adopted, evaluation is an ongoing process which itself reflects the changing ideologies prevalent in society. Sockett has defined this process quite clearly and stated the essential components as *appraisal; judgements made in light of (agreed) criteria; criteria appropriate to particular contexts;* and *contexts embodying human purposes, thus the evaluation informs decision-making.*[36] Inevitably, evaluations at the different levels of educational institution are bound by the history and context of those particular institutions. Elementary and primary schools are not normally embedded in processes of certification affecting job opportunity, and the social and cultural constraints on the secondary- or high-school curriculum are, above all, allied to questions of comparability and certification for life in the adult world outside. Schooling, say many, is *the* major vehicle for fitting people into the hierarchy and order of a specified economic and political structure. Evaluation is a central feature in a curriculum dependent upon 'selection, defining culture and rules, and teaching certain cognitive skills'.[37]

In all, any social-psychological perspective must serve to remind us of the context and process of interaction, of the competing forces in the socialising of the child, must emphasise again and again that school is compulsory institutionalisation of a particular type in which the scales of measurement and evaluation are ever-present. But socialisation is

about the attitudes, feelings and emotions of the person, as well as about his cognitive construction of the world. Socialisation tends towards conservation and the confirmation of existing norms, values and social roles; mercifully education is more creative, in that people do imagine, create, expand and develop new ideas about the world and about themselves. Learning, and hence the curriculum, is not merely the process of absorbing and storing facts, or of seeing how one performs in relation to another, it is about human development, too. It is about the development of the learners as *persons*. Thus, one returns to the crucial feature in any social-psychological consideration of the curriculum, that *particular learner*, his or her entering characteristics, feelings, perceptions and models of the world. Knowledge transmitted is not just knowledge received. To imagine so is to commit the most gross teaching blunder. To undertake transmission, without reflecting on and attempting to ascertain the perceptions of the learner, is to engage in insensitive (and certainly incomplete) forms of curriculum-planning. Object and perception are not necessarily congruent. The entering characteristics of the learners are vital ingredients, possibly the most vital ingredients, in the production of meaningful, well-matched, well-designed school learning.[38]

Lastly, it is as well to remember that the experienced teacher may be a more subtle evaluator, and possibly more accurate one, than many 'objective' forms of group evaluation commonly employed:

> Discussing the results of an IQ test administered to her class, Ms Allen disputed two-thirds of the scores. In almost every case she claimed that the child in question was considerably brighter than his score indicated, his poor performance being attributable to the group setting, to inexperience with test procedures, to poor motor control, to perfectionist standards, and so on. For Ms Allen none of the children in her class [was] intellectually deficient . . . [tests and evaluation of that sort] . . . she felt were insidious ways of labelling children as inferior and often served to bring about the kind of negative self-fulfilling prophecy that she sought to eliminate from her own relationships with children.[39]

NOTES AND REFERENCES: CHAPTER 6

This chapter is an extended, modified version of a paper which first appeared in Katz, L. *et al.* (eds), *Current Topics in Early Childhood Education*, Vol. 3 (Norwood; Ablex, 1980). pp. 139–50.

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24 Department of Education and Science (Bullock Report), *A Language for Life* (London: HMSO, 1975). Society makes its most conscious and concerted attempt at developing children's attitudes and beliefs through the school curriculum. These are made through policy documents, centrally inspired 'guidelines' and discussion papers (such as the DES paper on the curriculum, *Four Subjects of Debate* (London: HMSO, 1977) through systems of licence and inspection, through local or provincial advisory systems, through public and externally validated examinations, through teacher-training courses and textbooks, through research and development bodies (such as the Schools Council in the UK).
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26 In North America there is much greater emphasis on vocational aspects of education, particularly for age groups of 16 years onward in the collegiate and senior high schools.

27 A process of sprinkling from a fountainhead, or of attempting to 'wet each child equally', as a colleague put it.

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33 See, for instance, the work of Delamont, S., *Interaction in the Classroom* (London: Methuen, 1976), or Galton, M., Simon, B., and Croll, P., *Inside the Primary Classroom* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980).

34 Parlett, M., and Hamilton, D., 'Evaluation as illumination', in Tawney, op. cit. See also, Galton, M. (ed.), *Curriculum Change: The Lessons of a Decade* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1980).

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38 See especially the work of Good, L., Biddle, B., and Brophy, J., *Teachers Make a Difference* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1975). In referring to many studies of teacher effectiveness the authors report work showing that different styles, methodologies and structures are required for different types of pupils at different age levels. They say that their survey suggested that low-SES children and those with minimal skills progressed most rapidly in the early stages of schooling, 'in a carefully planned and teacher structured environment . . . [but] that although this appears the best *initial* strategy for teaching such students, the strategy becomes less effective to the extent that it succeeds!' (p. 78). See also, Brophy, J., 'Interactions between learner characteristics and optimal instruction', in Bar-Tal, D., and Saxe, L., *Social Psychology of Education* (New York: Halstead Press, 1978).

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Chapter 7

Self-Esteem and Social Learning

PERSONALITY AND SELF-ESTEEM: AN INTRODUCTION

Studies of personality are really studies about individual differences: the very core of psychology. (Each of us has a limited appreciation of our own personality.) Others may talk of it as attractive, complex, painfully shy, morose, and so on. We may view ourselves generously or critically. Rarely can we assess our own personalities, and never do we really see ourselves as others see us. So what is personality? It is, quite simply, the actual quality of being recognisably human and unique. Dictionary definitions usually stress that the term is used as signifying the totality of a person's behaviour and emotions, or the unique organisation of the person's traits, dispositions, habits and feelings.

Whereas the 'self' may be thought of as the recognition of one's own personality, it is in reality an abstraction that each person develops about himself for herself. The 'self' is the perception one has of one's attributes, qualities (both intellectual and emotional), about one's behaviour and one's physique. This abstraction is represented by the term 'me'. 'I' recognises 'me' as unique. The concept 'me' is learned in the course of development from a neo-nate to an adult. It is learned in the course of events which enable one to locate, measure and compare oneself with others, and it is self-referent, that is, it cannot be viewed as objectively as 'you' – the total personality – might be by others. Thus, the self and personality are not quite the same thing. Others may appraise your personality, weigh and compare its various facets with a colder or a warmer eye than you. The self is an abstraction that is selective. Certain aspects will be valued in our own appraising more than others. Certain people close to us as we grow (notably our parents and peers) will be more salient to and more formative of our emotions, desires and intellect than others. The gradual growth of the personality and of the 'self' will be subject to strange choices, odd elements of selectivity.

When one refers some thing, some behaviour, or some consistency (imagined or real) of events to a particular origin or cause, one ascribes or *attributes* an origin or source to the event or observation. In some senses a major component of one's personality is an accretion of such perceptions, since this is composed of a whole history of remembered inferences about self and others and the apparent consistencies or inconsistencies which have led to inferral about 'me' and 'them', about the relationship of self to others. It is not possible to see this in an

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'others' dimension only, since inferring another's motivations from his actions will at times, especially when that other is highly significant in the socialisation process, critically impinge on the perceptions of one's own behaviour and of its appropriateness in a given context. It would appear that in the early stages of infancy there can be little awareness by the individual of his own characteristics and attributes. Initially, it would seem the 'I' exists not only in relation to powerful others but almost in *extension*, rather than in relation. Gradually, something like the beginning of self-awareness develops during the first year of the child's life, during the sensori-motor period; and the differentiation of what is 'me' from what is 'not me' constitutes one of the first major steps in the formation of the self concept. There are, however, major differences in the perspectives taken by psychologists, and definitions of self and explanations of its development are by no means consensual.

'The concept of self is often used to refer to both the process and the reflexive content of conscious thinking,'[1] Some psychologists, such as Erikson,[2] have portrayed the increasingly sensitive definitions of self almost as a series of developmental goals for the individual. Successful solution of conflicts in each of his eight epigenetic developmental stages motivates the person upwards on the scale of maturity.[3] And clearly, this is an extremely useful way of looking at the developing self. But all definitions of personality and of the self are rather inclined to hover between *structure* and change or *process*. By and large, those of psychodynamic or psychoanalytic background and inclination tend to stress the organisational integrity rather more than emphasising the effects of structural variables, whereas those psychologists more behavioural in approach concentrate on the effects of the person's responses to changing situations. Definitions of personality reflecting the necessity for viewing the self as 'stable yet changing' abound. A classic definition of personality is Allport's, 'the dynamic organisation within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behaviour and thought'. A definition 'for better or worse', Allport called it,[4] and it is one which emphasised structure rather than process.

There are so many definitions of personality that even a detailed examination of some of the principal writings may leave one confused. Is personality the result of learning throughout life? Of development and constant modification? Or is it a relatively enduring display of those principal traits and beliefs with which one has learned to greet the world by the age of 7? 'Personality' is itself a major area of study for psychologists and personality psychologists generally work in areas of mental health and adjustment. Not surprisingly, many are medically trained and use clinical techniques of analysis and therapy which rely (on the whole) more on fixed than fluid notions of personality. Such a paradox can be best explained by noting the emphasis placed by such

clinicians upon early, formative and so-called 'critical' periods of infant learning and adjustment, and in their attempts to uncover any of the processes in such periods which may have caused maladjustment. It has been said earlier that a vital, indeed central, part of one's personality is that cluster of notions called the 'self' or 'self-concept', and that the self-concept refers to the way an individual sees himself or herself. One vital aspect of that multi-faceted self-concept, which seems to 'spill over' into so much of the personality in general, is how one perceives one's value. How one values oneself in relation to others determines (in part) one's self-esteem or self-regard. The self-concept and self-esteem are *not* the same. Self-esteem has been defined by Coopersmith as 'the evaluation which an individual makes and cutomarily maintains with regard to himself: it expresses an attitude of approval or disapproval and indicates the extent to which the individual believes himself to be capable, significant, successful and worthy'.[5] In short, your self-esteem is what you think you're worth, both in your eyes and those of others.

Self-esteem, like many other characteristics of personality, seems to be fixed at a fairly stable level by 7–10 years of age and, according to Coopersmith and others, is from then on relatively consistent and enduring.[6] But some writers (notably Erikson[7]) have maintained that during adolescence, when the peer group is of great significance, a person is able to experiment with new identities, try out new roles and, in a sense, re-establish his personality. This means that self-esteem can be critically affected during that 'psychological moratorium', as Erikson calls it. Coopersmith, in his study, decided that 'popularity is not associated with the subjective experience of esteem',[8] but other researchers have been more inclined to see a relationship between peer acceptance and self-esteem,[9] particularly during adolescence. But, the evidence is not that clear,[10] and in general it seems that self-esteem as an 'entity' is moderately settled by puberty. Of considerable interest in studies of self-esteem is another rather tenuous finding, that there appears to be some relationship between low self-esteem and various forms of maladaptation to society. Typical, in this respect, are the findings by McKinney *et al.*,[11] who noted that low self-respect and low confidence correlated fairly consistently with maladjustment and delinquency in a group of children.

Levels of self-esteem tend to vary across activities. While there may be some global entity, 'self-esteem', which seems roughly stable, the different elements which make it up are situationally specific. You may be good at Scrabble, but poor at football, and the feedback from the different situations will have an effect upon your own self-evaluation. There are, therefore, two major components to self-esteem, the subjective (that is, the individual's private evaluation of his general worth) and the behavioural (the actual way the individual performs in particular events, the observed behaviour). These components can



Figure 7.1 *Self-esteem.*

relate to each other in a variety of ways, as can be seen from Figure 7.1.[12] According to Coopersmith, children exhibiting congruent components along dimension A are generally socially and academically successful and (by definition) fairly content with themselves. Dimension B represents the average child, a moderately content, moderate achiever. Those children exhibiting congruence on dimension C tend to be anxious and to display signs of distress concerning their lack of academic and social success and 'to accept the unhappy reality of their inferiority'.[13] There is apparently little discrepancy between subjective and behavioural assessments, and children exhibiting high to low or low to high components are relatively rare and may be anxious, disturbed, or decidedly odd.

The principal burden of Coopersmith's research was that self-esteem had a marked effect upon the motivational patterns of schoolchildren. From his work with both children and adults, he concluded that success was normally assessed in terms of:

(1) *power* – the ability to influence and control others;
(2) *significance* – the attention, affection and acceptance of others;
(3) *virtue* – the adherence to certain valued moral and ethical standards;
(4) *competence* – successful performance in the face of demands for achievement.

His general conclusions fit into a stream of research from the 1950s to the present,[14] almost all of it pointing out that it is the under- or low-achiever who is most likely to express feelings of inadequacy or negative attitudes towards self. Purkey has even said that a host of studies clearly verify that it is the successful student who is most likely to see himself positively.[15] In short, that the self-esteem of the child in school is a crucial factor in his learning at all levels of success. Some have gone as far as to suggest that it has a predictive value for academic achievement equal to or better than measures of intelligence.[16] But whereas a

connection between low self-esteem and low school performance seems fairly well established, that between high performance and high evaluation of self seems (despite Purkey's comment) a little less sure. Positive self-evaluation seems a necessary but not simply *sufficient* condition for successful school learning.[17] Both Naylor [18] and Thomas [19] have pointed out that the research findings lead inescapably to the view that consistent differences in the self-concepts of children generally have been found to exist between high and low academic achievers. The causal relationship of self-esteem to academic achievement is an especially difficult one to establish, however. The two seem to result from complex sets of variables, and constantly to influence each other through the various experiences of success and failure in school and life.

There are many other related aspects. For instance, children (and adults) possess multiple selves which overlap and are set in particular circles of significant others. For a child the copying of roles (role-taking) becomes an important avenue to learning more about the self, and opportunities for role-taking are vital avenues to the gaining of consensual knowledge about the self. There are also questions of consistency and congruence. These loom large in social psychology, but here one may simply ask: what of consistency in objective and subjective perceptions of self? If one's self-evaluation is low, would that imply that one would wish to have *that* confirmed by others? After all, dissonance is difficult to deal with. There is also the process of rationalisation which occurs to varying degrees in adults and children. I may dance clumsily, but deny to myself and others the importance of this; thus the negative behavioural feedback is perhaps not so critical as, say, when I fail at a game of tennis, which means more to me. Then, too, one might consider discrepancies between the self, as ascertained by self (that is, the self-concept), and the self one would like to be (ideal self). Conflict here can be damaging and impose psychological strain on the individual. The relationship between anxiety and self-esteem is a curious one. Serious anxiety is consistently found to be a concomitant of negative self images. Yet it would appear that a certain degree of anxiety is necessary for an individual to be fully motivated to give of his best (see Chapter 5).

Clearly, human behaviour is so complex that one should never try to explain it through the use of a single concept. But a great deal of research into human behaviour indicates the importance of considering *both* the structural context, and those relatively stable sets or dispositions of the individual which go to make up his or her personality. In the latter self-esteem appears to have a lot to offer to educationists. All the evidence points to well-adjusted children and adults evaluating themselves positively. One cannot help thinking that a principal goal of schooling ought to be to assist pupils in this direction.

ATTRIBUTION, CAUSALITY AND LOCUS OF CONTROL

In the larger context of human learning one might say that gradually the perception of causality, as a process of inferral, becomes part of the growing child's understanding of his world. By certain processes we attribute causes to various events. Our attribution of causes may or may not result in the perception of some sort of unity – a generalisation (which may only be 'real' to us) – which we then employ in the ascription of further causes. The problem is, in part, the very circularity of such processes. In seeking to answer 'why' questions for which answers are not inherently obvious in the associated events, we may often attribute where we cannot observe, imposing a 'rationale' or unity where none exists; and one based upon our subjective or personal needs rather than events or the intentions of others. Having done so, apparently successfully, we go on. Some modicum of 'success', in terms of explaining things to ourselves satisfactorily, gives us a 'working model' which in truth leads to even greater assuredness in the ascription of causes. Too bad if they fit our perceptions rather than reality. Yet here, too, there are problems; those perceptions are indeed *our* reality and they themselves become the powerful wellsprings of our behaviour, and frequently the rationale for our course of action. This is not to imply that attribution of cause is necessarily rational, nor will it necessarily appear logically consistent. Our judgement will be subject to unconscious and to ego-defensive processes which may well disguise or alter perception.

All this may sound rather tedious, but it lies at the heart of what is called *attribution theory* and is very closely connected with self-esteem. For attribution theory is simply 'the process by which an individual interprets events as being caused by a particular part of a relatively stable environment'.[20] In short, man appears to need to understand his environment and to interpret and categorise events which will make sense to him. His interpretation (as in self-esteem in Coopersmith's diagram) depends on behavioural and on subjective components. The connections between self-esteem, attribution theory and social-learning theory become clearer when one realises that attribution theory is primarily concerned with attribution of causes to phenomena in terms of *self–others* relations, and with 'models' of ascription learned in social situations. Further, the rational-cum-conditioning emphasis has links with behaviourism, which are exposed in notions of the associative and accumulative effect of the experience which guides the person's 'rules' concerning the making of attributions.[21] By attributing causes to events, and motives to people, the resulting system of cumulative cognitions may be perceived as consistent with experience. 'Verification', however, is entirely within the *individual's perceptions* of his experience, and as such is not amenable to the objective testing which might be possible in more controlled surroundings. But the cumulative effects of these

ascriptions on the person's personality, unlike the difficulty in ascertaining the original motivational force, can sometimes be more clearly observed.

Attribution theory as such has its origins in the writings of Heider[22] and is, as has been stated, concerned with the ways in which people infer the causes of behaviour. Heider's model is of man seeking to make order out of the chaos around him, of man seeking the underlying causes of events and making, or attempting to make, some unity of his perceptions. Many have regarded attribution theory as 'a naïve version of psychology itself',[23] and it is clear that Heider saw his own work as a pursuance of what he termed 'commonsense psychology'. His own theories were strongly influenced by gestalt psychology, and by Kurt Lewin in particular. As Weiner says, Heider's views of the determinants of behaviour are 'manifestly similar to the Lewinian statement that behaviour is a function of the person and the environment: $B = f(P,E)$'.[24]

Heider saw internal and external forces combining in some way to cause behaviour. More important, he was concerned predominantly with perceived causes of behaviour and with the consequences of differential ascription of cause to internal or external factors. The latter was not seen as invariably dichotomised, but rather as creating a unique mix of causal ascriptions which would themselves be subject to different levels of modification dependent upon that individual's perceptual awareness and experience. Clearly, that degree of perceptual awareness would depend upon the antecedents of personal aetiology in terms of consistency in observation and experience, apparent accuracy of assessment and its associated reward (or success).

Attribution *theory* is for the most part couched in psychologists' terms, not in terms commonly employed in everyday language.[25] As such, like the attitude scales which inundate schools from time to time, it may be concerned with manners of description and conception alien to those actually used by real people, even though the acts of attributing are everyday, common experiences. Jones has suggested that, broadly speaking, attribution theory has generated or assisted research characterised along the following lines:

(1) factors motivating the individual to seek causal explanation;
(2) factors affecting the choice of cause;
(3) the consequences of making one sort of causal attribution rather than another.[26]

The causal inferences drawn by a person may well influence subsequent perceptions and, by implication, subsequent motivation and achievement behaviour, in such a way as to enhance or diminish the approach to the subject associated with those inferences. De Charms has expressed this rather differently by talking of attribution resulting in man seeing

himself as an 'origin' or a 'pawn', saying, 'When a person feels that he is an Origin, his behaviour should be characteristically different from his behaviour when he feels like a Pawn',[27] whereas a pawn feels that things are beyond his personal control, or that the powers that affect his life reside in others. Put simply, for example, constant experience of being terrorised *may* lead to an expectation that one will go on being terrorised; experience of repression might lead to submissive behaviour. People, so the theory runs, come to generalise on expectancy for this or that type of treatment to such an extent that it eventually pervades their whole personality. If such people experience constant domination and lack of personal power, they become convinced that they are the *losers* of this world, the 'pawns' to use De Charms's term. There are very close links between attribution theory and constructs such as individual feelings of power/powerlessness, self-esteem and (as we shall see later) perceptions of being internally or externally controlled. To the person concerned the perception of cause, while offering him some degree of cognitive understanding and even of cognitive mastery, does not necessarily imply that he feels he is becoming more in control of his life-span. His perceptions of causality may, in fact, lead him to inferences that he is less control than he would wish. As already pointed out, such inferences may involve ego-defensive mechanisms which safeguard him in some way. In particular, a person may attribute causality to apparently haphazard external sources (luck, fate and chance) when faced with his own inability to circumvent or control courses of action.

As in studies of self-esteem, it is possible to relate such constructs to measures of achievement motivation; and the connection makes good sense, since persons displaying high achievement motivation could be expected to approach areas similar to those in which there had been previous success with a heightened sense of security. Such people would infer that their previous success had been the result of high ability or continued effort. They would thus be more likely to select tasks associated with such previous experiences and the cumulative effect of knowing that success or failure appeared to be related to their efforts or ability would contribute to their feelings of control over their environment, as well as over themselves. Evidence cited by Jones and Goethals[28] would seem to indicate that ability is perceived, from fairly early on, as usually stable both in oneself and others, and that people seem quick to base expectations upon perceptions of their own levels of ability as relatively fixed personal attributes. In contrast, and of considerable interest to educationists, effort is *not* viewed in quite the same way. For one thing, effort is clearly (and usually consistently) rewarded both in early socialisation, and in later school experience, in terms which separate it from ability. The two are by no means concomitant. The 'tries hard despite low ability' comment on school

reports is not without meaning. De Charms poses the question, where does the concept of causation come from? For instance, what made a 6-year-old constantly blame everything but himself for his failures to glue a matchstick fence together? ('It's all their fault, isn't it?') The answer for De Charms is that our knowledge of causation is itself derived from our knowledge of motivation.

'The first "cause" that any of us know is ourselves. When we are motivated we cause things to happen.'[29] Such a viewpoint has far-reaching implications. It means that, for De Charms, motivation is primary and more fundamental than causation. Moreover, it involves one in the problems associated with the validation of subjective knowledge, of knowledge derived from private experience. In the last resort all scientists have to interpret their experiments through the medium of their own consciousness. As such, no knowledge can be 'objective', but the difficulty lies in the systemisation of experiences, so that they can be both communicated and experienced personally by others. Not only does acceptance of this perspective pose problems for the subjective-objective knowledge distinction, it also leads one to accept the fact that one may sometimes be employing some odd notions in order to 'tie together regularities in behaviour sequences (laws) regardless of the particular content of the behaviour sequence under study'.[30] Both Rychlak and De Charms would appear to share the view of motivation that is widely accepted at the present time, namely, that present theories of personal motivation are not yet adequate to account for complex human behaviour.

In an earlier chapter, I said that there are many research reports which show that there are systematic differences in child-rearing practices employed by different groups and that much of this work has emphasised socioeconomic status (SES), or social class, as a major variable in at least two related areas of training: the internalisation of controls and the learning of achievement motivation. The language used by parents and degree of emphasis on deferred gratification would appear to be major factors here, and that these have some implications for the child's later educational experiences as currently defined is undoubted. But, as we have also seen, much of the research on causal cognitions and expectancies acquired during childhood is inevitably rooted in different disciplines and utilises different theories of motivation and causation. Focusing on differing variables as key factors may lead to the elevation of those particular variables to the central position in the investigator's scheme of things. It is perhaps useful to reiterate that 'association with' does not imply 'caused by': the all-too-easy inference that a key variable is causal can lead to far too simplistic a model of human behaviour, yet such simplistic models may indeed be those which we all employ. When empirical investigations (or everyday experience) reveal certain regularities, causal relationships are

often assumed. In everyday language this might be termed the 'no smoke without fire' rule, and it clearly is a useful rule of thumb.

An important offshoot of attribution theory is Rotter's theory of generalised expectation. It is a direct development of some of Heider's ideas and also closely related to those of De Charms. All three theorists could be classified as members of the social learning 'school' of thought. One of the fundamental tenets of social learning theory, it will be recalled, is that people vary in the view they take of themselves as *determiners* of situations, or *determined* by them. But in attributing causes behaviourists of the social learning school (and Rotter would probably best be described as founder-member) locate causes of behaviour as much in the visible contingencies of the situation as in the unconscious elements within the individual: and for those psychologists the reinforcement value (RV) of the situation is vital.

Social learning theory itself makes the following assumptions:

> First, that one should focus attention on both the *person and the environment*. This doesn't just mean the whole context of personal experience; it means trying to observe and ascertain how each person deals selectively with his experience. Secondly, it is a theory concerned with *learned social behaviour*. It is not so concerned with notions of instinctual drive. Thirdly, that people make something of their *experiences* which *form a unity*. As Phares says, 'The common thread is their personality with all its stable aspects. New experiences become tinged by the effects of accumulated knowledge from previous experiences'.[31] Fourthly, that social learning theory is not solely concerned with broad general traits or with specific details. It *utilises* both the *general and specific features* of a human behaviour and seeks to represent human behaviour as a mix of both the situationally specific and the dispositional. Fifthly, that human *behaviour is motivated*, and that the motivation and its effect can be ascertained by the subsequent direction of behaviour. Sixthly, that expectancy or anticipation becomes of prime importance, in that people *learn to expect* that this or that behaviour will lead to certain goals. In other words, that cumulative cognition and affective experience will play a vital part in motivation and success and failure.

As already stated, notions of expectancies based on experiences and their (perhaps highly idiosyncratic) interpretation are central to social learning and attributional perspectives of behaviour; and these perspectives can be highly useful in consideration of the socialisation of children in home or school. Much work in this field, the ascription of causality, has stemmed from the viewpoint first put forward by Rotter and later refined by him and his colleagues.[32] In the original work Rotter expounded four basic concepts as being of use in the measurement and

prediction of behaviour. These were behaviour potential (*BP*), expectancy (*E*), reinforced value (*RV*) and what Rotter termed the 'psychological situation'. Rotter expresses these as a formula $BP = f(E \text{ and } RV)$, but it should be noted that he expressly avoids precise statement as to the *mathematical* relationship of these constructs. Of these, it is expectancy in particular which has been the focus of much US research.

Clearly, individuals do differ in their susceptibility to various influences. They also experience different influences, and the study of these two aspects forms the major concern of students of socialisation processes. Bandura and Walters have indicated that social models are of prime importance in the reinforcement process – and that major modes of behaviour are acquired through punishment and reward. The elicitation and strengthening of desired behaviour depends upon positive reinforcement: the suppressive effect of punishment is only being of value if presented in the context of supportive positive reward of desired behaviour.[33] In Rotter's social learning theory, too, the major modes of behaviour are acquired through the socialisation process and are 'inextricably fused with needs requiring for their satisfaction the mediation of other persons'.[34] In the footnote to this comment Rotter acknowledges a primary debt to Adler, Lewin and Kantor, but suggests that all the separate principles which have influenced him may be discerned in most contemporary writings on personality and that some, indeed, go back to antiquity. It has been frequently noted that Rotter's concepts of locus of control and of the development of associated attitudes are not dissimilar to those of Heider on the situational analysis of causal attribution and the consequences of internal versus external attributions. Other writers have noted the close relationship between the views of Rotter and those of Tolman, Atkinson and McClelland on expectancy and reward.[35]

The concept of reinforcement is clearly in the behaviourist tradition, though Rotter does use it rather loosely. He uses terms like 'strong belief in his own destiny', belief in self, and so on.[36] Nevertheless, there is an accumulation of empirical work which gives clear evidence in support of the overall hypothesis of Rotter's that an individual who believes he controls his own destiny is likely to be

(1) more aware of environmental cues which provide him with information for his own use;
(2) concerned to improve his environmental circumstances;
(3) more concerned with his own ability (especially his failures) and placing high value on skill and reinforcement of achievement;
(4) more resistant to attempts to influence him.[37]

In the same paper Rotter states the notion of generalised expectation

thus: there is a causal relationship with events that is based on the perceived source of reinforcement. If the reinforcement is perceived as not contingent upon the behaviour, it has little effect in determining future outcome expectancies. But if the reinforcement is seen as internally caused, then it will be highly relevant in determining future expectancies. This aspect of social learning, therefore, attempts to explain a person's reinforcement 'history' and posits that consistent cognitions accumulate which locate the reinforcement internally or externally in that person's scheme of things. However, as one might think, the expectancy variable comprises *two* independent determinants: one is that specific expectancy (E^1) which derives from the reinforcement history of the particular response in a particular stimulus situation; the other is a generalisation of expectancies (GE) accruing from other related behaviour-reinforcement situations, that is, $E = f(E^1 \text{ and } GE)$. The term 'locus of control' refers therefore to the extent to which persons see events in general as being consequent on their own actions and thus to some extent controllable (hence *internal control*), or to the extent that those persons perceive the events as unrelated to their own behaviour and therefore beyond personal control.

The bulk of empirical work has been concerned with the investigation of individual differences and the development of a number of scales for measuring differences in attitudes of internal-external control. Since about the mid-1960s, the term 'locus of control', in respect of internal-external attributions, seems to have passed into personality research as an acceptable and recognisable entity with relatively little criticism. (Though it tends to have been much more popular in the USA than in England.) Sociologists, social psychologists and psychologists have made a great deal of use of it.[38] Indeed, it would be fair to say that, like 'the achievement motive' it has been responsible for an avalanche of investigations in the USA and Europe, but strangely very few in England.

Initially, Phares and James developed a Likert-type scale with separate items for the display of internal and external attitudes.[39] But later Rotter *et al.* evolved a series of forced choice items (yes or no) and eventually a twenty-nine item scale, with six filler items employed. The original scale was not suitable for children, but during the early 1960s Crandall, Katkovsky and Preston developed an Intellectual Achievement Responsibility (IAR) scale which measured self-responsibility in achievement situations.[40] The attribution of responsibility was considered a school-achievement specific measure of internality. This has been much used but with different measures of success.[41] Larsen has developed a scale for measuring locus of control in an unstructured play situation using Peanut-style cartoons.[42] But probably the most successful scale for children has been that published by Nowicki and Strickland in 1973.[43] This appears reliable and valid and has now been

used in a very large variety of confirming situations. There are many other scales in this highly complex field of attribution and social learning. Probably the most readable and comprehensive views of this area – especially as it relates to personality – are those of Phares and of Lefcourt.[44] These also include copies of the most well-known scales and instructions on how to use them. A typical scale, designed for school use in England with children aged about 8–11 years is included at the end of this book (Appendix B). This is the Children's Attribution of Responsibility and Locus of Control Scale (CARALOC). It is an amalgam of items refined from an Englishish nation cohort study carried out in 1980.[45]

In major reviews of the topic carried out in 1972 and 1976, Lefcourt stressed that, as with many other personality variables, the use of locus of control as a *single predictor* of behaviour was unwise, since it was but one element of a total behavioural prediction formula which must also include situational and immediate reinforcement factors.[46] But overall Rotter's hypothesised relationship between internal control and behaviour has been well documented over the past twenty years, and many researchers have obtained data which are moderately supportive of such a positive relationship, though with some conflict of evidence as regards sex differences. Weiner suggests that in general the *I-E* scales have had much more success in prediction of behaviour related to action in the environment in order to improve one's life, than in prediction of behaviour in controlled laboratory situations. In the fields of ethnic group, social action and *I-E* control there have been many studies following that of Battle and Rotter[47] which suggest that blacks in the USA are especially external in locus of control, though some authors report a distinction between *I-E* measures and 'system versus individual blame' ones and say that these are independent factors.[48] Aronfreed's work, however, would appear to support the hypothesis that high status within a social structure provides greater reinforcement for internal control. This was evidenced by his finding that middle-class children and boys in general showed significantly more internality than working-class children or girls in general.[49]

One of the most common of research findings in their field is that there is an inverse relationship between motivations for achievement and external control; and Rotter has also reported a significant relationship between external control and measures of authoritarianism. It has been frequently utilised in operational definitions of human motivation and behaviour and has come to be accepted as signifying some important and fairly stable dimension of personality. But, as Lefcourt has said, the determinants (familiar antecedents) of an internal and external control orientation remain largely unexplained, unless one is willing to extrapolate to a greater degree than the data and content of experiments would allow.

Internal control, then, represents the attribution of causality to internal forces. External control represents the attribution of causality to forces outside of the self. Consistent with the work of Rotter is the notion that such attributions will themselves vary from time to time not only in respect of varied situations and circumstances, but also in terms of the individual himself. Locus of control has thus been conceived as a variable of personality at least as stable as other variables currently delineated in tests of anxiety, motivation, introversion, extroversion, and so on. The concept has what Phares calls 'intuitive appeal'. Moreover, it fits into a stream of social learning and attribution theory which helps us to see the world as people really see it. As Eiser says, 'one must start by looking at the "lay conceptions of personality" held by the perceiver, rather than searching in the personality of the perceived for stable dispositions corresponding to every separate verbal tag attached to him'.[50] In the last section of this chapter we shall see what some of this may mean in terms of schooling.

SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR SCHOOLING

It appears to be widely accepted that confirmation of one's value as an individual enhances feelings of self-esteem and confidence and that these feelings are critical to the learning process. As the Plowden Report put it: 'Confidence in the power to learn is vital.'[51] But, as Barth points out, the argument can be a circular one, for 'If a child is capable of making important choices affecting his own learning, he has a strong self-concept; if he has a strong self-concept, he will be able to make responsible choices'.[52] What, then, are some of the principal findings relevant to schooling from research in those areas touched upon here and at the beginning of this chapter? In summary form they are as follows:

(1) that a wealth of research has clearly established some relationship between low self-esteem and low school achievement;
(2) that a considerable body of research also points to a relationship between high self-esteem and high achievement;
(3) that some research points to a connection between low self-esteem and what one might term 'excessive' anxiety;
(4) that some research demonstrates a significant relationship between positive self-esteem in children and the degree to which teachers are calm, supportive and facilitative;
(5) that some research suggests that confidence in the child, as expressed by the teacher, can significantly influence the child's learning;
(6) that some research shows a relationship between negative pupil self-concept and threatening or sarcastic teacher behaviour.

The six main points listed here repeatedly emerge in various forms from the research cited at the end of this chapter. (Without citing more than a mere handful of more important writings, I have tried to show the strength of findings by the judicious use of words like 'clearly' or 'some'.) There are, however, a number of subsidiary issues somewhat less generalisable, perhaps more contentious, and more clearly the result of one writer or of one or two pieces of research. For instance, does low self-esteem block or hinder communication? Jourard said one has to feel free enough to talk truthfully, if communication is to be really effective and that self-revelation is a symptom of a healthy personality.[53] Put differently by Powell, 'I must be able to tell you who I am before I can act truly, that is, in accordance with my true self'.[54] If one refers back to Skilbeck's comment quoted at the beginning of this book (in the Introduction), you will see that he held the curriculum to be essentially a *communication system.* Jourard and Powell (and several others, notably Carkhuff [55]) regard an adequate self-concept as basic to relaxed and facilitative communication. Cautious, ritualised, nervous communication is, in short, unlikely to be the route for effective learning. Another subsidiary, but related, aspect is that concerning *humiliation.* Children clearly resent being exposed, humiliated before other children, since their own self-esteem can be badly shaken in the process. They will go to considerable lengths to avoid such situations, playing docile, stupid, or attentive as the case may be. The works of Holt[56] and of Nash[57] show just how aware children are of their evaluation in the eyes of others; and also that, often, they will be able to rank relative merits of other children as accurately as any teacher. Furthermore, having received the attribution of position, 'personality', or character traits from a teacher, the child will very often strive to confirm or 'fit' that attribution so as not to disturb the evaluation by others *or* self.

Staines regarded the self as 'pro-active'. By this he meant that it has a cumulative or 'knock-on' effect, helping or hindering learning both in terms of the ordinary cognitive and effective involvement in school subjects, and in terms of further learning about the self.[58] He suggested (rather obviously) that the most effective motives for learning were those 'leading to enhancement of the self-image in some way'. But Purkey has said that schools often damage self-esteem; they are sometimes enemies, 'distributing failure and defeat to the very children who need to experience success the most'.[59] Certainly, there are a wealth of studies reported in Purkey, Yamamoto and Thomas which rather depressingly suggest that the image of schools held by pupils becomes less positive with time and that, as the children grow older, schools communicate an increasing sense of personal inadequacy to many of their pupils.[60] Wragg has said that approximately one in seven children leaves school at 16 years (in 1980) with a sense of failure and with social

and academic skills inadequate to the needs of a technological society.[61] Black in 1974 found that retarded readers tended to display negative or low self-esteem in comparison with a group of normal achieving children, and Lawrence has consistently maintained and demonstrated that the value of counselling (directed towards improving the child's self-concept) is an important link in improving children's school performance.[62] Pritchard in his 'speculative analysis' (1978), based on a small-scale review and primary-school case studies, concluded: 'The child must be valued intrinsically, for himself, and where this feature is a natural characteristic of the child's environment the rest seems to follow automatically . . . [if] self-esteem is positive, he achieves and, in the best sense of the words, is prepared for life.'[63] In a recent study of aggression in schools Olweus found that the 'whipping boys (victims) stand out as generally more anxious, insecure and nervous than other boys'[64] and Paranjpe, using an Eriksonian case-study approach to identity, notes that to think oneself socially valued becomes an increasingly important feature of the adolescent personality.[65] All the evidence points to the fact that self-regard (or self-esteem) relates very clearly to the degree of regard by others, that rejection lowers self-esteem.[66] This is particularly so at adolescence, when 'significance' appears to be a dominant adolescent theme in a variety of guises. The adolescent perceives that making some sort of significant contribution, in whatever avenue, from punk rock to sixth-form physics, is a vital factor in the process of self-definition. 'As the ability to make significant contributions increases, so also does self-esteem; conversely, when significant contribution declines, so also does self-esteem.'[67] Thus, the evidence suggests that adolescent self-esteem is particularly dependent upon peer approval, companionship and the chances to demonstrate some sort of 'worthwhileness'. The teacher cannot be ignored in this, either. Despite the less adult-oriented nature of post-pubertal development, the teacher is still a powerful rewarder of self-esteem; and at all stages of child development the teacher is a highly significant adult whose opinions can do so much for (or against) confidence in the child.[68] Denzin has said, 'Depending on where students stand with respect to the school's dominant moral order, they will find their self-conceptions complemented or derogated and sometimes both'.[69] The biggest thing that schools do – all the time – and for those 15,000 hours of school life, is to *communicate social judgement* to children. Children are weighed, evaluated, compared, praised, ridiculed and ignored. Small wonder that one's self-esteem is bound to be a critical factor in education! It appears that children with confidence and with a reasonably high level of self-esteem are more likely to form good relationships with the teacher (especially if those teachers are part of the 'behavioural component' by which self-esteem is measured), and a good teacher–pupil relationship tends towards a more secure learning

position, an adoption of teacher values and perspectives in part – and hence more effective learning.[70]

All this leads one to ask, as Lawrence did,[71] whether raising the self-esteem of pupils would have a significant effect on their school achievement. What evidence there is suggests that this would indeed be so, though by itself it is no substitute for effective teaching.[72] Lawrence says that though counselling is not likely to help children who lack basic skills, or who suffer from specific physiological defects, it does seem likely that many of the causes of low attainment may be associated with low self-esteem. If counselling can improve the self-concept, then improvement in general school work is likely to result. Canfield and Wells have emphasised the value of a classroom atmosphere which enhances the self-concept, saying that such an environment must be free from suspicion, hostility and anxiety. They provide exercises designed for teachers in order to help them improve the classroom atmosphere and to enhance children's self-concepts.[73] More recently Hemming writing on the search for self in education said, 'ensure the growth of confidence and self-value in every child'.[74] And Wilson says that a sense of personal power and autonomy leads to effectiveness in the classroom, and that this is clearly associated with self-esteem.[75] There seems therefore no good reason to disregard the messages of Yamamoto and many others, that the overriding task of a teacher is to see that respect for and acceptance of the self by each child is one of the main avenues to a loving and worthwhile life.[76]

Maslow said, 'Satisfaction of the self-esteem needs, leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength, capability, and adequacy, of being useful and necessary in the world'.[77] As we have seen earlier, Coopersmith (and many others) regard self-esteem as functionally dependent upon the appraisal of others, the external dimension, and upon subjective assessment and experience. But it has been said that, during adolescence, possibly more than at any other time in life, the external dimension seems of critical importance. It may be that this is a relatively recent development in Western society, for Bronfenbrenner indicated that a special form of age segregation is developing in which we markedly stratify and separate parents from adolescents and children such that a companionship 'vacuum' arises which is then filled by the peer group.[78] One of the strange facets of our present society is the way that we have so often excluded young people from an active 'stake' in the means of production and regeneration. It may be inevitable, given the nature of technological society, of the lengthy processes of institutionalised education, but it cannot be denied that in past ages adults and young people *worked* together. I think Mitchell is probably correct when he says that the problems of youth do not lie simply in lack of security or profound maladjustment; rather they lie in this exclusion from productivity, involvement in the real work of society.[79] And even

at school adolescents see confusion. Schools apparently subscribe to the Protestant Ethic. But much that the adolescent does is recognised as ritualistic time-filling. It does not compete with peer-group pressures or the enticements of the mass-media. Even if it did, many adolescents realise that not only do they have no useful place in schools, they (may well) have no useful place in society at large. Under such circumstances, educationists and psychologists may prattle about self-esteem and personality growth with no effect. The society is structured to exclude adolescents and to increase their chances of conflict and confusion, rather than reduce them.

Educationists seeking the implication of research on locus of control would be likely to note first two important aspects: the relationship between measures of internality and school achievement, and the relationship between measures of internality and social class. On close examination they would see that the findings in these respects are somewhat ambiguous. In the first case there does seem some consistency in findings which relate boys' achievement to measures of locus of control. In the case of girls such findings are less clear, particularly after puberty. This might lead one to ask whether the sexes receive different feedback from the culture in such a way as to make the association between locus of control measures and those of achievement entirely haphazard in the case of girls. Yet one might assert that, if anything, girls receive a more positive and certainly more uniform feedback in the primary stages of education than do boys. Such a view would find some substantiation in the work of Crandall[80] and, more recently, in that of Brandis and Bernstein. The latter say that 'the infant school environment favours girls . . . [and] the sex of the child in the middle class area is as important as measured ability in its effect upon the overall teachers' rating'.[81] All the evidence points to schoolgirls' achievement being more related to a desire for approval and affection than is boys' achievement.[82] This is not to suggest that locus of control is simply a measure of achievement motivation, but it is a construct associating beliefs with cognitions of the consequences of one's own past behaviour and may, thus, be expected to play a considerable part in achievement motivation. Of course, the goal of early achievement may be somewhat differently defined for each sex, and it is a fundamental tenet of social learning theory that behaviours become functionally associated with various goal definitions through the processes of learning and socialisation. From his review of this field, Lesser[83] suggested that girls do tend to seek affiliative outcomes more than boys. In primary-school situations such affiliative outcomes are usually possible at any level of performance. But girls appear to see high achievement as less appropriate during adolescence and early adulthood. It may be that security in the goals of closeness to teacher and/or friends is for girls of more overriding importance than immediate success or apparent

academic competence. In fact, if such is the case, then fear of *academic* failure becomes considerably lessened and its consequences only important if it disturbs the tenor of those affiliative strivings or of social success. At the same time, however, it would seem logically consistent to see affiliation to some extent delimiting the area of internal control and permitting greater attention to external sources of direction. If this were the case, one might expect girls to show greater externality on measures of locus of control than boys. But findings have not been uniform here, either. There is a suggestion that girls are somewhat less emotionally independent than boys and that parents might not stress the need for school achievement in girls in quite the same way. The meagre research on pre-school girls does, according to Lesser, point to a similar conclusion: that girls are socialised towards greater dependency in a context of less concern for or emphasis upon school achievement. Within the elementary/primary-school context there is ample evidence to suggest that the differentiation of sex roles is stereotyped in its presentation,[84] that both in England and the USA one may see reading primers portraying adventurous and striving roles for boys and domestic, nurturant and more obviously affiliative roles for girls. It may be unwise to overestimate the importance of all this, especially in relation to the dominant patterns of behaviour already learned in the home, but analysis of sex-role stereotyping would seem to leave some considerable room for justifiable female disquiet.

Mead argued that, in American society, success for the female depended upon affiliative goals rather than competence in career, and she has shown that one might reasonably view the socialisation of each sex as very differently oriented voyages of enculturation. Even within the same culture sex-role learning entails fundamental differences in perspective.[85] Hoffman, in her review of research findings in child development in respect of female achievement motives, said that affective relationships were of paramount importance in females and that 'much of their achievement behaviour is motivated by a desire to please'.[86] She cites a number of school studies, including that of Crandall, to support the viewpoint that boys' achievement motivation (measured by a variety of different means) is positively related to actual school achievement, whereas among girls there appears little or no relationship. Such a perspective fits that of Sears,[87] who found that among girls affiliative motives – not achievement motives – were related to school achievement. Hoffman's thesis is that generally the girl receives inadequate parental encouragement in her early strivings for independence and that there is some delay in the separation of the self from the mother because, being of the same sex, mother and child identify with each other in terms of sex-role expectations. Such a viewpoint is by no means new. Rutter has reviewed much of the substantive work on sex-role differentiation, all of which points to

similar conclusions about the development of sex differences in self-concept and attitudes.[88] Hoffman regarded her thesis as speculative, but one linking a large number of variables in a way which seemed consistent with empirical findings. She noted also that formal education itself tends to reward uniformity and that girls tended to cluster closer to the mean of intellectual performance than boys.

During the last decade or so many feminists have turned their attention to the models of behaviour offered in children's books. 'Out of the 1,000 books read, the group found only 200 which they felt offered the readers a positive image of woman's "physical, emotional and intellectual potential".[89] The feminist viewpoint was perhaps most forcefully highlighted in Horner's now-classic study of university students in the USA. She stated that her studies led her to believe that young women equated intellectual achievement with some subtle loss of femininity, and her original thesis illustrated a problem which has since been consistently examined by many sociologists. That the socialisation of the sexes is sometimes so stereotyped as to discourage strong motivation to intellectual achievement on the part of girls is now a familiar enough theme in the literature. But Acker has pointed out,

> Levine and Crumrine have questioned whether a motive to avoid success even exists, and have criticised Horner's methodology. Their more careful experiment on a larger sample failed to substantiate the thesis ... Other replications of Horner's work have had conflicting results.[90]

A further implication which must be considered in the context of sex differences is that of the staffing of elementary schools in the USA and primary schools in England. It is still true that most teachers in these schools are women (about 80 per cent of the teaching force, as opposed to principals, in the USA; and about 70 per cent including head teachers, in the UK). Such a situation would clearly make for similarity in modes of socialisation between the home, where mother is still *mainly* responsible for early role-learning,[91] and the primary school. (Though, as has been said earlier, this is clearly complicated by the differing subcultural value systems.)

In a relatively recent English study of locus of control girls and boys of primary-school age did not show marked differences in their scores on that measure. But only in the case of boys were the locus of control expectations clearly associated with achievement.[92] Lesser, reviewing the findings on achievement motivation in women generally, is able to indicate a 'fragmentary' yet reasonably consistent picture for girls from pre-school to secondary-school. Though he warns that one should not think of achievement motivation as some simple unitary variable,[93] he goes on to emphasise that strong achievement motivation in girls does appear to have broadly similar socialisation antecedents throughout the

age ranges. These antecedents are best thought of in terms of a background of stricter than usual child-rearing. His conclusions were that, while data are scarce, there are certain indications that girls with strong achievement motivation have had somewhat unusually structured (and possibly authoritarian) early socialisation, that differences between achievement motivation in men and women are somehow characterised in social role-learning and that there is obvious conflict between presumed female goals and intellectual achievement.

Very many studies of locus of control and achievement report on apparent association between SES (or social class) and locus of control. It is said that middle-class children seem to be able to make the most of goal definition and to be able to function reasonably well, but that lower- or 'working-class' children are often unable to see the point of long-term goal definition and the possibility of future rewards.[94] Neither Crandall (in 1965), nor Gammage (in 1974), found any relationship between SES and locus of control, however. Crandall and her colleagues explained this in terms of the specificity of her measure (intellectual achievement responsibility, IAR) and maintained that any school attempting to do a good job would encourage 'internal' attitudes regardless of social-class factors.[95] In the light of comments by Barth and by Boydell on the sort of assumptions underlying much early-childhood education, such an interpretation would seem plausible.[96] But there are puzzling anomalies. If most studies report a connection between externality and low social-class origin, and if teachers do encourage independence, self-control and self-initiation (often claimed in primary schools, especially), then one might expect to see a very strong relationship between measures of locus of control and achievement. Indeed, if such schools do put a premium on independence and dimensions of internality, then possibly such schools would be more likely to penalise children from low social-class origins than would have been the case in more formal classrooms in the past. Furthermore, one might expect some considerable alienation from school on the part of externally oriented boys, who could not, presumably, rely upon affiliative compensations, as might externally oriented girls. In this respect it is significant that, in some work reported, low-achieving boys *are* significantly more external in their orientation.[97] This fits rather nicely with Brandis's and Bernstein's findings that girls from low social-class origins were likely to attract significantly higher teacher ratings than were boys of similar status.[98]

This last point is likely to be of considerable concern to teachers, particularly if taken in conjunction with the earlier comment on sex differences in the relationship between locus of control and achievement. Any movement throughout education towards more 'open' system of classroom organisation, while not materially affecting girls' performance before puberty, *might* critically affect the

performance of certain groups of boys. Such comment is, of course, highly speculative and there would in any event be many other variables to be considered. But it is in line with the comments of Good, Biddle and Brophy on teacher effectiveness[99] and it is a sobering thought, since presumably no one would wish to see general acceptance of an educational practice which actually increased the appreciable disadvantages by which children from low SES sources are already handicapped.

Though it may be unwise to generalise, the atmosphere of the modern primary school in England could often be described as 'affective', and as such may well favour the girls more than the boys. There has been little research into this in England, though Pollack (in 1968) reported the results of a small survey in the USA which suggested that teachers in the elementary grades preferred working with girls, and more recently there has been a spate of work in the USA showing girls to be more 'co-operative', 'deferent', etc.[100] There is some evidence in England to show that girls are seen as more attentive and more co-operative than boys, and Banks reported, not perhaps surprisingly, that teachers prefer children who are co-operative and therefore easier to teach. Such findings lend strength to the view that, at least throughout the early stages of education, girls are (with *perhaps* a less obviously strong achievement motivation) the preferred pupils. This does not easily square with the recent research on primary classrooms however, in which teachers seemed to devote roughly the same proportions of attention to both sexes.[101]

In any discussion concerned with aspects of socialisation and formal education, it is important to appreciate that one is dealing with a changing and dynamic situation. While it may be true that the home plays a large and very important part in the process of socialisation, it is equally clear that the internalisation of attitudes and values is not static, but is an ongoing process throughout schooling. The sources of learning about oneself and the bases of the beliefs one holds (in terms of internal/external control of reinforcement) are the consequences of feedback from the environment and of the reinforcement value of specific situations. This feedback is itself a highly important process in education. dependent upon many complex conditions: it may well, of course, change from situation to situation and from teacher to teacher. Primary education, because of its very nature, with its emphasis on affectivity would, one might confidently expect, result in more immediate and more intimate feedback than would secondary schooling.

The psychological theory underlying concepts of internal/external control should be considered not only as an offshoot of social learning theory, but also as an interactional theory, which may offer social scientists a useful perspective for investigating and monitoring

important changes in the individual as he adopts his cognitive structures and beliefs to changing situations. Most studies of intellectual achievement point to the significance of teachers' values and judgements in the whole process as well as the child's. The values of the teachers as well as those of parents must, therefore, be seen as significant elements in the cumulative cognitions of children. The problem, when considering school achievement, lies in the enmeshing of psychological and sociological components in such a way that the value orientations of the cultural components cannot easily be disentangled from the internal mechanisms which are operating. Moreover, the influence of cultural factors upon individuals is not necessarily direct or clearly observable and the indirect and accidental factors within the individual's life history also affect the feedback situations.

It would seem safe to say that locus of control is quite clearly related to the self-concept of the individual. However, there are dangers in seeing locus of control as a generalised 'trait' functioning across all situations. An individual may not only vary in his perceptions of locus of control from one time to another, but may encounter varieties of situations in which cumulative cognitions associated with those situations are markedly different. Certainly, one should not necessarily assume the causal direction of any relationship between internality and school achievement. Most studies have been correlational in nature and an alternative view that successful school performance causes high internal attributions is at least as tenable as the general assumption that the causal direction is internality-high achievement. It seems very likely that there are clear, but complex, associations between internality and certain measures of independence, aspiration and achievement;[102] it seems equally likely that, in line with social learning theory generally, the construct relies upon expectations following certain behaviours. The interactive elements in such a theory are quite explicit and the grouping of constructs like dominance, independence and need for affection depend considerably upon the situation *and* the set of empirically determined antecedents involved. As such, locus of control should be regarded as relatively specific, and measures obtained in one circumstance not automatically assumed to predict behaviour in another. After a series of unfortunate events, the individual's externality may increase. After a series of fortunate events, though dependent on perceived contingency, it may decrease. In all, evidence on locus of control is fairly clear:

(1) There is a positive relationship between high internality and high self-esteem.
(2) High correlations are reported between internality and achievement, and some researchers (most notably Nowicki and his associates[103]) claim that the relationship between internal locus of

control and achievement is stronger for boys than for girls. Stipeck and Weisz in a recent review of the field suggest that such findings may be an artefact of the scales employed.[104] Nevertheless, the implications in respect of sex-role learning are interesting, and closer study and interpretation of the findings in general particularly pressing, especially in the light of changing beliefs on classroom organisation.

(3) Measures of intelligence do not seem clearly related to locus of control measures, but there are problems, particularly with wording of tests, the levels of logical facility required and the reading levels of the tests employed.
(4) Anxiety seems clearly associated with externality.
(5) High aspirations seem clearly associated with internality and low aspirations with externality.
(6) Perception of even generalised locus of control does itself seem a significant predictor of academic achievement.

The general conclusion must be that, without adequate feelings of control and belief in himself, the intelligent child may be no match for the less intelligent who does possess such beliefs. The concept of goal, too, becomes all important. What girls construe as desirable may, in the initial stages of education, help them to succeed as well as and often better than boys. But as institutionalised education progresses and social learning accumulates, other factors begin to militate against girls such that locus of control may be an inappropriate measure to employ when exploring dimensions of personal dynamics and of achievement-related beliefs. However, children with different locus of control scores do appear to differ in self-esteem and in the ability to organise and control their own work-schedules. Locus of control tells one something of the person's perceptions of his ability to affect his environment and gain power over it. There are undoubtedly important sex, age, class and ethnic differences to disentangle, but as a feature in school performance locus of control should not be overlooked by teachers.[105] The perceptions that a human being has of himself or herself are crucial factors in all learning, and the education of children is hard work. But, as Yamamoto says, 'Much of this work concerns itself with the knowledgeable and systematic planning of conditions and behaviours which will lead the child to develop his potential fully'.[106] Put differently: 'evidence suggests that it is possible . . . to modify maladaptive attributions which may, in turn, subsequently affect achievement behaviour and improve academic achievement. This task rests, to a large extent, on teachers who can often substantially influence the attributional patterns of their pupils.'[107]

NOTES AND REFERENCES: CHAPTER 7

1 Gordon, C., and Gergen, K. J., *The Self in Social Interaction*, Vol. 1 (New York: Wiley, 1968), p. 33.
2 Erikson, E. H., *Childhood and Society* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965).
3 Erikson uses the term 'epigenetic' to show that the stages arise from gradual diversification and differentiation of human experience and associated tasks, each stage itself giving rise to greater complexity of life and its challenges.
4 Allport, G. W., *Pattern and Growth in Personality* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), p. 28. This is not peculiar to studies of self and personality. Concern over the relationship between structure and process, and the constant debate over structuralist versus process-oriented perspectives are central features of the abstractions and constructs employed by social scientists and major causes for argument over the validity of the representative picture of human life thus depicted.
5 Coopersmith, S., *The Antecedents of Self-Esteem* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1967), pp. 4–5.
6 ibid., pp. 5–6.
7 Erikson, op. cit.; but see also Erikson, E. H., *Identity, Youth and Crisis* (London: Faber, 1968).
8 Coopersmith, op. cit., p. 48.
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105 Appendix B contains an example of a measure of locus of control devised for children aged 9–10. This is the Children's Attribution of Responsibility and Locus of Control scale (CARALOC). It is an amalgam of material from British and American sources, and thus highly derivative. It has been used by the national Child Health and Education Study, which is following the progress of some 16,000 children in England, Wales and Scotland, born 5–11 April 1980. The research project under the auspices of the University of Bristol and the National Birthday Trust, is based at the Department of Child Health, University of Bristol; but see n. 104, above, for comprehensive details of existing tests.

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SUGGESTED READING: CHAPTER 7

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Appendix A: A Rough Linguistic/Cognitive Socialisation Chart Showing Changes in Conceptual Growth and Development

(Not to be interpreted as other than a very crude approximation in respect of Western children).


AGE
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16
Styles of child-rearing are paramount and social value/class factors inextricably involved
Talking, naming, synpraxis
Assimilation and accommodation
Changes in pitch and in comfort sounds; babbling – certain sounds imitated, and reinforcement and reward takes place – emergence of *naming* and rough categorisation
Language as control, repression, processes of analogous reasoning (transductive in Piaget's terms)
Cross-cultural studies suggest children's language development follows similar patterns. Chomsky, Lenneberg, *et al.* say innate 'deep structure' elements of similarity are revealed
(It is said that 'middle-class' mothers favour abstract definitions and explicit instructions, information-giving strategies in answer to children's questions, that they emphasise language in terms of feelings and moral principles . . . possibly more consistent and predictable)
Schooling, groups, secondary socialisation processes
Refinement of categorisation, of concept-building and an extension of *transductive/intuitive* thinking, a gradual build up and elaboration of mental operations and of reversability, though still a tendency to handle only one viewpoint at a time. Increasing awareness of others and socialisation and language begins to reflect significant others to a much greater extent. Many attitudes and orientations appear to harden. Language of family now intermeshed and at times submerged in language of peers, of own sex group
Growth and extension of *hypothetico-deductive* reasoning. Language of peers becoming paramount. Ability to operate within different linguistic communities. Dominant concerns reflected: fashion; self in relation to others; possible rejection of authority; emergence of autonomy. Language of hobbies and specialisms, jargon, 'closed' communities
ADULTHOOD
So-called 'restricted' – 'elaborated' continuum might mean
800–1,000+ vocabulary (syntax weak?)
3,000+ vocabulary (syntax sophisticated?)
N.B.: Primacy of import of a child's interchange with his linguistic community at every stage of his cognitive development

It should be apparent that the linguistic socialisation of the middle-class child is critically relevant to his ability to profit from the educational experience as this is *currently* defined. There is little discontinuity between the symbolic orders of the school and those to which he has been socialised through his family, whereas for the working-class child, there is a hiatus between the symbolic orders of the school and those of his family. He is less orientated towards the meta-languages of control and innovation and the pattern of social relationships through which they are transmitted. The genesis of educational failure, according to our findings, may well be found in the patterns of communication and control which are realisations and thus transmitters of specific sub-cultures.

(D. Henderson, 'Cognitive socialization', *Sociology*, vol. 4, no. 3, 1970, p. 337)

No mysterious underlying cognitive structures or 'language acquisition devices' need be called on to explain this process. The child as an organism is capable of responding to and manipulating symbols and its body. The child becomes an organism that engages not only in minded behavior but also in self-reflexive behavior. The origins of this process are lodged in the social order that he is born into and not in physiological structures, innate needs and drives, or in age-specific developmental phases. Most importantly, that social order is presented and 'represented' to him through the symbolic gestures and utterances of the significant other.

(N. K. Denzin, *Childhood Socialization*, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1977, p. 91)

Two widely held generalizations about individual differences in language are not as well supported as supposed: the superiority of females over males, which is difficult to demonstrate in the pre-school and elementary school years, and the poor performance of children from poverty environments, which appears to be limited to vocabulary, as opposed to syntactic, development. There is a small amount of evidence for the claim that identical twins are more similar in language development than same-sex fraternal twins, supporting the view of language development as, in part, a genetically controlled maturational process.

(P. S. Dale, *Language Development*, 2nd edn, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976, p. 322)

Appendix B: The CARALOC Pupil Questionnaire

	Yes	No	Don't know
1 Do you feel that most of the time it's not worth trying hard because things never turn out right anyway?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
2 Do you feel that wishing can make good things happen?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
3 Are people good to you no matter how you act towards them?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
4 Do you like taking part in plays or concerts? *			
5 Do you usually feel that it's almost useless to try in school because most children are cleverer than you?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
6 Is a high mark just a matter of 'luck' for you?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
7 Are you good at spelling? *			
8 Are tests just a lot of guesswork for you?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
9 Are you often blamed for things which just aren't your fault?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
10 Are you the kind of person who believes that planning ahead makes things turn out better?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
11 Do you find it easy to get up in the morning?*			
12 When bad things happen to you, is it usually someone else's fault?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
13 When someone is very angry with you, is it impossible to make him your friend again?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
14 When nice things happen to you, is it only good luck?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
15 Do you feel sad when it's time to leave school* each day?			
16 When you get into an argument, is it usually the other person's fault?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
17 Are you surprised when your teacher says you've done well?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐

18 Do you usually get low marks, even when you study hard?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐
19 Do you like to read books?	*		
20 Do you think studying for tests is a waste of time?	0 ☐	2 ☐	1 ☐

Notes:
Cumulative rating, scored in the direction of internality.
* = filler items, no score.
See especially notes 103 and 105, Chapter 7, for sources of validated tests and data.

Appendix C: Twenty Official Rules of the Schools in the USSR

1 To acquire knowledge persistently in order to become an educated and cultured citizen and to be of the greatest possible service to his country.
2 To study diligently, to be punctual in attendance and not arrive late at classes.
3 To obey the instructions of the school director and the teachers without question.
4 To arrive at school with all the necessary textbooks and writing materials; to have everything ready for the lesson before the teacher arrives.
5 To come to school clean, well groomed and neatly dressed.
6 To keep his place in the classroom clean and tidy.
7 To enter the classroom and take his place immediately after the bell rings; to enter and leave the classroom during the lesson only with the teacher's permission.
8 To sit upright during the lesson, not leaning on his elbows and not slouching; to listen attentively to the teacher's explanations and the other pupils' answers; and not to talk or let his attention stray to other things.
9 To rise when the teacher or the director enters or leaves the room.
10 To stand at attention when answering the teacher; to sit down only with the teacher's permission; to raise his hand if he wishes to answer or ask a question.
11 To take accurate notes in his assignment book of homework scheduled for the next lesson, and to show these notes to his parents; to do all the homework unaided.
12 To be respectful to the school director and teachers; when meeting them, to greet them with a polite bow; boys should also raise their hats.
13 To be polite to his elders, to behave modestly and respectfully in school, on the street and in public places.
14 Not to use coarse expressions, not to smoke, not to gamble for money or for any other objects.
15 To protect school property; to be careful of his personal things and the belongings of his comrades.
16 To be attentive and considerate of old people, small children, the weak and sick; to give them a seat on the trolley or make way for them on the street, being helpful to them in every way.

17 To obey his parents, to help them to take care of his small brothers and sisters.
18 To maintain cleanliness and order in rooms, to keep his clothes, shoes and bed neat and tidy.
19 To carry his student's record back with him always, to guard it carefully, never handing it over to anyone else, and to present it upon request of the teachers or the school director.
20 To cherish the honour of his school and class and defend it as his own.

(Anon., but see U. Bronfenbrenner, *Two Worlds of Childhood*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974, pp. 30–1)

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The themes with which *Children and Schooling* deals were derived from discussions held between its author and teachers – both serving and still training. The book has two primary objectives: to provide a synthesis of a research-based social-psychology of education, and to bridge the gap between theory and practice in education by emphasising the relationship between research and actuality. In a humane, sensible and realistic text Dr Gammage writes about the major issues in childhood socialisation relating to schooling, achievement and the curriculum, and in so doing makes a sensitive and well-argued case for the social-psychological perspective.

He presents a social-psychologist's view of the interaction between child, school and curriculum, and summarises mainstream psychological contributions to current thinking on achievement, self-esteem and education. He covers areas of social learning and attribution theory not commonly dealt with in education texts, showing that there are major fields of research which have until now been neglected. His book will extend our understanding of what a curriculum needs to take account of if it is to be responsibly planned and defensibly implemented.

Children and Schooling is constructed so that its chapters can be used as independent study-guides to specific subjects or read in sequence, each subject inter-related. The easily assimilated, well-informed and spirited text can be treated as an introduction, particularly in view of the gradually developing complexity of its arguments and its extensive notes and comprehensive and apposite scholarly apparatus; and as a spring-board for serious study at advanced level. It will prove invaluable to in-service and B Ed students alike.

Philip Gammage is a social-psychologist and a teacher of advanced and in-service courses in education who has taught at all levels in several countries, and is at present Senior Lecturer in Education at the University of Bristol.

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